

Civilian Harm, Wartime Informing, and Counterinsurgent Operations*

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Abstract

A rich body of theory suggests that civilian support is central to the success of counterinsurgent campaigns. Yet there have been few direct tests of the claim that harm to civilians, and who harms them, influences when and with whom non-combatants collaborate. We provide three novel pieces of evidence on this score. First, we review the historical evidence from 59 asymmetric civil wars since 1970, showing that civilian cooperation was important to combatants in the majority of them. Second, drawing on newly declassified military records and large-scale survey data, we demonstrate that civilians responded to harm suffered in insurgent-initiated attacks by providing intelligence to security forces in Afghanistan. Finally, we show that these tips improved the success of subsequent counterinsurgent operations.

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What are the effects of civilian victimization in civil war? Classic theories of counterinsurgency (Galula 1964; Thompson 1966), as well as modern theories of the strategic logic of violence (Kalyvas 2006; Valentino 2014), assert that civilians condition their support of armed actors on how they are treated, an argument formalized in recent work (Berman, Shapiro, and Felter 2011). One particularly valuable component of non-combatant support is the provision of local intelligence on insurgent activity, including rebel recruitment, force movement, and planned attacks. As Kalyvas (2006, 174) observes, “[i]t is widely accepted that no insurgency can be defeated unless the incumbents give top priority to and are successful in building an intelligence organization.” Civilian abuse, therefore, can shape the course of internal conflict through its effects on civilian sharing of sensitive information.

In their review of the research agenda on theories of asymmetric conflict, Berman and Matanock (2015) note that direct evidence on civilian sharing of information is largely missing. Instead, researchers have leveraged increased access to survey and conflict microdata to test the observable implications of informational theories and have shown that: (1) self-expressed willingness to inform is linked to coethnicity with security services in surveys from Afghanistan (Lyall, Shiraito, and Imai 2015); (2) in Iraq, technological changes—which reduce the risks to informing—are associated with lower intensity of insurgent activity (Shapiro and Weidmann 2015); and (3) insurgent-initiated violence in Iraq at the district level is lower in the week following insurgent attacks that injure or kill non-combatants in that district, and higher in weeks after Iraqi or American forces did so (Condra and Shapiro 2012). The latter finding is consistent with civilians responding to harm from insurgents by withdrawing their support and sharing intelligence with security forces, but is not direct evidence. And prior work also tended to focus only on one step at a time.¹ This dearth of direct empirical

1. Shaver and Shapiro (2021), for example, provide evidence from Iraq that harm to civilians influences hotline tips, but do not evaluate the downstream impact on counterinsurgent activity. Schutte (2017) studies how harm influences one battlefield outcome (IED turn in’s), but lacks an evaluation of civilian information sharing and relies on leaked data covering a shorter time period than we do. And Lyall, Blair, and Imai (2013) study how civilians’ views of harm depend on the identity of the perpetrator.

evidence for all steps in the theory is due in no small part to the lack of available data on actual information sharing. As Lyall, Shiraito, and Imai (2015, 833) observe: “Information about insurgent groups is a central resource in civil wars: counterinsurgents seek it, insurgents safeguard it, and civilians often trade it. Despite its essential role in civil war dynamics, the act of informing is still poorly understood, due mostly to the classified nature of informant ‘tips.’”

Moreover, the observable implications of shift in violence following civilian harm are often consistent with other explanations of violent outcomes. A decline in insurgent activity following an incidental civilian casualty could also be due to active opposition to rebel control, a refusal to pay “revolutionary taxes” to fund insurgent operations, or a significant decline in recruitment (Berman, Shapiro, and Felter 2011, 811). Similarly, counterinsurgent operations that cause harm to non-combatants provide insurgents with a persuasive tool for mobilizing the civilian population against government forces. Successful insurgent attacks could thus increase following state-initiated harm, either because civilians do not share intelligence to thwart these rebel attacks, or because the insurgents simply have more fighters they can deploy or more financial resources to pay for attacks.

We provide new evidence on the importance of informing in civil war in three steps. First, we show that there is systematic historical evidence across 59 conflicts since 1970 for the relational chain posited by informational theory. Our survey of prominent historical works on all but three of the asymmetric civil wars since 1970, shows civilian cooperation is viewed as critical by historians for a clear majority.

Second, we provide a direct quantitative assessment of the strength of the relationship using newly declassified data on incident-level data on civilian intelligence sharing with the government and insurgent attacks that caused civilian casualties, between 2006 and 2014 in Afghanistan. To our knowledge this is the first paper to use such granular data on civilian information sharing. Consistent with the theory, we find that harm to civilians during

insurgent-initiated events led to increased information flow to the government and its allies. The effect on informing of a one s.d. increase in the number of insurgent-initiated civilian casualty incidents is small in standardized terms, a .03 s.d. treatment effect, but statistically robust and represents a fourfold increase from the mean number of tips, amounting to approximately one more tip every two weeks.

Third, we examine whether that increased flow directly affected counterinsurgency effectiveness, as measured through meaningful operational outcomes such as government missions to clear roadside bombs, neutralizing weapons factories, conducting safe house raids, and detaining suspected insurgents. We find that it did. Once again the impacts were modest in standardized terms—ranging from a .03 s.d. treatment effect of IED tips on roadside bombs found and cleared to a .06 s.d. treatment effect of all tips on insurgents detained—but very large in terms of changes from the mean rate of such outcomes. And we estimate that every four IED-related tips predicts one additional roadside bomb found and cleared. These effects are consistent with information being an important resource for counterinsurgents in this context.

This combination of broad historical evidence with micro-level data on the full causal chain provides the most complete evidence yet that civilian cooperation is a *central resource* in civil wars. There are many other interesting questions about how violence against civilians affects civil war dynamics (e.g., the effects of discriminate harm), which are outside the scope of this note.

In the next section, we examine the set of irregular asymmetric civil wars since 1970 to provide evidence of information theory’s relevance to understanding conflict dynamics. The third section introduces the research design and data used in the micro-level empirical study of Afghanistan. We present the core results of that analysis in the fourth section and a final section concludes.

Historical Cross-Conflict Evidence

From at least the early-1970s military officers writing on counterinsurgency have emphasized the centrality of information.² This suggests that information theory should apply to irregular asymmetric conflicts broadly, though how tightly it binds in each case will vary depending on context-specific factors.

Information theory has been formalized in various ways. Berman, Shapiro, and Felter (2011) model a three-way interaction between citizens with political preferences over who controls the territory, insurgents seeking to impose costs on the government, and a government balancing its efforts between militarized counterinsurgency and public goods provision. Khanna and Zimmerman (2017) study a similar interaction but shift the order of play and have rebels fighting over territory vs. simply seeking to cause harm. Vanden Eynde (2018) focuses on the two-way interaction between rebels and civilians but focuses on how shocks to the normal economy shape the capacity of rebels to attack government forces and their incentives to deter information sharing through violence against civilians.

All these variants implicitly or explicitly make four claims:

- information sharing by civilians shapes battlefield outcomes;
- information sharing helps the receiving party (government or insurgent);
- civilians share operationally relevant information in equilibrium; and
- civilians respond to harm by decreasing/increasing information sharing.

To assess how widespread is the evidence in support of the causal process posited by information theory, we conducted brief case studies of all but three of the conflicts since 1970 on the list of irregular asymmetric conflicts in Kalyvas and Balcells (2010), as well as

2. For example, British General Sir Frank Kitson famously argued of the campaign in Malaya that “[i]f it is accepted that the problem of defeating [an insurgent] consists largely of finding him, it is easy to recognize the paramount importance of good information” (Kitson 1971, 58).

more recent conflicts we judged to meet their criteria.³ For each case, we researched whether there was evidence for each of the four claims above by examining prominent histories, journalistic accounts, and research articles.

Out of 59 irregular asymmetric civil wars coded from 1970 through 2018, we found clear evidence that at least one side thought information sharing mattered in 45 of them (76%). For example, during the First Sudanese Civil War (1963-1972), “men were temporarily recruited in ‘friendly’ villages to pursue ‘outlaws’. In this conflict, the warring parties expanded violent control of local populations to the individual level. Their recruitment of informers, scouts and ‘home guards’ during the 1960s formed the basis for a fine-meshed intelligence network and, in the last years of the first civil war, local government authorities in the south also established a formal system of National Guards (Aras Watani) as informers and armed auxiliary troops” (Kindersley and Rolandsen 2019, 390). We see evidence of this in the Moro Insurgency in the Mindanao region of the Philippines: “Additionally, the GRP [Government of the Philippines] has supplemented its control of the region with the help of village-based civilian militias called Citizen Armed Force Geographic Units (CAFGUs) and ‘village watch’ and intelligence gathering units called ‘civilian voluntary organizations’ (CVOs)” (Chen 2015, 64). The white-minority Rhodesian government that fought against the Zimbabwe African People’s Union and the Zimbabwean African National Union in the 1970s even tried to incentivize civilian information sharing through reward and punishment: “In due course it was made a punishable offence not to report the presence of guerrillas in an area, and rewards of Rh\$5,000 or more were offered for information leading to the death or capture of guerrillas and the seizure of arms caches” (Moorcroft and McLaughlin 2008, 400).

3. We did not collect data on the conflict in Pakistan in 1973 as it is covered by sources on the conflict that Kalyvas and Balcells (2010) code as Bangladesh 1974. The civil wars in Ethiopia, Indonesia, and the Philippines in the 1970s all enter the data multiple times within a 5-year period. For each we just code the first occurrence. We did not collect data on the conflict in Guatemala, which began in 1966.

Second, we find evidence that information helps the receiving party in 33 of the cases reviewed (56%). In Colombia's civil conflict, the FARC suffered because of information passed on to the government side: "In the Middle Magdalena Valley, deserters like Berta were the corner-stone of the paramilitary strategy. Dozens of them helped the right-wing groups identify and, in some cases, kill rebel collaborators" (Dudley 2006, 57). In El Salvador's civil war, information sharing was a key resource for rebel tactical planning: "campesinos collected information about Salvadoran military patterns; a better understanding of official patterns increased the probabilities for successful guindas because it meant that campesinos could predict what was to come and respond accordingly" (Todd 2010, 62). And in Sri Lanka, "the JVP were dependent for security on the support or acquiescence of surrounding populations, and thus very vulnerable once this support was withdrawn and information began to be passed on to the security forces on a substantial scale" (Moore 1993b, 602).

Third, civilians provided operationally relevant information in 37 of the conflicts (63%). In Nigeria's conflict with Boko Haram, "The police also work with local communities, through community public relations committees, which meet intermittently to exchange information to prevent and combat crime (including terrorism)" (Akinola, Khan, and Faluyi 2019, 94). In Mali's ongoing conflict against terrorist groups, "in Timbuktu, one officer reported receiving numerous calls a day from locals wishing to provide information on enemy movements" (Shurkin, Pezard, and S. Zimmerman 2017, 72). In its conflicts with Latvia (LTSPA) and Lithuania (BDPS), the USSR relied on civilian informing. "Thus, according to Soviet data, 3,597 secret informers, agents and residents were engaged in the struggle against the national partisans in January 1947" (Komisija 2008, 290) and "In other regions, the informer network was less numerous but growing with every month; the Lithuanian police had 27,700 informers by 1951" (Statiev 2010, 235). And in the insurgency in the Dhofar region of Oman in the 1970s, "For the most part, however, the information gained by the Intelligence Corps personnel was overwhelmingly derived from human intelligence sources (HUMINT), most

notably informers and, of crucial importance, surrendered enemy personnel (SEPs)” (Jones 2011, 566).

Finally, we find evidence that civilians responded symmetrically to harm in 10 conflicts. In Nepal’s Maoist insurgency, “it appears that the Maoists obtained food largely irrespective of whether or not the populace were attitudinally supportive, but that this was not the case with information” (Khalil, 236). There is some evidence of this in Chechnya, as well. “In keeping with the code of silence, Chechens largely refused to provide internal information to the Russian military and secret services during the First Chechen War, including information on the identities of insurgents, their supporters, and relatives. In contrast to a number of other (counter)insurgencies elsewhere in the world where locals have often been eager to supply incumbents with information on the insurgents and their social networks in an attempt to obtain benefits, the Chechens stubbornly resisted dragging outsiders into what they considered to be their own internal issues. As one interviewee observed, ‘on many occasions, the Russian officers approached us offering various things... Money, cattle, security [...] in exchange for information about the fighters. Naturally, we refused, because it’s not a Chechen habit to rat on your people’” (Souleimanov and Aliyev 2015b, 30-31). And in Thailand’s southern insurgency, “More informants in Muslim areas were reported to have been available because local people were growing weary of the violence and intimidation exercised by insurgent groups” (Askew 2008, 195). Most cases included evidence that both negative and positive inducements were offered to motivate information sharing in many more cases (e.g. threats, jobs, public goods provision, etc.). For a full list of conflicts considered see Supporting Information (SI) table SI-17, which includes coding and exemplary quotes for each question.⁴

This cross-conflict analysis suggests that the informational theory applies across a broad

4. The table includes all asymmetric civil wars since 1944, but we only report results for the post-1970 cases because the earlier cases were collected with a different source inclusion criteria.

set of cases. To more precisely assess how civilian abuse affects information flow to armed actors and how information affects counterinsurgent effectiveness, we turn next to a micro-level and systematic analysis of these dynamics in Afghanistan.

Afghanistan Empirical Design

This section reviews the military records used to track civilian abuse and wartime informing and introduces our identification strategy.

Data

The newly declassified military records on insurgent activity, harm to civilians, and intelligence reports were compiled by both International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) and Afghan forces (ANDSF). These records of significant activities (SIGACTS) cover 2003 through 2014, documenting more than 270,000 separate events, including: insurgent attacks on government forces, harm to civilians, and civilians' provision of local intelligence to security forces. The data were collected systematically by security forces, not derived from media sources, which avoids concerns about reporting biases in data collected from newspapers and other media, both in Afghanistan and in other conflicts (Weidmann 2016).⁵ These data are the most complete account of security operations in Afghanistan currently in the public domain (see SI section A.1). Descriptive statistics for the data are reported in Table 1. There was approximately one tip every 2 weeks in an averaged sized district (approximately 63,700 people).

The data include details on 97,006 intelligence collection events. These represent a combination of calls to anonymous hotlines, one-off tips from direct civilian-to-security force

5. Weidmann (2016, 210-211) describes the military records used in our study as the “universe” of insurgent-initiated combat activity.

Table 1: Summary statistics for violence data

Variable	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min.	Max.
All Tips	0.008	0.0284	0	2.6667
Tips about Threats to COIN Forces	0.0053	0.0201	0	1.2121
Tips about Threats to Civilians	0.0004	0.0029	0	0.5
Tips about Insurgent Activity	0.003	0.0138	0	1.831
IED Tips	0.0022	0.0097	0	0.5389
Roadside Bombs Found/Cleared	0.0037	0.0179	0	1
Weapon Caches Found/Cleared	0.0012	0.0086	0	0.6475
Insurgents Captured and Detained	0.0012	0.0062	0	0.5319
Tactical Safe House Raids	0.0001	0.0018	0	0.2878
Insurgent CIVCAS	0.0009	0.0051	0	0.5
Combat activity	0.0158	0.063	0	3.0135

Notes: summary statistics are calculated for the sample studied in the main estimating equations (four digits shown). All variables are reported in per 1000 population terms.

interactions and reporting by cultivated sources, but do not include intelligence derived from monitoring insurgent communications.⁶ The data also contain records on 120,247 direct fire, 28,974 indirect fire, and 38,205 IED explosion events. To measure civilian abuse by insurgents, we isolate all insurgent-initiated attacks that caused either a civilian injury or death that was observed by or occurred in the presence of government forces. Following previous literature, we treat injuries and deaths as casualty events. Importantly, since these casualties occur in the context of violence between insurgents and government forces, they are collateral damage; they should not be considered discriminate violence targeted at civilians, which do not enter the data.

We analyze the effects of this collateral damage on informing because harm to civilians associated with insurgent action is central to the relevant theory. Sensitivity analysis suggest that alternative explanations for the results are unlikely to account for the pattern. We supplement our main analysis with additional evidence from survey data, which demonstrate that estimating the model without data on coalition-initiated civilian casualties is highly

6. Author interview with senior official responsible for data collection and management, May 24, 2017.

unlikely to lead to erroneous conclusions about the reaction to casualties from insurgent-initiated events.

Estimation Strategy

How does insurgent abuse affect information sharing by civilians?

To estimate the effect of civilian harm in insurgent-initiated events on information sharing with security forces, we begin with the assumption that, conditional on appropriate controls for trends in the conflict, collateral damage to civilians caused by insurgent attacks on military forces is “as if” randomly assigned. This approach is the benchmark specification in previous work (Condra and Shapiro 2012; Shaver and Shapiro 2021). We conduct our analysis at the district level because this is the level at which ISAF, ANDSF, and Taliban forces were organized during the campaign. In this setting conditioning out district and week fixed effects, as well as short-run trends in overall violence, leaves us with residual variation in civilian abuse that is arguably random.

To begin, we sum all collected intelligence reports, all insurgent attacks with civilian casualties, and all insurgent operations—including direct line-of-sight attacks, indirect mortar and rocket engagements, and improvised explosive device (IED) detonations—by district-week and standardize per 1,000 district inhabitants. Our base model is captured by equation 1:

$$Y_{dt}^a = \alpha + \beta_1 CIVCAS_{dt-1} + \zeta_j \sum_{j=1}^4 (V_{dt-k}) + \mu_d + \eta_t + \epsilon_{dt} \quad (1)$$

where Y_{dt}^a is the number of intelligence reports shared with counterinsurgents in district d in week t where the superscript a indicates the type of tip ((1) all tips, (2) threats to COIN forces, (3) threats to civilians, (4) tips about insurgent activity); $CIVCAS_{dt}$ is the sum of insurgent attacks resulting in civilian harm in a given district; V_{dt-k} is the lagged sum of insurgent attacks in previous week k (direct fire, indirect fire, IED explosions); μ_d is a district

fixed effect; η_t denotes a week fixed effect; and ϵ_{dt} is the error term. In all models we cluster standard errors at the district level, and regressions are weighted by district population in thousands.

Importantly, there could be a cross-sectional correlation between insurgent-initiated attacks and informing induced by insurgents preferentially targeting pro-government areas as suggested by results in Hirose, Imai, and Lyall (2017).⁷ Including district fixed-effect accounts for such enduring political differences.⁸

One might also worry that when either side moves forces into an area for the fighting season that would create both more opportunities for civilian harm and more activity to inform on. It is unlikely that such medium-term trends would drive results in an estimation strategy like ours which relies on week-to-week variation in combat events combined with the randomness inherent in harm to civilians during such events. The week is a temporal unit smaller than that at which either side could re-position significant forces.⁹ Our main specifications also control for multiple lags of combat incidents, which would account for very short term flows of forces by either side.

Views regarding combatant efforts to avoid harm and attitudes on informing

Despite authors' repeated efforts over several years to gain access to data detailing government-caused civilian casualties, neither U.S. Central Command nor other agencies intend to declassify this information. Lack of such data could lead to biased estimates under two sce-

7. Hirose, Imai, and Lyall (2017) provide evidence for such a correlation by showing that favorable sentiment towards international forces in January-February 2011 was positively correlated with insurgent-initiated attacks in the remainder of the 2011 fighting season in a sample of 204 villages in the 13 Pashtun-majority provinces of Afghanistan.

8. To enable assessment of the results' stability to time-varying trends in political conditions and force levels, the SI shows all main results with province \times year, province \times quarter, and district \times year fixed effects.

9. Moving even a company sized unit (about 140 soldiers) for anything other than 48-72 hour operation required substantial construction and logistics support and was not done for such short periods, let alone larger battalion sized elements (500-1000 people) which were the size unit typically moved in and out of districts.

narios. First, we may worry that insurgent and government harm occur in offsetting-cycles, such that harm caused by insurgents is correlated with future (but not present) government harm. This would imply that insurgent and government harm are negatively correlated. If government harm is also negatively correlated with tipping (as the informational theory hypothesizes), then our estimates of the impact of insurgent harm would be biased upward (larger magnitude) since government harm remains an omitted variable. Second, civilians might react to relative harm—which actors hurt them more—as opposed to absolute harm. This would lead to a similar type of bias in our estimates. While we cannot evaluate these patterns quantitatively, we have not found systematic qualitative evidence suggesting these dynamics occurred in Afghanistan.

We augment our main results with survey data which provides suggestive evidence that neither of these mechanisms drive the results. Specifically, we study the relationship between self-reported willingness to inform (the survey analogue of tipping) and perceived level of care that government or insurgent forces exercise to avoid harming civilians (the survey analogue of measured harm) in eight waves of the Afghanistan Nationwide Quarterly Assessment Research (ANQAR) survey from 2013 to 2015 ($n = 99,666$ respondents). The survey included questions about insurgent *and* government attempts to avoid civilian harm as well as the willingness of respondents to report roadside bombs (see data description in SI section A.2 for more details).

Since we observe perceived harm by both actors, we can evaluate (a) whether we replicate the results from the observational data and (b) if our estimates of the relationship are sensitive to omitting the survey-based measures of government harm. We do so with equation 2:

$$Y_{idw} = \alpha + \beta_1 GovtNoEffort_{idw} + \beta_2 InsNoEffort_{idw} + \gamma X_i + \mu_d + \eta_w + \epsilon_{idw} \quad (2)$$

where Y_{idw} is whether or not an individual i is ‘very likely’ to report IED placement to

security forces in district d and survey wave w ; $Govt/InsNoEffort_{idw}$ is perception that the government/insurgents do not do enough to prevent civilian casualties; μ_d is a district fixed effect; η_w is a survey wave fixed effect; X_{idw} is a vector of individual-level demographic controls that vary across specifications; and ϵ_{idw} is the error term. In all models we cluster standard errors at the district level, and regressions use district-specific survey weights.

How do civilian tips affect battlefield outcomes?

Informational theory hypothesizes that civilian cooperation positively influences counterinsurgents' battlefield success. To quantitatively investigate whether variation in information flow is strategically valuable, we estimate the short term conditional correlation between tipping and various counterinsurgent operations controlling for trends in combat violence and insurgent harm using equation 3:

$$Y_{dt}^b = \alpha + \beta_1 Tips_{dt-1} + \zeta_j \sum_{j=1}^4 (V_{dt-j}) + \theta_j \sum_{j=1}^4 (CIVCAS_{dt-j}) + \mu_d + \eta_t + \epsilon_{dt} \quad (3)$$

where b denotes the type of counterinsurgent outcome in Y_{dt}^b , which can be the number of (1) roadside bombs found and cleared, (2) weapons caches found, (3) safe house raids, or (4) insurgents captured and detained in district d in week t . $Tips_{dt}$ is the sum of all tips or the sum of tips specifically related to IED deployment in a given district-week. As in equation 1, we control for previous levels of insurgent violence. Accounting for violence—including IED deployment—means that any change in the outcome variable associated with tips is not confounded by shifting intensity of combat activity. We also control for previous levels of insurgent-caused civilian casualty events. All models are weighted by district population and include district and time fixed effects. We cluster standard errors at the district level.

Results

Main Results

Insurgent abuse increases civilian tips to security forces

We find that civilian abuse by insurgents is associated with a significant increase in information sharing with state security forces. These results are robust across different kinds of tips and substantial in magnitude. Table 2 shows the estimated impact of civilian abuse on wartime informing using equation 1. The dependent variable in Column 1 is tips aggregated across all types. Columns 2-4 decompose tips by type: threats to counterinsurgents; threats to civilians; and insurgent activities.

Across specifications, there is a statistically significant association between (lagged) insurgent attacks that result in civilian casualties and the number of tips that counterinsurgents receive from civilians. A one standard deviation increase in attacks resulting in civilian casualties (0.322 more civilian casualty events per week in an average sized district) is associated with a 12% increase in informant reports over the weekly mean level (Column 1). This overall effect is largest for tips related to threats against counterinsurgents (2), but there are also statistically significant increases in tips on threats to civilians (3) and insurgent activities (4).

Those who feel insurgents do not try to avoid harming civilians express greater willingness to inform

The size and significance of the association between willingness to tip and perceived level of effort in avoiding civilian harm are in the direction predicted by the informational theory, as we see in Table 3 (estimated via equation 2). The magnitude of these effects is large. Those reporting they think insurgents do not try to avoid killing civilians are

Table 2: Effects of insurgent-initiated civilian casualties on civilians’ wartime informing to security forces

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	All Tips	Threats to COIN Forces	Threats to Civilians	Tips about Insurgent Activity
CIVCAS, PC (1 WEEK LAG)	0.189*** (0.0519)	0.128*** (0.0325)	0.00953*** (0.00340)	0.0333* (0.0172)
SUMMARY STATISTICS				
Outcome Mean	0.00804	0.00529	0.000374	0.00304
Outcome SD	0.0284	0.0201	0.00289	0.0138
PARAMETERS				
District FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Time FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Violence Trends	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
MODEL STATISTICS				
Number of Observations	171936	171936	171936	171936
Number of Clusters	398	398	398	398

Notes: Outcome of interest is tips on specific threats, as noted in column headings. All models are weighted by district population and include district and week fixed effects. Standard errors clustered at the district level and are presented in parentheses. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

approximately 25% more likely (relative to the baseline mean of .442) to say they are ‘very likely’ to provide a tip on an IED if they know about one. These additional results are consistent with the attitudinal mechanism posited by informational theory underlying the behavioral findings reported earlier.

To provide evidence on the potential bias that missing information on Coalition abuse might cause in the behavioral data we examine how including or excluding each measure affects the estimated effect of the other measure in the survey data. Comparing the results in Columns 3 and 5 shows the coefficient on insurgent effort moves by less than 1 percentage point with the inclusion or exclusion of the measure of perceived government effort.

Table 3: Civilians' willingness to tip as function of perceived effort by armed actors to minimize harm to civilians

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
	Baseline	Baseline w. Political Controls	Baseline w. Political and Security Controls	Baseline w. Political and Security Controls	Baseline w. Political and Security Controls
Govt. No Effort	-0.103*** (0.00829)	-0.0951*** (0.00786)	-0.0879*** (0.00746)	-0.0996*** (0.00795)	
Ins. No Effort	0.115*** (0.00703)	0.112*** (0.00691)	0.108*** (0.00661)		0.112*** (0.00674)
SUMMARY STATISTICS					
Outcome Mean	0.442	0.442	0.442	0.442	0.442
Outcome SD	0.497	0.497	0.497	0.497	0.497
PARAMETERS					
District FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Demographic Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Interacted Model	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Govt. going Wrong Direction	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Police Patrols Weekly	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Village Insecure	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Taliban Gaining Strength	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
MODEL STATISTICS					
N	99666	99666	99666	99666	99666
Clusters	377	377	377	377	377

Notes: Outcome of interest is respondent reporting being 'very likely' to report tip on IED if known (from ANQAR survey waves 20-27). 'Govt./Ins No Effort'=1 if respondent thinks government/insurgents does not do enough to prevent the killing and injuring of civilians; non-response to both questions are parameterized separately (coefficients omitted). All models include survey sample weights. All models include fixed effects for district, SES, ethnicity, gender, and ANQAR survey wave. Standard errors clustered at the district level and are presented in parentheses. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

Civilian tips improve battlefield outcomes

We next report how information sharing affects meaningful operational outcomes. In Table 4 we show the effects on IEDs found and cleared (Column 1), weapons caches found and cleared (2), insurgents captured (3), and tactical safe house raids (4). Insurgent-inflicted civilian casualties lead to a subsequent increase in each of these operational outcomes that are vital to the success of counterinsurgency. The effects are substantively large. A one standard deviation increase in IED-related tips (0.616 more IED-related tips per week in an average sized district), for example, is associated with a 16.8% increase in roadside bombs found and cleared over the weekly mean level. This effect size amounts to approximately one more IED found per week for every four tips in an averaged sized district.

Recall that these model specifications account for shifts in the intensity of violence, enabling us to address concerns about potentially confounding factors. For example, one might be concerned that tips about IED deployment and IEDs neutralized may be mechanically correlated with the number of IEDs deployed. We can rule this out since our model partials out the variation in IEDs cleared that is correlated with shifts in IED deployment.¹⁰ Together with the evidence on increased information sharing, this stands as remarkably strong and consistent evidence that harm inflicted on civilians in civil war has strategic consequences.

Supplemental Results

In SI, we provide a series of robustness checks for the main results. First, we evaluate whether there is a substantial difference in estimated magnitudes across the full sample relative to the period characterized by the most intense annual fighting season (Tables SI-2, SI-3, SI-4 and SI-5). Results are largely unaffected. Second, to account for spurious results due to trends

10. One alternative to this specification would be to study the clear-rate: the percentage of IEDs deployed that are neutralized before they detonate. The central concern we have with this approach is econometric: the clear-rate is undefined for district-weeks which experience no IED activity. This would create an unbalanced panel, breaking the panel difference-in-differences (unit and time fixed effects) approach we take here.

Table 4: Effects of wartime informing on counterinsurgent operational outcomes

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	Roadside Bombs Found/Cleared	Weapon Caches Found/Cleared	Insurgents Captured and Detained	Tactical Safe House Raids
IED TIPS, PC (1 WEEK LAG)	0.0645*** (0.0131)	0.0272*** (0.00820)		
ALL TIPS, PC (1 WEEK LAG)			0.0136*** (0.00300)	0.00260*** (0.000550)
SUMMARY STATISTICS				
Outcome Mean	0.00371	0.00121	0.00123	0.000108
Outcome SD	0.0179	0.00857	0.00622	0.00183
PARAMETERS				
District FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Time FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Violence Trends	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Civ Cas Trends	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
MODEL STATISTICS				
Number of Observations	171936	171936	171936	171936
Number of Clusters	398	398	398	398

Notes: Outcome of interest is specific counterinsurgent outcomes, as noted in column headings. All models are weighted by district population and include district and week fixed effects. Standard errors clustered at the district level and are presented in parentheses. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

which could effect both insurgent activity and tips, such as the deployment of additional government or ISAF forces, we estimate the models with four lags of the dependent variable as added regressors (Tables SI-6 and SI-7). Third, we estimate unweighted regressions (Tables SI-8 and SI-9). Fourth, we provide further evidence that the informational mechanism drives the effects of tips on counterinsurgent outcomes. While the estimated coefficients on all (lagged) tips and (lagged) tips specifically on IEDs deployed are statistically significantly related to IEDs and weapons caches found as outcomes, the size of the effect of specific tips is substantially larger (Table SI-10).

Finally, we provide further evidence to address concerns about omitted variable bias in the core results. One concern might be that what drives variation in information sharing is not variation in insurgent-inflicted harm to civilians, as we argue, but rather simply variation in insurgent presence in an area. There could be a mechanical relationship whereby both

information sharing and insurgent-initiated incidents increase when more Taliban are in an area to inform on. Our main specifications include multiple lags of combat activity and Taliban activity, which should go some way to dispelling this concern. We also show that the main results (linking harm and tips, and then information sharing to counterinsurgent outcomes) are robust to the inclusion of an additional set of fixed effects in our models to control for changes in presence of armed actors over longer periods. Specifically, we add to the district and week-of-year fixed effects already in the main specifications a series of interactive fixed effects: province \times year, province \times quarter-year, and district \times year. For models with tips as the outcome variable, results of these regressions are shown in Tables SI-11, SI-12, and SI-13. For counterinsurgent operations as the outcome variable, see Tables SI-14, SI-15, and SI-16. The direction of the results is unaffected and the magnitudes change little, though some coefficients are estimated less precisely in models that include district \times year fixed effects.

We also conduct two different sensitivity analyses to determine how stable our main results are to the possibility of unobserved confounds. First, following Altonji, Elder, and Taber (2005) and Nunn and Wantchekon (2011, 3237-3238), we compare the treatment effect of interest under two scenarios: an estimate of the effect ($\hat{\beta}$) recovered from a regression with the full set of controls ($\hat{\beta}^F$) and one recovered from one with a restricted set ($\hat{\beta}^R$). Assuming that the part of the outcome related to the set of observables in the model has the same relationship with the independent variable as the part of the outcome that is related to unobserved confounds (Altonji, Elder, and Taber 2005, 154), the ratio of these estimates ($\hat{\beta}^F / (\hat{\beta}^R - \hat{\beta}^F)$) is increasing in the size of the effect of unobservables that would be necessary to return a null treatment effect.

We calculate this ratio for the regression models that include (full) and exclude (restricted) the extra interactive fixed effects just described—province \times year, province \times quarter-year, and district \times year—first for the effect of civilian casualty events on tipping (Tables SI-11

and SI-12) and then for the effect of informing on counterinsurgent outcomes (Tables SI-14 and SI-15).

For the four columns in Table SI-11 the ratio is 3.13, 3.53, 5.96, and 6.04, respectively. To attribute the entire estimated effect of lagged civilian casualty events to selection effects, selection on unobserved confounds would have to be between 3 and 6 times greater than selection on the province \times year fixed effects. Similarly, comparing models with and without province \times quarter-year fixed effects (Table SI-12), confounds would have to be between 2 and 2.8 times greater. In the case of district \times year fixed effects (Table SI-13), confounds would need to be between .131 and .253 times greater, depending on the outcome.

Turning to the impact of tips on counterinsurgent outcomes, the omitted variables would need to account for more than eleven times as much of the variance in outcomes as province \times year fixed effects, at least 3.82 times as much in the case of province \times quarter fixed effects, and between 1.11 and 2.12 as much in the case of district \times year fixed effects.

For the second test, we follow Cinelli and Hazlett (2020), who propose reporting measures of the sensitivity of linear regression coefficients. One is the “robustness value”, which “describes the minimum strength of association (measured in terms of partial R^2 that unobserved confounders would need to have, both with the treatment and with the outcome, to bring the effect estimate down to exactly 0.” The closer this value is to 1, the more robust is the treatment effect to even strong confounders explaining residual variation (the closer to 0, the less robust it is; even weak confounders could render results spurious). This exercise allows us to provide an answer to the question: how strong would a confounder like short-run variation in Taliban activity have to be (or Taliban activity interacting with others, such as government harm to civilians) to overturn our central results?

The robustness values are quite high for the estimated coefficients on civilian casualty events for models in Table 2 and for the estimated coefficients on tips for models in Table 4. In the main regressions with tips as the outcome, the estimated coefficients on civilian casualty

events are fairly insensitive to unobserved confounds. For example, when the outcome is all tips, unobserved confounds would need to explain at least 77.35% of residual variance both of lagged civilian casualty events and of the outcome to reduce the effect we estimate to zero, which seems unreasonably large. This sensitivity increases as we disaggregate tips into different types, but the lowest robustness value for lagged civilian casualty events is still 57% when the outcome is tips about insurgent activity. Similarly, the estimated coefficients on tips (where the outcome is counterinsurgent operations) are quite insensitive to unobserved confounds, with robustness values ranging from 65% to over 77%. Given the extensive controls in our main models and robustness checks as well as the noisiness of the outcomes week-to-week, it is hard to think of confounders that would be that influential.

Conclusion

In this manuscript, we present a multi-method empirical test of key elements of the information sharing theories of civil war that have shaped the academic study and military doctrine of counterinsurgency for the last half century. These theories posit that governments' military success at the tactical level depends on civilians sharing critical information about insurgent identities, whereabouts, and activities. Civilians, in turn, punish combatants for harming them by sharing or withholding support and local intelligence. We provide compelling evidence that in Afghanistan civilian harm in insurgent-initiated events led to increased information sharing with the government, and that such information sharing was associated with subsequent counterinsurgent operation.

Of course, a macro-level political-military strategy involves broader considerations. As critics of the campaign in Afghanistan have argued, consolidating military control is only a small part of what is required to create a legitimate government (Eikenberry 2013). Information sharing may help government forces and their external supporters win battles; a

broader strategy is required to win wars.

We highlight several promising avenues for future research. First, the willingness of civilians to share information may be mediated by the type, intensity, and spatial proximity of combatant abuse. Second, information-sharing might influence other wartime dynamics, including the resolve and capacity of insurgents to fight and the ability of rebels to credibly bargain with state rivals. If insurgents know that civilian abuse affects information sharing, then engaging in civilian abuse is a particularly costly signal of insurgent resolve and capability. Finally, winning local support for counterinsurgent campaigns is a core motivation of military aid provision and drives many recent empirically-focused social science articles investigating the effects of aid as a tool to win “hearts and minds” and thereby both establish territorial and popular control and reduce insurgent violence (Berman, Shapiro, and Felter 2011; Crost, Felter, and Johnston 2014; Lyall 2019; Sexton 2016). Yet we still know relatively little about how civilian sympathies and insurgent strategy respond to these aid interventions.

The insights of this paper are relevant to a number of ongoing conflicts. Although our quantitative analysis focuses on insurgent-initiated civilian abuse, our results speak to harm caused by government forces as well. They suggest that attempts to minimize civilian harm will likely help government forces more effectively combat insurgencies and thereby contribute to rebuilding social and political order.

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SUPPORTING INFORMATION

— For Online Publication Only —

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A Data

A.1 Conflict Data

The data on insurgent activities, civilian casualties, and information received by ISAF and Afghan forces was received and processed by Authors. The data were declassified and released to them by the U.S. Department of Defense and provide the precise timing and locations (often accurate to the nearest minute and within several meters, respectively) of hundreds of thousands of incidents of insurgent violence throughout the Afghanistan war.

Insurgent Attacks and Civilian Casualties. The dataset is constructed from reports provided by U.S., Afghan, and other ISAF military and police units and includes more than 200,000 observations of attacks perpetrated by insurgents with corresponding details on the weaponry used, as well as whether civilians were (unintentionally) killed or injured in the course of the attack. We use these data as our measure of insurgent violence and civilian casualties in estimated models.

Information Sharing. The dataset also includes tens of thousands of specific incidents of information received by counterinsurgent forces about insurgents. These include specific threats posed by insurgents, frequently identified by the specific attack type (e.g., direct fire, indirect fire, improvised explosive device) as well as reported locations of insurgents. We do not observe the means of collection (in-person, hotline, etc.). Some reports may have been captured via signals, though former ISAF officials indicate these events were unlikely to be released with our records request. If present, however, these records would likely bias our results toward zero.

Counterinsurgent Outcomes. Finally, the dataset includes a variety of details related to operational outcomes, including IEDs found and cleared, weapons caches found and cleared, tactical raids of safe houses, and operations resulting in captured insurgents.

A.2 Survey Data

We use waves 20-27 of the Afghanistan Nationwide Quarterly Assessment Research (AN-QAR) platform for models reported in Table 3. The Afghan Center for Socio-Economic and Opinion Research (ACSOR) enumerated these waves of the survey. Using a grid-based random walk method, the firm surveyed ten households from the randomly sampled villages within a district. When ACSOR could not access sampled villages, intercept interviews were used to collect information from residents traveling in neighboring areas.

We analyze responses to three questions in the ANQAR surveys:

1. “If you knew that an IED had been planted, how likely would you be to report it?”
Coded 1 if response was ‘very likely’ and 0 otherwise.
2. “Do you think the Afghan National Defense and Security Forces (ANDSF) do enough to prevent the killing or injuring of civilians?” Coded 1 if the response is “No, I think the ANDSF doesn’t do anything” and 0 otherwise.
3. “Do you think the insurgents do enough to prevent the killing or injuring of civilians?”
Coded 1 if the response is “No, I think the insurgents don’t do anything” and 0 otherwise.

B Descriptive Statistics

Table SI-1: Summary statistics for ANQAR survey data

Variable	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min.	Max.
Very likely to report IED	0.442	0.497	0	1
Govt. No Effort to prevent CIVCAS	0.089	0.285	0	1
Ins. No Effort to prevent CIVCAS	0.648	0.478	0	1

Notes: summary statistics are calculated for the sample studied in the main estimating equations (three digits shown). All variables are weighted by district population (following the main specification).

C Supplementary Results

Table SI-2: Effects of insurgent-initiated civilian casualties on civilians' wartime informing to security forces (June-October only)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	All Tips	Threats to COIN Forces	Threats to Civilians	Tips about Insurgent Activity
CIVCAS, PC (1 WEEK LAG)	0.191*** (0.0553)	0.141*** (0.0371)	0.00794** (0.00345)	0.0339** (0.0143)
SUMMARY STATISTICS				
Outcome Mean	0.00845	0.00571	0.000384	0.00317
Outcome SD	0.0285	0.0207	0.00292	0.0132
PARAMETERS				
District FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Time FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Violence Trends	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
MODEL STATISTICS				
Number of Observations	89550	89550	89550	89550
Number of Clusters	398	398	398	398

Notes: Outcome of interest is tips on specific threats, as noted in column headings. Estimated only during the short fighting season (June to October). All models are weighted by district population, include district and week fixed effects. Standard errors clustered at the district level and are presented in parentheses. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

Table SI-3: Effects of wartime informing on counterinsurgent operational outcomes (June-October only)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	Roadside Bombs Found/Cleared	Weapon Caches Found/Cleared	Insurgents Captured and Detained	Tactical Safe House Raids
IED TIPS (1 WEEK LAG)	0.0632*** (0.0162)	0.0197*** (0.00711)		
ALL TIPS (1 WEEK LAG)			0.0130*** (0.00360)	0.00312*** (0.000701)
SUMMARY STATISTICS				
Outcome Mean	0.00395	0.000961	0.00129	0.000114
Outcome SD	0.0178	0.00637	0.00658	0.00209
PARAMETERS				
District FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Time FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Violence Trends	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Civ Cas Trends	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
MODEL STATISTICS				
Number of Observations	89550	89550	89550	89550
Number of Clusters	398	398	398	398

Notes: Outcome of interest is specific counterinsurgent outcomes, as noted in column headings. Estimated only during the short fighting season (June to October). All models are weighted by district population, include district and week fixed effects. Standard errors clustered at the district level and are presented in parentheses. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

Table SI-4: Effects of insurgent-initiated civilian casualties on civilians' wartime informing to security forces (May-October only)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	All Tips	Threats to COIN Forces	Threats to Civilians	Tips about Insurgent Activity
CIVCAS, PC (1 WEEK LAG)	0.204*** (0.0538)	0.141*** (0.0366)	0.00651** (0.00328)	0.0527*** (0.0157)
SUMMARY STATISTICS				
Outcome Mean	0.00850	0.00576	0.000379	0.00314
Outcome SD	0.0287	0.0210	0.00291	0.0132
PARAMETERS				
District FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Time FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Violence Trends	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
MODEL STATISTICS				
Number of Observations	103878	103878	103878	103878
Number of Clusters	398	398	398	398

Notes: Outcome of interest is tips on specific threats, as noted in column headings. Estimated only during the long fighting season (May to October). All models are weighted by district population, include district and week fixed effects. Standard errors clustered at the district level and are presented in parentheses. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

Table SI-5: Effects of wartime informing on counterinsurgent operational outcomes (May-October only)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	Roadside Bombs Found/Cleared	Weapon Caches Found/Cleared	Insurgents Captured and Detained	Tactical Safe House Raids
IED TIPS (1 WEEK LAG)	0.0627*** (0.0137)	0.0206*** (0.00717)		
ALL TIPS (1 WEEK LAG)			0.0121*** (0.00337)	0.00289*** (0.000719)
SUMMARY STATISTICS				
Outcome Mean	0.00386	0.00104	0.00125	0.000112
Outcome SD	0.0175	0.00695	0.00645	0.00201
PARAMETERS				
District FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Time FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Violence Trends	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Civ Cas Trends	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
MODEL STATISTICS				
Number of Observations	103878	103878	103878	103878
Number of Clusters	398	398	398	398

Notes: Outcome of interest is specific counterinsurgent outcomes, as noted in column headings. Estimated only during the long fighting season (May to October). All models are weighted by district population, include district and week fixed effects. Standard errors clustered at the district level and are presented in parentheses. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

Table SI-6: Effects of insurgent-initiated civilian casualties on civilians' wartime informing to security forces, including lags of dependent variable

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	All Tips	Threats to COIN Forces	Threats to Civilians	Tips about Insurgent Activity
CIVCAS, PC (1 WEEK LAG)	0.0237 (0.0225)	0.0279* (0.0150)	0.00676** (0.00278)	0.00585 (0.0101)
SUMMARY STATISTICS				
Outcome Mean	0.00804	0.00529	0.000374	0.00304
Outcome SD	0.0284	0.0201	0.00289	0.0138
PARAMETERS				
District FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Time FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Violence Trends	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
MODEL STATISTICS				
Number of Observations	171936	171936	171936	171936
Number of Clusters	398	398	398	398

Notes: Outcome of interest is tips on specific threats, as noted in column headings. All models are weighted by district population, include four lags of the dependent variable, as well as district and week fixed effects. Standard errors clustered at the district level and are presented in parentheses. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

Table SI-7: Effects of wartime informing on counterinsurgent operational outcomes, including lags of dependent variable

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	Roadside Bombs Found/Cleared	Weapon Caches Found/Cleared	Insurgents Captured and Detained	Tactical Safe House Raids
IED TIPS (1 WEEK LAG)	0.0181** (0.00701)	0.00910*** (0.00286)		
ALL TIPS (1 WEEK LAG)			0.00659*** (0.00175)	0.00133*** (0.000492)
SUMMARY STATISTICS				
Outcome Mean	0.00371	0.00121	0.00123	0.000108
Outcome SD	0.0179	0.00857	0.00622	0.00183
PARAMETERS				
District FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Time FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Violence Trends	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Civ Cas Trends	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
MODEL STATISTICS				
Number of Observations	171936	171936	171936	171936
Number of Clusters	398	398	398	398

Notes: Outcome of interest is specific counterinsurgent outcomes, as noted in column headings. All models are weighted by district population, include four lags of the dependent variable, as well as district and week fixed effects. Standard errors clustered at the district level and are presented in parentheses. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

Table SI-8: Effects of insurgent-initiated civilian casualties on civilians' wartime informing to security forces, unweighted regressions

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	All Tips	Threats to COIN Forces	Threats to Civilians	Tips about Insurgent Activity
CIVCAS, PC (1 WEEK LAG)	0.0445 (0.0473)	0.0339 (0.0257)	0.00296 (0.00270)	-0.00105 (0.0199)
SUMMARY STATISTICS				
Outcome Mean	0.00952	0.00621	0.000424	0.00402
Outcome SD	0.0386	0.0267	0.00464	0.0210
PARAMETERS				
District FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Time FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Violence Trends	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
MODEL STATISTICS				
Number of Observations	171936	171936	171936	171936
Number of Clusters	398	398	398	398

Notes: Outcome of interest is tips on specific threats, as noted in column headings. All models include district and week fixed effects. Models are unweighted. Standard errors clustered at the district level and are presented in parentheses. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

Table SI-9: Effects of wartime informing on counterinsurgent operational outcomes, unweighted regressions

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	Roadside Bombs Found/Cleared	Weapon Caches Found/Cleared	Insurgents Captured and Detained	Tactical Safe House Raids
IED TIPS (1 WEEK LAG)	0.0656*** (0.0112)	0.0223*** (0.00509)		
ALL TIPS (1 WEEK LAG)			0.0117*** (0.00289)	0.00231*** (0.000711)
SUMMARY STATISTICS				
Outcome Mean	0.00438	0.00138	0.00123	0.000131
Outcome SD	0.0215	0.0106	0.00800	0.00259
PARAMETERS				
District FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Time FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Violence Trends	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Civ Cas Trends	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
MODEL STATISTICS				
Number of Observations	171936	171936	171936	171936
Number of Clusters	398	398	398	398

Notes: Outcome of interest is specific counterinsurgent outcomes, as noted in column headings. All models include district and week fixed effects. Models are unweighted. Standard errors clustered at the district level and are presented in parentheses. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

Table SI-10: Effects of wartime informing on counterinsurgent operational outcomes, comparing tip types

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	Roadside Bombs Found/Cleared	Roadside Bombs Found/Cleared	Weapon Caches Found/Cleared	Weapon Caches Found/Cleared
ALL TIPS (1 WEEK LAG)	0.0161** (0.00678)		0.0117*** (0.00403)	
IED TIPS (1 WEEK LAG)		0.0645*** (0.0131)		0.0272*** (0.00820)
SUMMARY STATISTICS				
Outcome Mean	0.00371	0.00371	0.00121	0.00121
Outcome SD	0.0179	0.0179	0.00857	0.00857
PARAMETERS				
District FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Time FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Violence Trends	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Civ Cas Trends	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
MODEL STATISTICS				
Number of Observations	171936	171936	171936	171936
Number of Clusters	398	398	398	398

Notes: Outcome of interest is specific counterinsurgent outcomes, as noted in column headings. All models are weighted by district population, and include district and week fixed effects. Standard errors clustered at the district level and are presented in parentheses. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

Table SI-11: Effects of insurgent-initiated civilian casualties on civilians' wartime informing to security forces, with province \times year fixed effects

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	All Tips	Threats to COIN Forces	Threats to Civilians	Tips about Insurgent Activity
CIVCAS, PC (1 WEEK LAG)	0.143*** (0.0422)	0.0995*** (0.0258)	0.00816*** (0.00284)	0.0286** (0.0144)
SUMMARY STATISTICS				
Outcome Mean	0.00804	0.00529	0.000374	0.00304
Outcome SD	0.0284	0.0201	0.00289	0.0138
PARAMETERS				
District FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Time FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Violence Trends	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
MODEL STATISTICS				
Number of Observations	171936	171936	171936	171936
Number of Clusters	398	398	398	398

Notes: Outcome of interest is tips on specific threats, as noted in column headings. All models are weighted by district population and include district and week fixed effects, as well as province \times year fixed effects. Standard errors clustered at the district level and are presented in parentheses. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

Table SI-12: Effects of insurgent-initiated civilian casualties on civilians' wartime informing to security forces, with province \times quarter-year fixed effects

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	All Tips	Threats to COIN Forces	Threats to Civilians	Tips about Insurgent Activity
CIVCAS, PC (1 WEEK LAG)	0.126*** (0.0380)	0.0897*** (0.0244)	0.00703*** (0.00266)	0.0224* (0.0131)
SUMMARY STATISTICS				
Outcome Mean	0.00804	0.00529	0.000374	0.00304
Outcome SD	0.0284	0.0201	0.00289	0.0138
PARAMETERS				
District FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Time FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Violence Trends	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
MODEL STATISTICS				
Number of Observations	171936	171936	171936	171936
Number of Clusters	398	398	398	398

Notes: Outcome of interest is tips on specific threats, as noted in column headings. All models are weighted by district population and include district and week fixed effects, as well as province \times quarter-year fixed effects. Standard errors clustered at the district level and are presented in parentheses. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

Table SI-13: Effects of insurgent-initiated civilian casualties on civilians' wartime informing to security forces, with district \times year fixed effects

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	All Tips	Threats to COIN Forces	Threats to Civilians	Tips about Insurgent Activity
CIVCAS, PC (1 WEEK LAG)	0.0381 (0.0383)	0.0256 (0.0221)	0.00529** (0.00247)	0.00386 (0.0165)
SUMMARY STATISTICS				
Outcome Mean	0.00804	0.00529	0.000374	0.00304
Outcome SD	0.0284	0.0201	0.00289	0.0138
PARAMETERS				
District FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Time FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Violence Trends	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
MODEL STATISTICS				
Number of Observations	171936	171936	171936	171936
Number of Clusters	398	398	398	398

Notes: Outcome of interest is tips on specific threats, as noted in column headings. All models are weighted by district population and include district and week fixed effects, as well as district \times year fixed effects. Standard errors clustered at the district level and are presented in parentheses. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

Table SI-14: Effects of wartime informing on counterinsurgent operational outcomes, with province \times year fixed effects

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	Roadside Bombs Found/Cleared	Weapon Caches Found/Cleared	Insurgents Captured and Detained	Tactical Safe House Raids
IED TIPS, PC (1 WEEK LAG)	0.0616*** (0.0123)	0.0250*** (0.00724)		
ALL TIPS, PC (1 WEEK LAG)			0.0133*** (0.00276)	0.00258*** (0.000682)
SUMMARY STATISTICS				
Outcome Mean	0.00371	0.00121	0.00123	0.000108
Outcome SD	0.0179	0.00857	0.00622	0.00183
PARAMETERS				
District FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Time FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Violence Trends	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Civ Cas Trends	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
MODEL STATISTICS				
Number of Observations	171936	171936	171936	171936
Number of Clusters	398	398	398	398

Notes: Outcome of interest is specific counterinsurgent outcomes, as noted in column headings. All models are weighted by district population and include district and week fixed effects, as well as province \times year fixed effects. Standard errors clustered at the district level and are presented in parentheses. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

Table SI-15: Effects of wartime informing on counterinsurgent operational outcomes, with province \times quarter-year fixed effects

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	Roadside Bombs Found/Cleared	Weapon Caches Found/Cleared	Insurgents Captured and Detained	Tactical Safe House Raids
IED TIPS, PC (1 WEEK LAG)	0.0579*** (0.0117)	0.0216*** (0.00629)		
ALL TIPS, PC (1 WEEK LAG)			0.0130*** (0.00271)	0.00257*** (0.000627)
SUMMARY STATISTICS				
Outcome Mean	0.00371	0.00121	0.00123	0.000108
Outcome SD	0.0179	0.00857	0.00622	0.00183
PARAMETERS				
District FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Time FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Violence Trends	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Civ Cas Trends	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
MODEL STATISTICS				
Number of Observations	171936	171936	171936	171936
Number of Clusters	398	398	398	398

Notes: Outcome of interest is specific counterinsurgent outcomes, as noted in column headings. All models are weighted by district population and include district and week fixed effects, as well as province \times quarter-year fixed effects. Standard errors clustered at the district level and are presented in parentheses. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

Table SI-16: Effects of wartime informing on counterinsurgent operational outcomes, with district \times year fixed effects

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	Roadside Bombs Found/Cleared	Weapon Caches Found/Cleared	Insurgents Captured and Detained	Tactical Safe House Raids
IED TIPS, PC (1 WEEK LAG)	0.0347** (0.0149)	0.0143* (0.00808)		
ALL TIPS, PC (1 WEEK LAG)			0.00761*** (0.00204)	0.00177 (0.00110)
SUMMARY STATISTICS				
Outcome Mean	0.00371	0.00121	0.00123	0.000108
Outcome SD	0.0179	0.00857	0.00622	0.00183
PARAMETERS				
District FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Time FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Violence Trends	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Civ Cas Trends	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
MODEL STATISTICS				
Number of Observations	171936	171936	171936	171936
Number of Clusters	398	398	398	398

Notes: Outcome of interest is specific counterinsurgent outcomes, as noted in column headings. All models are weighted by district population and include district and week fixed effects, as well as district \times year fixed effects. Standard errors clustered at the district level and are presented in parentheses. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

Case Data

Informing in irregular asymmetric conflicts since 1944

SI-21

Country Name (conflict if ambiguous)	Start Year	Evidence that information sharing by civilians matters?	Evidence that information sharing helps the receiving party? (Government or Insurgents)	Direct evidence of civilian informing?	Evidence that civilians respond to harm by reducing/increasing information sharing?
Greece	1944	Yes. "However, the Greek insurgents managed to establish an impressive military and civil intelligence network which supported the fight of their army, the Democratic Army of Greece (DAG), and contributed to the resilience of the insurgency." (Tantalakis 2019, 1047)	Yes. "Undoubtedly, intelligence was a crucial factor in explaining the resilience of the numerically and technologically inferior DAG." (1047)	Yes. "The civil intelligence network was established in the period before the actual outbreak of the war in 1946, dating back to the era of the triple occupation of the country by the German, Italian and Bulgarian armies." (1046)	Could not find evidence
USSR (Estonia, Forest brothers)	1944	Yes. "The Forest Brothers frequently needed a temporary place to hide when danger threatened; they needed medical supplies and, most important of all, information. The City Brothers were very helpful in obtaining forged documents." (Anusauskas 1999, 220)	Yes. "They also relied heavily on the information they got from local people. They were well informed of the movements of the reprisal squads and even the NKVD units. Information on Soviet transport columns and shipments of money was passed on to them." (220)	Yes. "The Forest Brothers got all their supplies, including clothes, tools and everyday necessities, from farms. They also relied heavily on the information they got from local people." (220) There were informants on both sides. (<i>The Erik HEINE Case</i> 1966)	No. Found evidence of using coercion to obtain info by Soviet forces: "The arrest of a person's family became a powerful method of coercion. By essentially taking the family hostage, the security apparatus hoped to gain information on the Forest Brothers' movements and the location of their bunkers, so that ambushes could be organised to capture them. According to records in the CPE archives, female agents were widely used to entrap Forest Brothers. The results of these operations were all too often ruinous for the partisans." (Anusauskas 1999, 227)
USSR (Latvia/LTSPA)	1944	Yes. "For example, under the guidance of a pupil of Aluksne secondary school, Llvija Eglte, a group of 13 young people published a handwritten magazine called Kokle. This group had connections with the partisan group led by Reders. Apart from having the same political goal, the restoration of independent Latvia, these groups supported the partisans in everyday life, distributed their illegal publications and communicated information about the arrival of USSR NKVD troops or their planned actions." (Komisija 2008, 157)	Could not find evidence	Yes. "Thus, according to Soviet data, 3,597 secret informers, agents and residents were engaged in the struggle against the national partisans in January 1947." (290) The Latvian side had an informant network. (Burds 2007)	Could not find evidence

Informing in irregular asymmetric conflicts since 1944

Country Name (conflict if ambiguous)	Start Year	Evidence that information sharing by civilians matters?	Evidence that information sharing helps the receiving party? (Government or Insurgents)	Direct evidence of civilian informing?	Evidence that civilians respond to harm by reducing/increasing information sharing?
USSR (Lithuania/BDPS)	1944	Yes. "The repressive institutions also invoked agents, informants, special provocation teams of alleged Lithuanian partizans to defeat the resistance." (<i>War After War: Armed anti-Soviet resistance in Lithuania, 1944-1953</i> 2018)	Yes. "The informers were particularly efficient in cities where communication between informers and police was easy, and the latter could instantly react to tips. In May 1945, Lithuanian agents reported the emergence of a new, predominantly urban resistance group, the Lithuanian Partisan Union. It had existed for just two months when the police arrested its key leaders in Vilnius, including Matas Mastauskas , deputy commander-in-chief; Zigmas Petrauskas, chief of its central headquarters; Juozas Petrauskas , a member of its central headquarters; Juozas Cekaitis, chief of the administrative section; and 32 other leaders who had gathered for a meeting. Information received from their interrogation allowed the police to kill and arrest 2,000 Lithuanian Partisan Union members within three months, virtually destroying this network by September 1945." (Statiev 2010, 235)	Yes. "In other regions, the informer network was less numerous but growing with every month; the Lithuanian police had 27,700 informers by 1951." (235)	No. Informing described in terms of pay and personal risk reduction not reaction to events. "These people understood that they were in danger as long as resistance existed, and they willingly collaborated with the police. Others worked for pay. A police manual stated that every informer who had brought valuable information leading to the liquidation of guerrillas had to be rewarded with money. Many agents received flat wages in addition to lump payments. A dangerous job presumed generous rewards. In Lithuania, the average wage was 6,000 rubles for six months of work, but some agents got up to 21,000 rubles. By comparison, the heads of the republican Communist parties received 12,000 rubles, republican ministers received between 9,600 and 11,400 rubles, and first secretaries of provincial party committees received 7,800 rubles over the same period. 14 In addition to monetary rewards, the police granted its agents exclusion from military conscription, 15 an important motivation as long as the war continued. The police also recruited teenagers by promising them attractive careers and offered assistance in the enlistment into pilot or military cadet schools in return for spying." (234)

Informing in irregular asymmetric conflicts since 1944

SI-23

Country Name (conflict if ambiguous)	Start Year	Evidence that information sharing by civilians matters?	Evidence that information sharing helps the receiving party? (Government or Insurgents)	Direct evidence of civilian informing?	Evidence that civilians respond to harm by reducing/increasing information sharing?
USSR (Ukraine/UPA)	1944	Yes. "The liaison between the informer network and MVD-MGB officers is excellent. ... They [the police] receive comprehensive information about the daily events in the village. ... The number of informers among us is growing." (Statiev 2010, 238)	Yes. "The enemy presses us most severely with their secret army, the agent network. Here we have our greatest reversals." He believed that the police had at least five informers in every village." (238)	Yes. "By 1 June 1945, the NKVD in western Ukraine had 175 residents, 1,196 agents, and 19,843 informers." (235)	Yes. Evidence that civilian support decreased after guerilla violence: "Even if guerrillas punished those who indeed were informers, most peasants were horrified when their neighbors suffered the fate described in the NKVD report filed in May 1944: UPA fighters cut off M. Il'chuk's head with a hand saw, beheaded his 14-year-old daughter with an axe, and shot dead his three-year-old son, his wife, another daughter, and his mother. Such repressions drove a wedge between guerrillas and civilians, which was the strategic goal of Soviet counterinsurgents." (246)
Korea	1948	Yes. "The informants included North Korean and Soviet deserters, anti-Japanese guerrillas, Japanese laborers, and a former interpreter for the North Korean People's committee." (Caprio 2011)	Yes. "Having information on the North's plans would have placed the United States in a better position to control Rhee's desires to initiate a northern campaign simply by cautioning him to wait until the enemy made its move." (Caprio 2011)	Yes.	Could not find evidence.
Myanmar / Burma (Communist Insurgency)	1948	Yes. "Further, Thet Tun enjoyed an advantage through the use of local informers and interception of the Tatmadaw's wireless. He initiated several attacks and captured 127 weapons from the Tatmadaw in 1972 alone." (Myoe 2009, 159)	Yes. "One of the Tatmadaw's weaknesses was information leakage. The BCP knew almost every move of the troops. It had informers in the vicinity of the Tatmadaw's camps. The BCP knew how many days a certain platoon could stay on patrol without a fresh supply of food. For example, troops carried four-day rations which could be made to last up to six days in the most extreme situation. The BCP therefore initiated a battle on the fifth day, if there was no sign of fresh supply on the fourth day. The Tatmadaw suffered heavy casualties from this kind of attack." (153)	Yes. "The RC government, and later the BSPP government, secretly deployed many intelligence personnel and informers among the student population." 115	Yes. Government used atrocities committed by insurgents against them. "On 29 May 1967, a NDUF troop burnt down Shwe Pyi Thar village, a resettlement village with over 800 households. They also killed those who were suspected of being in the people's militia. The situation was exacerbated by the introduction of 'Red Power Building Committees' in the districts. More and more killings were committed by the insurgents in the search for intelligence, food and finance. The government sensationalized these atrocities in the media, over which it had tight control. Depicting the insurgents as 'bad guys' encouraged many people to dissociate themselves from the insurgents. Later, many villagers came to provide information about insurgent activities." (154)

Informing in irregular asymmetric conflicts since 1944

SI-24

Country Name (conflict if ambiguous)	Start Year	Evidence that information sharing by civilians matters?	Evidence that information sharing helps the receiving party? (Government or Insurgents)	Direct evidence of civilian informing?	Evidence that civilians respond to harm by reducing/increasing information sharing?
Myanmar / Burma (Karen Rebellion)	1948	Yes, "Like other insurgent organizations in Burma, the KNU has an interest in controlling, or at least maintaining, populations in traditionally Karen lands—as a source of legitimacy, and of food, intelligence, volunteer soldiers, and porters." (Adams, n.d., 23)	Yes. "In essence, the insurgents are waging a protracted war based on guerrilla warfare . . . They operate by relying on people's support. It is evident that villages are becoming insurgent strongholds and hideouts. They infiltrate villages and breed hardcore cadres. Through these hardcore cadres they control the villages. Then in the next stage, these villages are turned into base areas. It is very difficult for our troops [the Tatmadaw] to operate in these areas. The officer further said that insurgents gained the element of surprise, had better intelligence, relied on maintaining a high tempo in manoeuvres, and applied mobile defence." (Myoe 2009, 26)	Yes. Tatmadaw introduced "four cuts" doctrine to cut intelligence between the people and insurgents: "A dominant theme of discussions at the 1968 Tatmadaw conference in connection with the "people's war" doctrine was the 'Phyet-Lay-Phyet' [four cuts] strategy as counter-guerrilla strategy: to cut food supply to the insurgents; to cut protection money from villagers to the insurgents; to cut contacts (intelligence) between the people and the insurgents; and to make the people "cut off the insurgent's head" (meaning, involving the people in fighting, particularly the encirclement of insurgents)." (26)	No. Did not find specific evidence of response to harm. Found evidence of buying information: "Local commanders assigned tax collection duties to their men, and whatever was collected was used on the spot to buy rice, guns, telescopes, homemade weapons, and information from local populations across the country." (Callahan 2005, 135). Also found evidence civilians were targeted by counterinsurgency because of their suspected aiding of insurgency groups.
Philippines	1950	Yes. "On his first day as secretary, Magsaysay began to clean his new house...He then began a personal routine that included extensive travelling, talking with troops and he civilians alike, and taking quick and found a situation that warranted decisive actions when it." (Greenberg 1987, 83)	Yes. "The cover was working better than expected. "Force X" spent two days at the base - camp learning a great deal about local officials , Huk sympathizers and about mayors, and police chiefs who were informants within the constabulary. "Force X" attacked the unsuspectings quadrons . In a thirty-minute firefight, "Force X" killed eighty-two Huks, one local mayor, and captured three squadron commanders." (72)	Yes. Civilians were informing police and insurgency.	No. "Civilians were tortured, intimidated, and murdered by the Japanese as they sought information on guerrilla whereabouts and members. These terror tactics produced little information but drove many recruits to Taruc." (19)
Bolivia (Bolivian National Revolution)	1952	Could not find evidence	Could not find evidence	Yes. " "The characteristics of the month are the same as those of the previous one, except that the army is now showing more effectiveness in action. In addition, the mass of peasants (campesinos) are not helping us as all and are being turned into informants" " (Tapia 2019, 135)	Could not find evidence

Informing in irregular asymmetric conflicts since 1944

Country Name (conflict if ambiguous)	Start Year	Evidence that information sharing by civilians matters?	Evidence that information sharing helps the receiving party? (Government or Insurgents)	Direct evidence of civilian informing?	Evidence that civilians respond to harm by reducing/increasing information sharing?
Indonesia (Darul Islam rebellion)	1953	Could not find evidence	Yes. "By forming village security organizations, the army was able to reinforce its presence in the region and gain better intelligence on the insurgent activity on the ground." (Paul, Clarke, Grill, and Dunigan 2013, 121) Also : "By forming village security organizations, the army was able to reinforce its presence in the region and gain better intelligence on the insurgent activity on the ground." (121)	Yes. "COIN force received substantial intelligence from population in area of conflict." (120). Also, it seems like some villagers became informants and provided the Ulama (of the Darul Islam Rebellion) with information during the beginning of the Aceh conflict (Barter 19), and some civilians became informants for the army (120)	No evidence. "Popular support for the rebellion remained limited to small pockets of the country, and the insurgents received no assistance from an external actor." (123)
China	1956	Yes. "Still, the local authorities found the information indispensable." (U. 2007, 984)	Yes. The information helps the government with the Thought Reform. "During Thought Reform, local governments used the information they collected to divide the participants into different political categories for the purposes of political control, ..." (985)	Yes. Students are required to inform the local authorities to help with the thought reform.	Could not find evidence.
Indonesia (Darul Islam, PRRI, Permesta)	1956	Yes. "By 1961 the central government troops had burned over 10,000 homes in West Sumatra, mostly of accused rebel collaborators." (Fogg 2015, 170). This indicates that the government saw collaboration, which, while not directly stated, could include information sharing, as a large threat.	Could not find evidence	Yes. Due to ethnic ties, personal relationships, and anticommunist sentiments, insurgent forces had informants in the capital. Counter-insurgent forces also had had "loyalists" in Sumatra and Sulawesi. (Conboy and Morrison 1999)	Yes. Regarding the burning of houses by government troops, "The strong statement from these incidents was that the general populace of West Sumatra was willing to suffer through them and not turn in the rebel militias" (Fogg 2015, 170).
Cuba (Cuban Revolution)	1958	Yes. "The men and women who made up the intelligence network that gathered the information necessary for the conduct of guerrilla warfare were usually local inhabitants. They maintained direct contact with Batista's front lines and forwarded coded information, via a postal system, on the enemy's forward encampments and rear troop movements. In this way the guerrilla bands avoided places where there was large enemy troop concentration and attacked the smaller units in the most unexpected places." (American University 1963, 78)	Yes. "Prior to an assault on a populated area, advance information on telephone and telegraph lines, radio stations, railroads, airfields, number of enemy troops if any, and terrain was necessary to plan the operation, avoid surprises, and operate with the greatest possibility of success. Information received from the local inhabitants was analyzed by the intelligence sections of the guerrilla organizations." (78)	Yes. "Guerrilla units operating in the rural areas depended on the local population for food, supplies, intelligence, and fresh recruits." (69)	Could not find evidence

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SI-26

Country Name (conflict if ambiguous)	Start Year	Evidence that information sharing by civilians matters?	Evidence that information sharing helps the receiving party? (Government or Insurgents)	Direct evidence of civilian informing?	Evidence that civilians respond to harm by reducing/increasing information sharing?
Laos	1960	Yes. "CIA managers were already squeezing their teams... This required exploiting informants – occasionally recruited agents – among villagers cultivated by team members native to the area." (Ahern 2006, 219)	Yes. "It tracked enemy troop and weapons deployments for the benefit of tactical planning, both offensive and defensive, and followed the movement of North Vietnamese men and supplies into and through Laos. It reduced the risk to supply and liaison flights by identifying enemy presence on the ground below the approaches to upcountry sites." (272)	Yes. CIA documents mention villagers in Laos being informants.	Could not find evidence.
Myanmar / Burma (Kachin conflict)	1960	Could not find evidence	Could not find evidence	Yes. "They did not eat at Arakan villages for fear that information might be leaked." (Pwint)	No. Found evidence of torture to extract information: "Soldiers have threatened and tortured civilians during interrogations for information about KIA insurgents, and raped women." (Smith 2012, 10)
Vietnam	1960	Yes. "Informants were recruited to identify communist cadres and a civic action program trained security teams and strengthened provincial administration." (Ahern)	No. "One complicating factor was the decision of the Vietnamese government to treat captured VC as criminals, not prisoners of war, with the result that after short sentences they were free to return to the fight. (339) The Provincial Interrogation Centers posed additional difficulties. Cases of brutality resulted when old traditions among the Vietnamese prevailed, a problem aggravated by the lack of trained interrogators. The CIA regarded the practices "as not only inhumane but counterproductive." (367)"	Yes. (Ahern)	No. "United States again faces the problems of foreign forces trying to protect populations that do not fully participate in their own defense and the alienation brought on by the destruction inherent in counterinsurgency and counterterrorist operations." (Ahern)
Iraq	1961	Could not find evidence	Yes. "Given its network of informers, one must assume the Baath was well aware of Mulla Mustafa's real views." (McDowall 1997, 330)	Yes	Could not find evidence
Algeria	1962	Yes. "Furthermore, the civilian population was thought to be informed of enemy movements and thus regarded as a key source of intelligence." (Branche 2007, 548)	Yes. "The purge of Timizar was the result of precise information given by an old widow who lived in a shack near the post. Sergeant Marty had befriended her by giving her food. She became our best undercover agent in the village, getting her information from other, unsuspecting women." (Galula 1964, 190)	Yes. "With the people of Igonane Ameer I used the process by which I had succeeded in getting information from Bekri at Bou Souar. It worked, and an old man gave me the names of three villagers who were FLN." (92)	No mentioning of response to violence. People were tortured and threatened to obtain info.
Kenya	1963	Could not find evidence	Could not find evidence	Could not find evidence	Could not find evidence

Informing in irregular asymmetric conflicts since 1944

Country Name (conflict if ambiguous)	Start Year	Evidence that information sharing by civilians matters?	Evidence that information sharing helps the receiving party? (Government or Insurgents)	Direct evidence of civilian informing?	Evidence that civilians respond to harm by reducing/increasing information sharing?
Sudan	1963	<p>Yes. "Then – during the first civil war – men were temporarily recruited in 'friendly' villages to pursue 'outlaws'. In this conflict, the warring parties expanded violent control of local populations to the individual level. Their recruitment of informers, scouts and 'home guards' during the 1960s formed the basis for a fine-meshed intelligence network and, in the last years of the first civil war, local government authorities in the south also established a formal system of National Guards (Aras Watani) as informers and armed auxiliary troops." (Kindersley 390) "Both insurgent and counter-insurgent forces tried and executed alleged informants." (Kindersley and Rolandsen 11). Further, "accumulated evidence from government security files indicate that in some months, their violent retribution against chief's police, suspected collaborators and informants (and their villages) surpassed the number of attacks on the Sudanese army or police." (Kindersley and Rolandsen 12). This together indicates that, at a minimum, both sides, and insurgents especially, viewed informants as major threats and placed great priority on targeting them. In addition "more recent expansions of this informant-based security state' by the Sudanese government "are rooted in logic and practices from this period." (Kindersley and Rolandsen 2019, 12)</p>	<p>Yes. "Government troops were often at a disadvantage owing to lack of intelligence about activities in the southern forests. They did not know the local dialects, whereas the Anya-Nya invariably had members of local tribes in its ranks, who were able to obtain instant information about Muslim forces in the area." (O'Ballance 2000, 47). Also Found: As stated under "Info sharing by civilians matters," both counter-insurgent forces and insurgent forces targeted suspected informants, with insurgents appearing to place greater emphasis on this, indicating that the information provided was at least seen by both sides as important (Kindersley and Rolandsen 2019, 11). Further, the Sudanese governments adoption and expansion of this system of informants in later years potentially points to the effectiveness of the system (12)</p>	<p>Yes. "Instead, this guerrilla force relied heavily on Southerners in the town to provide information, firearms, and morale. " (Poggo 2008, 69)</p>	<p>Could not find evidence</p>
Chad (FROLINAT)	1965	<p>Could not find evidence</p>	<p>Could not find evidence</p>	<p>Could not find evidence</p>	<p>Could not find evidence</p>

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Country Name (conflict if ambiguous)	Start Year	Evidence that information sharing by civilians matters?	Evidence that information sharing helps the receiving party? (Government or Insurgents)	Direct evidence of civilian informing?	Evidence that civilians respond to harm by reducing/increasing information sharing?
Thailand	1966	Yes. "These informants said that the basis of the rumours of split grew out of the dissatisfaction and impatience of some of the new members who were eager to begin an urban insurgency." (Wedel 1981, 329)	No. "In a similar vein, Therdpoom said: I just could not accept the direction they were moving in. The guidelines were wrong, pointing the wrong way. I could not see any future. There was no chance that they could succeed in making revolution in Thailand. The discipline I could follow, the conditions I could bear, but there was no future. (Interview, 12 December 1980.)" (339)	Yes.	Could not find evidence
Uganda (Baganda Rebellion)	1966	Could not find evidence	Could not find evidence	Could not find evidence	Could not find evidence
Cambodia	1970	Could not find evidence	Yes. "Because of the rebels' superior mobility and local intelligence, they often could seize the control of hamlets and villages and mobilize combatants wherever they went." (Kubota 2013, 55)	Yes. "Government forces also coerced civilians to cooperate. Villagers offered not only material goods but information about the rebels' confidential activities." (61)	Could not find evidence. Literature does suggest that harm by the government decreased civilian support. "However, restrictions imposed on civilian liberties and the coercive nature in paramilitary recruitment may in fact undermine popular support for the government." (33)

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Country Name (conflict if ambiguous)	Start Year	Evidence that information sharing by civilians matters?	Evidence that information sharing helps the receiving party? (Government or Insurgents)	Direct evidence of civilian informing?	Evidence that civilians respond to harm by reducing/increasing information sharing?
Oman	1971	<p>Yes. "The local populace provided the movement with basic provisions and intelligence, enabling the guerrillas to avoid contact with the military forces and continue to conduct hit-and-run attacks." (Paul, Clarke, Grill, and Dunnigan 2013, 276) "Informants, known as "Fred" were very important to British counter-insurgent forces. They provided information which was otherwise near impossible to come by." (Jones 2011, 566)</p>	<p>Yes. "Where an SIO did gain useful information from the local inhabitants, the mass of material produced was rarely collected and collated as part of a recognizable intelligence cycle that could usefully produce assessments – political or military - because of inadequate supporting staff. What little indigenous intelligence was forthcoming had to be treated with care based as it was on 'paid headmen' (muqqadam). Their information could be accurate but equally, was often influenced by the vagaries of tribal rivalries masquerading as insurgent activity." (563). "The intelligence provided by "Fred" was critical to British forces because the Omani military and intelligence was quite lacking in terms of information." (566)</p>	<p>Yes. "Particular areas and the threat that they may pose to SAF operations. For the most part, however, the information gained by the Intelligence Corps personnel was overwhelmingly derived from human intelligence sources (HUMINT), most notably informers and, of crucial importance, surrendered enemy." (566)</p>	<p>Yes. "The brutality of the Omani forces, combined with the extraordinary lack of civil development in the region, sparked significant grievances among the inhabitants of Dhofar that the insurgents were able to successfully exploit." (Paul, Clarke, Grill, and Dunnigan 2013, 276). Initially in the insurgency, the Dhofari people were quite against the government due to Taimur's restrictive policies, which denied the people of Oman, and specifically the Dhofari, "educational, medical, or social infrastructure" such as "hospitals, schools, roads, houses, electricity supply and water supply," and also offered amnesty to former insurgents. (Zimmerman 2007, 107). Under Sultan Qaboos, British and Omani teams dug wells, built medical infrastructure and introduced different forms of husbandry in Dhofar, helping turn public opinion. (Jones 2011, 562). In addition to clearing the way for the "Fred," this resulted in the defection of information sharing by former insurgents, providing "critical intelligence" aiding in the defeat of insurgents (Zimmerman 2007, 112). In this sense, insurgents and civilians responded positively to the end of a situation perceived to be harmful. Further, insurgents often used torture against locals, which was initially resented less than the Sultan's abuses. However, with the ascension of Sultan Qaboos, and the insurgents' inability to match public works and services, public opinion in Dhofar shifted against the insurgents (107)</p>

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Country Name (conflict if ambiguous)	Start Year	Evidence that information sharing by civilians matters?	Evidence that information sharing helps the receiving party? (Government or Insurgents)	Direct evidence of civilian informing?	Evidence that civilians respond to harm by reducing/increasing information sharing?
Philippines (Moro conflict)	1971	Yes, " Additionally, the GRP has supplemented its control of the region with the help of village-based civilian militias called Citizen Armed Force Geographic Units (CAFGUs) and "village watch" and intelligence gathering units called "civilian voluntary organizations" (CVOs). (Chen 64)	Yes. "Nevertheless, the AFP recognises that women are essential to the waging of war and are skilled at key tasks such as intelligence gathering and disseminating and gathering information from the public." (Report 30)	Could not find evidence	Maybe. "The MNLF did try to screen and train its recruits—an investment that went some way to ensuring good behavior towards civilians" (Keister 340)
Sri Lanka (1971 JVP insurrection)	1971	Yes. The government promised monetary rewards for information about suspects (Obeyesekere 1974, 368)	Mixed evidence. "After the spirit of the movement was broken, the government urged members of the public to provide information on suspects to a special bureau established for this purpose, or to the police. In some instances minor monetary rewards were offered, and in all instances the informant's anonymity was guaranteed. As would be expected, this led to a spate of information and many persons paid off private grudges, or hostile feelings against low caste persons or personal enemies by informing against them. There is no doubt whatsoever that several innocent people were implicated and subsequently arrested as a result of all this." (368)	Yes. "Innocent Tamils who dared to come forward and give evidence were targeted as informants and eventually killed by the militants." (Bandarage 69)	Likely not. Evidence suggests people reported false information based on their personal dislike: "Goyigama folk living in proximity to these low caste people used the post-insurgency period to inform against persons of this caste, so that in some Batgama villages in the Kegalle District the youth were practically decimated." (372)
Zimbabwe (Rhodesian Bush War)	1972	Yes, "In due course it was made a punishable offence not to report the presence of guerrillas in an area, and rewards of Rh\$5,000 or more were offered for information leading to the death or capture of guerrillas and the seizure of arms caches." (Moorcroft and McLaughlin 2008, 400)	Yes. "Collective fines were imposed on the affected areas. Tribesmen were hit where it hurt most: their cattle were impounded. In February 1973, all facilities—shops, clinics, schools, churches, businesses and mills—were shut down in the Chiweshe TTL. Other areas were also 'closed' while the Rhodesian army swept them. 'Inform on the guerrillas or your schools and shops will stay shut' was the message. Although intelligence began to improve, these collective measures embittered the peasant farmers. Still, guerrilla movement was seriously hampered by these measures." (78)	Yes. "The local black population assisted by volunteering information about suspicious activity." (Frame 2018, 236)	No direct evidence, but one source suggests that there were concerns that the establishment of protected villages by the Rhodesian Government might drive these villages to support the guerillas. ' (342)

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Country Name (conflict if ambiguous)	Start Year	Evidence that information sharing by civilians matters?	Evidence that information sharing helps the receiving party? (Government or Insurgents)	Direct evidence of civilian informing?	Evidence that civilians respond to harm by reducing/increasing information sharing?
Namibia (Namibian War of Independence)	1973	Yes. "A poster of the time lists the rewards as R5000 for an RPG launcher, R2000 for information leading to the capture of a SWAPO insurgent, R1000 for a landmine, R500 for a AK47, R100 for a mortar bomb, R100 for a hand grenade and R100 for a jumping-jack anti-personnel mine." (Visser 2013, 5)	Yes. "Indeed, the number of times that information supplied by civilians led to the capture or elimination of SWAPO insurgents, or to the capture of arms caches, rose from sixty-four in 1983, to more than two thousand in 1987." (28)	Yes. "By contrast, in the contested Ovamboland region the the quantity and quality of information received from the population were considered insufficient, although former Head of the SADF Gen Georg Meiring insists that results improved towards the end of the war." (6)	No direct evidence. One source does suggest that the troops were to treat civilians with respect and sympathy to gather intelligence. "At the very minimum troops were presented with the paradox that Army Head Quarters expected them to treat the population with respect and sympathy, so that the people would withhold support from SWAPO and freely give up information, while on the ground they found Koevoet extracting information by force." (13)
Bangladesh	1974	Could not find evidence	Yes. "Moreover, the country's independence was attained through a guerrilla warfare—many ordinary people within the country provided guerrillas with much-needed shelter and crucial information for their operations." (Dowlah 2016, 132)	Yes. "The law allowed arrests without warrant of anybody who helped Pakistani occupation forces 'by words, signs or conduct,' and sanctioned punishments included confiscation of properties, imprisonment for not less than three years, and death sentence." (172)	Could not find evidence
Ethiopia (Ethiopian Civil War)	1974	Yes. "Before the coup attempt, people used to worry that negative remarks about the government might be reported by one of the army of government informants in the neighborhood, says one Ethiopian woman." (Press)	Yes. "The officer could not have been wrong in his conclusion, since it was well known that the rebels, both the TPLF and EPLF, used peddlers, priests, shoeshine boys, and prostitutes as spies and informers. One prostitute was responsible for the death of her lover, a highly regarded security officer in Asmara, Eritrea." (Tareke 2009, 170)	Yes. "Rural people helped the rebels, willingly or under duress, by providing sustenance, shelter, and intelligence information." (222)	Could not find evidence
Iraq (Second Iraqi-Kurdish War and Kurdish insurgency)	1974	Could not find evidence	Yes. "The Kurds in Iran had been kept on a tight leash by the SAVAK system of informers, government bribes and patron- age, and turning one tribe against another." (O'Ballance 1996, 108)	Could not find evidence	Could not find evidence
Cambodia (Cambodian genocide)	1975	Yes. "Special spy units, Kang Chhlop, were composed mainly of children and were used to spy on adults." (<i>Children in Cambodia under the Khmer Rouge</i>)	Could not find evidence	Yes. "Also in practice, however, authority to execute was delegated to or usurped by District or lower level Party cadre, including cooperative-level authorities who relied heavily on the chhlop and other villagers whom they recruited as undercover informers to report on the pasts and activities of their fellow villagers." (Heder and Tittmore 2001, 33)	Could not find evidence

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Country Name (conflict if ambiguous)	Start Year	Evidence that information sharing by civilians matters?	Evidence that information sharing helps the receiving party? (Government or Insurgents)	Direct evidence of civilian informing?	Evidence that civilians respond to harm by reducing/increasing information sharing?
Indonesia (Indonesian invasion of East Timor)	1975	Could not find evidence	Could not find evidence	Yes. "Villagers informed them that the enemy, wearing military uniforms and red scarves around their necks, were already in the village of Megir, to the west." (Kammen 2015, 129)	No. Found evidence of torturing to extract info: "The torture and maltreatment happened at several specific moments - that is, before the killing was carried out and after the arbitrary arrests for the purpose of extracting information from the victims." (McDonald et al. 2002, 53)
Morocco / West Sahara (Western Sahara War)	1975	Could not find evidence	Could not find evidence	Yes. "The bergag could be a neighbor, a teacher, a café server, a Sahrawi, a – they could have been any one of the customers drinking tea or coffee in front of the Agjijimat building. I constantly received warnings about braguig, and while I could infer from certain interactions that specific small shop owners, café servers – or even interlocutors – were likely serving as government informants, their embeddedness in the social fabric of the city itself made it difficult to confirm their presence with any certainty." (Drury 2018, 55)	Could not find evidence
Afghanistan (Soviet presence in Afghanistan)	1978	Could not find evidence	Yes. "As well as major cordon and search operations, the Soviets mounted smaller raids for more limited objectives, eg, the destruction of a small guerrilla band or the elimination of a commander. These were often successful where KHAD infiltrators or informers in the local population provided intelligence to government forces and/or the people failed to give early warning of an enemy approach." (Dick 2002, 11)	Yes. Found evidence of civilians informing Mujahidin: "The Mujahidin's ability to successful interdict the main LOCs throughout the country was highly dependent on a robust informant network of civilians and government contacts." (Thorne 2013, 53)	No direct evidence, but Soviets considered minimizing civilian casualties to win over local population support. "By 1987, many Soviet commanders had come to realize that winning the support of the people was the key to the successful prosecution of the war. Consequently, they sought to minimize military operations, both to reduce their own casualties and to reduce damage to the Afghan population." (Robinson 2010, 7)
Colombia (Colombian conflict)	1978	Yes. "The FARC was consistently able to obtain information on politicians, political candidates, and wealthy businessmen with enough fidelity to kidnap them for ransom. Perhaps equally important, through its underground and auxiliary, the FARC constructed a sophisticated intelligence collection capability to identify new recruits and develop the information needed for complex attacks." (Command, n.d., 140)	Yes. "In the Middle Magdalena Valley, deserters like Berta were the corner-stone of the paramilitary strategy. Dozens of them helped the right-wing groups identify and, in some cases, kill rebel collaborators." (Dudley 2006, 57)	Yes. "In a second example, the FARC used locals to gather information on troop disposition within a Colombian Army unit operating in the Caguan River region in 1998. As a result, the insurgents were able to inflict a devastating blow that wiped out 107 of the unit's 154 soldiers." (Command, n.d., 144)	Could not find evidence

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SI-33

Country Name (conflict if ambiguous)	Start Year	Evidence that information sharing by civilians matters?	Evidence that information sharing helps the receiving party? (Government or Insurgents)	Direct evidence of civilian informing?	Evidence that civilians respond to harm by reducing/increasing information sharing?
Guatemala (Guatemala Civil War)	1978	Mixed evidence. Some mentioning of sympathizers and enemy guerrillas sharing valuable intel: "Moreover, according to Letona, an estimated "20,000 former enemy guerrillas and sympathizers enrolled in the amnesty program in the first year. Some were combatants, others were part of the logistical or political structure, and some belonged to the political and military leadership structure." Many would become Civil Patrols members "providing an invaluable source of information to military units." (Schirmer 2010, 52)	Could not find evidence	Yes. "Part of such intelligence gathering has come from children in indigenous communities temporarily separated from their mothers by S-5 officers who are checking, for example, on CERJ members organizing against Civil Patrols. The children are shown toys and given sweets while being asked about what their father does, if he makes trips, what time he goes to bed and gets up, if he gets up during the night [to leave the house]." (107)	No. There is evidence of luring peasants into sharing intelligence: "Food for Work programs forcibly recruited peasants, primarily for intelligence purposes and soldiering, then for road construction with the Army Engineers Brigade and later for refugee model village projects. The major purpose of the refugee camps was "to sustain the success of the campaign by breaking the infrastructural support of the guerrillas and minimize the participation and killing of noncombatants, because [the army] wasn't winning the war by doing so." (Schirmer 58). Interrogation was also used: "Interrogation sessions shifted to depend more on psychological measures (e.g., threats against family) and cooperation (show us where your companeros and safe houses are) to elicit as much information as possible." (170)
Nicaragua (Nicaraguan Revolution)	1978	Yes. "According to a former State Security agent, "The contras' information system was so good that an army convoy could leave Quilalí at 12 o'clock and at 12:10 they would have an ambush set up on the hillside just outside town. They [contra collaborators] always knew where their family members were so as to get information to them." (Horton 1998, 208)	Yes. "Such peasant collaborators played a role in the 1983 attack on the El Coco cooperative and later attacks on the cooperatives of Panal'í and La Reforma. Quilalí peasants who lived near the cooperatives sent word to contra patrols when the adult men of the cooperative and the Sandinista Army were away, allowing the contras to launch their attack when the cooperative was left relatively defenseless. Peasant collaborators also kept close track of the movements of Sandinista military and government vehicles and this information sometimes allowed contras to directly ambush vehicles or place mines in their path." (208)	Yes. "In addition, thousands more peasants participated in civilian collaborator networks that provided contra troops with food, shelter, and vital military information." (XII)	No. One source suggests "that in communities under contra influence, peasants collaborated out of a sense of genuine conviction and support for the contras, and in other cases as a result of open and implicit contra intimidation." (207). No mentioning of response to civilian harm.

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Country Name (conflict if ambiguous)	Start Year	Evidence that information sharing by civilians matters?	Evidence that information sharing helps the receiving party? (Government or Insurgents)	Direct evidence of civilian informing?	Evidence that civilians respond to harm by reducing/increasing information sharing?
El Salvador (Salvadoran Civil War)	1979	Yes. "The many campesinos who joined government networks and civil patrols or served as government informants came from equally diverse economic backgrounds." (Wood 2003, IX)	Yes. "Another important adaptation in campesino defense strategies at this time was the expansion of intelligence gathering into the military realm. More specifically, campesinos collected information about Salvadoran military patterns; a better understanding of official patterns increased the probabilities for successful guindas because it meant that campesinos could predict what was to come and respond accordingly." (Todd 2010, 62)	Yes. "The many campesinos who joined government networks and civil patrols or served as government informants came from equally diverse economic backgrounds." (Wood IX) "Safety concerns also prompted refugee organization and action from the start. Just as they had at home and during the guindas, refugee men formed grupos de vigilancia (vigilance groups) and took turns patrolling the camps in order to inform the community about the movement of troops around the camp circumference, suspicious behavior, and impending incursions." (Wood 2003, 103)	Could not find evidence
Iran (Iranian Revolution)	1979	Yes. "On 24 February, for example, the Tabriz Komiteh reportedly issued an order saying that the local population should inform them of the names of "counter-revolutionary suspects and leave the arrest to revolutionary militia." (LAW AND HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN 1980, 19)	Could not find evidence	No. Guerrillas were interested in winning civilian support: "Abrahamian (1989) has written that the guerrillas "tended to set off their bombs late at night and after telephone warnings in order to limit civilian casualties," suggesting that they were more interested in making political propaganda points than perpetrating terrorist activities." (Ritter 2010, 77)	Could not find evidence
Nigeria	1980	Mixed evidence. No mention of the Army's attitude toward information sharing, but it does seem to have received and acted on tips from unknown sources. (Isichei 1987, 198)	Mixed evidence. Nigerian police acted on 'reports' from small villages, which helped them unearth insurgent cells. Whether reports came from civilians or intelligence apparatus. (198)	Yes. There is mention of suspected police informants being killed.	No. Response to violence described in terms of moving. "Those witnessing the murder took to the street, shouting that the Maitatsine people had struck again. They were soon followed by residents of other parts of Yola. During the morning thousands of people fled their homes, taking their essential belongings with them. Some fled Yola altogether, but most rushed for the army and police barracks and police stations in Yola for protection." (Kastfelt 1989, 85). Information sharing not directly mentioned.
Peru	1980	No. Shining Path benefited greatly from civilian support, but their encouragement of information sharing isn't mentioned.	Yes. "The guerrillas were observed (although not by the author) sleeping in mountain caves known only to the local people. They also received food - although opinion varied as to whether this was given by sympathizers or by people terrorized into assisting." (Berg 1986, 179)	Yes	No. Peruvian government forces mistreated civilians, and it has been argued this is responsible for the swelling of support for Sendero Luminoso, but there is no direct mention of information sharing. (166)

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Country Name (conflict if ambiguous)	Start Year	Evidence that information sharing by civilians matters?	Evidence that information sharing helps the receiving party? (Government or Insurgents)	Direct evidence of civilian informing?	Evidence that civilians respond to harm by reducing/increasing information sharing?
Nicaragua	1981	Could not find evidence.	Could not find evidence.	Could not find evidence.	Could not find evidence.
Uganda	1981	Yes. "According to one PC, still holding a high position in the government at the time of interview, "we couldn't create a political network unless the population understood. Without their help, we couldn't get information about the enemy. We had to make them part and parcel of the struggle"." (Kasfir, n.d., 32)	Could not find evidence.	Could not find evidence.	Could not find evidence.
Sudan	1983	Could not find evidence.	Could not find evidence.	Yes, there are mentions of civilians informing to the military.	Could not find evidence.
Zimbabwe	1983	Could not find evidence.	Could not find evidence.	Could not find evidence.	Could not find evidence.
India (Manipur / PLA?)	1984	Yes. All sides in the conflict used villagers as a source of information, though they usually used force to get the villagers to talk. (Lierde 2011, 59)	Could not find evidence.	Yes	No. Civilians shared information under pressure or for profit. No mention of information sharing as a result of harm suffered. (66-67)
Turkey (PKK)	1984	Yes. "The village guard system, a progovernment militia force comprised of Kurdish local bosses, constituted one of the republic's most ambitious projects to gather information about the allegiances of the Kurdish population." (Belge 2016, 294-295)	Yes. "The village guard system appeared to resolve the identification problem for the government in two ways. First, village guards could provide locally embedded information to military authorities on the behavior or allegiances of other villagers, enabling the state to select individual targets. Second, villages that refused to enlist in the progovernment militias could be deemed PKK supporters. Simply 'inviting' a village to participate in the militia could thus divide the population into two exhaustive and mutually exclusive categories—progovernment and pro-PKK." (295)	Yes. PKK targets reportedly includes informants, village guards, and local level government officials.	No. Most sources mentioned anti-government sentiment that arose as a result of army brutality against civilians, but no specific references to information sharing were found.

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Country Name (conflict if ambiguous)	Start Year	Evidence that information sharing by civilians matters?	Evidence that information sharing helps the receiving party? (Government or Insurgents)	Direct evidence of civilian informing?	Evidence that civilians respond to harm by reducing/increasing information sharing?
Sri Lanka (JVP)	1987	No. "The JVP leadership was committed to winning power. It was prepared to sacrifice some popular support if that was the price to be paid for eliminating or weakening the opposition and thus increasing the chances of eventual success. What it required from the mass of the population was sympathy, passive quiescence to its own activities and abstinence from active support for the government." (Moore 1993a, 626). Information sharing is not part of this list.	Yes. "...the JVP were dependent for security on the support or acquiescence of surrounding populations, and thus very vulnerable once this support was withdrawn and information began to be passed on to the security forces on a substantial scale." (602)	It appears that civilians were captured to inform the JVP, and some suspected informants for opposition were killed.	Mixed evidence. "...the JVP were dependent for security on the support or acquiescence of surrounding populations, and thus very vulnerable once this support was withdrawn and information began to be passed on to the security forces on a substantial scale." (602) Also, " "There was no one to complain to. The government was deaf; the opposition absent; the Police drove us away like dogs. The JVP killed, the Army killed," said a mother who had lost three sons taken away in three different rounding-up operations never to return." (Sri Lanka Brief) The second quote illustrates a war in which both sides drove away those civilians who could provide information.
Burundi (army vs civilians)	1988	Could not find evidence.	Could not find evidence.	Could not find evidence.	Could not find evidence.
Papua New Guinea (BRA)	1988	No. Some mentions of civilians being accused of informing on the other side, but no evidence of whether the sides cultivated it.	Could not find evidence.	Yes.	No. "People believed to have breached BRA 'Standing Orders' were punished, with many alleged sorcerers being executed, most of them older people. In the face of such development, BRA support reduced rapidly in many areas." (Regan 2008, 278). No mention of information sharing in response to specific harm.
Somalia (SNM)	1988	Could not find evidence.	Could not find evidence.	Could not find evidence.	Could not find evidence.
India (Kashmir)	1989	Yes. "The Kashmir experience also supports the adage that intelligence drives COIN operations, and all security forces involved in the Kashmir theater worked to improve intelligence about insurgents or terrorists, especially tactical intelligence." (Ganguly and Fidler 2009, 77). This included information from apparent civilian sources, including double agents and informants who reported similar information to multiple government agencies. (77)	Yes. "Since they are familiar with the area, VDC [village defense committee] members have been providing the security forces with valuable information on the militants' movements and tactics. Thanks to the tips given by villagers, the number of militants killed by the security forces has almost doubled in the past year." (Telford, 7)	Yes, there were civilians informing the Indian government. It appears many of the informants were killed by insurgents.	Yes. "Kashmir's centrally appointed governor, Jagmohan Malhotra, showed open contempt for local police and government officials, who he viewed as corrupt and in league with anti-India elements. As a result, local intelligence dried up, and the state's capacity to combat emerging militant organizations and deal peacefully with popular agitations plummeted." (Meyerle, n.d., 12-13)

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Country Name (conflict if ambiguous)	Start Year	Evidence that information sharing by civilians matters?	Evidence that information sharing helps the receiving party? (Government or Insurgents)	Direct evidence of civilian informing?	Evidence that civilians respond to harm by reducing/increasing information sharing?
India (Naxalites)	1989	Yes. "The state also set up rival mass organizations to attract youth away from the Naxalites, started rehabilitation programs, and established informant networks." (Ganguly and Fidler 2009, 77)	Yes. Referring to grassroots intelligence networks, Ganguly writes: "These organizational changes and development of human resources at the grassroots level allowed security agencies to capture, arrest, and remove militants; conduct raids on safe houses and seize weapons and explosives; and eliminate militant's networks of logistical, financial, and material support." (117). Two source of intelligence mentioned in the same section are civilians paid by the government and ex-militants who had surrendered to police. No mention of voluntary information sharing by civilians.	Yes.	No. Vanden Eynde found that economic downturns were likely to prompt greater Naxalite violence against civilians in an attempt to deter information-sharing with security forces; it does not mention if these attempts were successful. The news article by Rajput confirms a frightened populace.
Senegal (Casamance / MFDC)	1989	Yes. "It is obvious that people may be questioned as a result of information obtained from other prisoners or willing informants." (Int'l,)	No. "In most cases, Casamance civilians have been imprisoned on the basis of anonymous, unverifiable accusations. In some cases, these have been malicious denunciations by jealous neighbours or political opponents who saw this as a convenient way of getting rid of bothersome rivals." (Int'l,)	Yes.	No. "Unable to overpower their adversary by military means, the two parties to the conflict have consciously chosen to terrorize civilians, including women and the elderly, to force them to take their side or at least to dissuade them from supporting the other side." (Int'l,)
India (northeast)	1990	No. "Using the perhaps unfortunate acronym of WHAM (winning hearts and minds), Indian doctrine also emphasizes winning popular support and a strict code of conduct in dealing with civilians." (Cline 2006, 142). No specific mention of information sharing.	Could not find evidence.	Yes	Could not find evidence.
Indonesia (Aceh / GAM 90-91)	1990	Yes. "In Aceh the main function of the wanra is helping to secure the rural areas, relieving the military of routine security duties such as guarding the villages at night, building sandbag barricades, and patrolling the area. The TNI also sees them as a vital source of information and local knowledge. The villagers are familiar with the terrain and generally tend to know who the GAM supporters in their areas are." (Schulze 2004, 43)	Yes. "AGAM/TNA has, however, been able to overcome its lack of firepower and training somewhat through its extensive network of informers with good communications able to provide intelligence and early warning of the movements of the TNI and the police." (31)	Yes.	Yes. "Yes, Front TUM [an anti-separatist group] will take action if someone is truly kidnapped by GAM. They try to investigate the GAM family, as kidnapping someone from a GAM family is a very effective way of responding [to a GAM kidnapping]. Then they inform the police of their actions. Because they don't have weapons, they coordinate with the police for back-up. They tell the police where they are keeping the person so they can guard them." (Barron, Clark, and Daud 2005)

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Country Name (conflict if ambiguous)	Start Year	Evidence that information sharing by civilians matters?	Evidence that information sharing helps the receiving party? (Government or Insurgents)	Direct evidence of civilian informing?	Evidence that civilians respond to harm by reducing/increasing information sharing?
Mali (Azawad conflict)	1990	Yes. Both examples from post-2012 Mali conflict: "In an attempt to bring the population to accept their extreme interpretation of Islam and its social rules, Ansar Dine distributed food, sometimes stolen from the stocks of humanitarian organizations, and also gave money to those giving information about theft and looting and any other information about persons not having adopted "the rules of God". They also set up patrols with phone lines available to the population wanting to denounce cases of this sort and authors of theft and looting." (<i>War crimes in North Mali</i> 2012, 7) "In units that deal with terrorism, one Malian gendarme reported that two to five people a day go out among the people to collect intelligence." (Shurkin, Pezard, and S. Zimmerman 2017, 73)	Could not find evidence.	Yes. Civilians reported as informing insurgents (MNLA) about community for money.	No. "Since civilians were the main victims of army retaliation, many civilians sided with the rebels, and many young men joined the MPLA." (Lecocq and Klute 2013, 426). No mention of information sharing.

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Country Name (conflict if ambiguous)	Start Year	Evidence that information sharing by civilians matters?	Evidence that information sharing helps the receiving party? (Government or Insurgents)	Direct evidence of civilian informing?	Evidence that civilians respond to harm by reducing/increasing information sharing?
Burundi (Palipehutu-FNL)	1991	No. "As pointed out by former local commanders of the movement, establishing good relationships with the local population was also part of PALIPEHUTU-FNL's strategy when they arrived in Bujumbura Rural in 1998." (Van Acker 2016, 26). Information sharing not mentioned.	No. "But civilian contributions were essential for sustaining the rebellion's local presence in the community and for supporting the broader war effort in other places, as well as for buying guns and ammunition. In addition to supplying food to the combatants stationed on the hill, often voluntarily, families and local business were also making regular monetary contributions so that the troops could buy additional food and cover other daily expenses, such as medication." (27). No mention of information sharing.	Yes	No. Example refers to CNDD, not Palipehutu: "Life is difficult. Children no longer go to school because we are afraid to lose them if shooting suddenly begins and we have to flee immediately. We have been especially afraid since the military chief said that we would pay. The government should know that we civilians are not equipped to confront armed men. There are too many armed men and too much insecurity. And we, we have no choice but to cooperate with them because we have nowhere else to go." (Burundi 2003). Also, "Despite this persecution by government troops, the crowd of Hutu informants did not enthusiastically support the CNDD. Instead, they claimed that they had also suffered when the FDD was active in the area: "There was a period when there was infiltration by the rebels. We heard the exchange of gunfire. The rebels asked for food by force. If you did not give it, you would be killed. We have two problems—we have a fear of the army and a fear of the assailants. They [the rebels] demanded food, then cattle. Then they killed, even if you gave them what they asked for. If you did not have the same ideology as them, they would kill you.'" (Longman, Watch (Organization), and Africa 1998, 98). Information sharing not mentioned.
Algeria (AIS, GIA)	1992	Yes. "Militias (also known as 'paramilitary' groups) are the answer of incumbents [Algerian government] to protracted guerilla warfare. First, they allow incumbents to reduce information costs: local people know who supports and helps the rebels." Also, "As the Algerian pro-government journalist Salima Tlemcani puts it... 'people can't eradicate the terrorists without the army, and the army can't exterminate the terrorists without the people'." (kalyvas'logic'2006)	Yes. "Militias (also known as 'paramilitary' groups) are the answer of incumbents [Algerian government] to protracted guerilla warfare. First, they allow incumbents to reduce information costs: local people know who supports and helps the rebels." Also, "As the Algerian pro-government journalist Salima Tlemcani puts it... 'people can't eradicate the terrorists without the army, and the army can't exterminate the terrorists without the people'." (kalyvas'logic'2006)	Yes	No. "A Rais resident describes the period of rebel domination as one in which 'people were afraid to give information to the army, afraid of reprisals'." (kalyvas'logic'2006)

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Country Name (conflict if ambiguous)	Start Year	Evidence that information sharing by civilians matters?	Evidence that information sharing helps the receiving party? (Government or Insurgents)	Direct evidence of civilian informing?	Evidence that civilians respond to harm by reducing/increasing information sharing?
Angola (UNITA?)	1994	Yes. "After 1976, the core element of UNITA's presence in rural Angola comprised bases with a military character that were also central to the movement's attempts to provide services to nearby villages. Villagers were militarily useful, for instance as sources of information, but they were separate from UNITA. According to a farmer whom UNITA recruited to be a village 'director' and liaison with the base: 'The leaders lived in bases, the population lived in the villages. When [the leadership] came from the bases to the villages, they would contact the director. They would ask, for example, 'Were there MPLA troops here?' and make a report.'" (Pearce 2012, 457)	Yes. "UNITA's mobility; collusion and support from local communities (either voluntarily or through extreme coercion and intimidation); linkages with regional networks based on familial, tribal and clan ties - especially in Zambia); the over-abundance of weaponry in Angola; collusion between FAA and UNITA forces on the ground in terms of control and access to areas; the lack of infrastructure and an absence of communications; provide a fertile breeding ground for the continuance of the current UNITA war effort." (Grobbeelaar 2003, 27)	Could not find evidence.	No. Grobbelaar discusses the myriad ways that UNITA lost civilian support due to violence, but information sharing is not mentioned.

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Country Name (conflict if ambiguous)	Start Year	Evidence that information sharing by civilians matters?	Evidence that information sharing helps the receiving party? (Government or Insurgents)	Direct evidence of civilian informing?	Evidence that civilians respond to harm by reducing/increasing information sharing?
Egypt (al-Gamaa al-Islamiyya / Islamic Group)	1994	<p>Yes. "On the frontlines against the IG [Islamic Group] and al-Jihad was the SSIS. A lineal descendant of the old political police, the SSIS is still responsible for the core missions of intelligence, counterintelligence, counterterrorism, and combating 'political crime.'...Informants are vital to the SSIS mission and they come from all walks of life. They include doormen at hotels and apartment complexes and sweepers who keep a sharp eye out for the suspicious and unusual. They might be any of Cairo's numerous taxi drivers who swarm in the traffic circles, hand on horn and footon pedal. Additionally, the SSIS recruits informants from the legions of unemployed young men who lounge at cafésor on the streets near major hotels, tourist sites and foreign diplomatic facilities. Sometimes the informants are ordered to maintain an overt presence to deter and intimidate their targets...The secret police supplements its informants with computer network monitoring, audio-visual surveillance, opening mail and tapping telephones. Legally, the SSIS must obtain judicial authorization before it can tap any telephone or fax line; however, Egypt's emergency laws grant the mukhabarat unlimited authority to monitor any Egyptians it deems suspicious." (Sirrs 2010, 163-164)</p>	<p>Yes. "The mukhabarat's emphasis on human intelligence operations in general and informants in particular has been a consistent trend over the last 100 years. From the city police Special Branches to today's technically sophisticated State Security Investigations Service (SSIS), the 'City Eye' has been a vital tool in intelligence collection, counterintelligence, counterterrorism, and other internal security missions. Built around a legion of street kids, merchants, doormen, hotel employees, civil servants, taxi drivers, and others, the City Eye is a formidable obstacle for any regime opponent to overcome. Indeed, the informants are the key to Egypt's well-deserved reputation as a secret police state." (Sirrs 2010)</p>	<p>Could not find evidence.</p>	<p>Could not find evidence.</p>

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Country Name (conflict if ambiguous)	Start Year	Evidence that information sharing by civilians matters?	Evidence that information sharing helps the receiving party? (Government or Insurgents)	Direct evidence of civilian informing?	Evidence that civilians respond to harm by reducing/increasing information sharing?
Congo-Zaire (AFDL, MLC, RCD)	1996	<p>Yes. "In Bunyakiri, when I was still with Padiri, a lot of natives joined our movement in the beginning; If a youth came to us, we would ask him if he knew other people who would be interested to join, some of his brothers, but it was almost automatic, they would come in groups (...). Some of them would be integrated directly as combatants, others would be sent back into the population to give us information on troop movements and the positions of the RCD (...) when the RCD controlled the "milieu", then it was more difficult. There were about 80% of the chiefs who were with the RCD, and the RCD always had their ANR (intelligence services) in the area to verify movements." (Marchais 2016, 144)</p>	<p>Yes. "We knew that the population was supporting the Mayi-Mayi; the population itself was like a combatant. In order to catch and kill them, we had to go through the chiefs; we would corrupt a chief and ask him to give us the names of those who were the Mayi-Mayi in the village. That's how we captured them." (150)</p>	<p>Could not find evidence.</p>	<p>Yes. "In Nyabibwe, the RCD had an intelligence service to know who was with the Mayi-Mayi. They carried out massacres; One day, they killed 6 people, including one of my catechists, in the forest of eucalyptus next to the lake. If you were called to the hill (where the military camp is), it was as if it was the end for you (...) The Mayi-Mayi attacked Nyabibwe several times; in late 1998, there was a terrible attack, combats lasted three days. I managed to not get killed; and then the RCD was telling me that if I am invincible like that then I must be with the Mayi-Mayi. And then they said we will soon find out whether you are invincible. Several times they ordered me to come to the camp but I never went, because I knew that my I was waiting for me up there. I am very lucky to be alive; everyone was fed up with the RCD; they were colonizers, and they were killing us. So we supported the Mayi-Mayi." (181)</p>
Nepal (CPN-M)	1996	<p>Yes. "In their relationship with ordinary people, the Maoists considered them enemies if they did not cooperate. On the other hand, the government used the same methods, extracting any information with the use of arms if they did not cooperate willingly." (Stalenoj 2014, 40)</p>	<p>Yes. "Maoist forces have controlled much of the countryside in Nepal since the beginning of the insurgency. The Nepali security forces typically operate out of heavily fortified positions at the district headquarters of each district. From there the Nepali security forces carry out raids on suspected rebel troop concentrations, relying heavily on local informants and other sources to determine where the Maoist rebels may be located. In a typical raid, the Nepali security forces will receive information that Maoists are staying the night in a particular village and quickly send troops to the village—often walking long distances in Nepal's inhospitable terrain—to capture or kill the Maoists." (<i>BETWEEN A ROCK AND A HARD PLACE: Civilians Struggle to Survive in Nepal's Civil War</i> 2004, 27)</p>	<p>Yes</p>	<p>Yes. "More specifically, it appears that the Maoists obtained food largely irrespective of whether or not the populace were attitudinally supportive, but that this was not the case with information." (Khalil, 236)</p>

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Country Name (conflict if ambiguous)	Start Year	Evidence that information sharing by civilians matters?	Evidence that information sharing helps the receiving party? (Government or Insurgents)	Direct evidence of civilian informing?	Evidence that civilians respond to harm by reducing/increasing information sharing?
Yugoslavia (Kosovo)	1998	Yes. "The Serbian Ministry of Internal Affairs also contains the state security service (SDB), otherwise known as the secret police, which was organized into directorates and sectors. The state security's role in the wars of the former Yugoslavia generally and Kosovo in particular should not be underestimated. The SDB maintained a large network of operatives and informants in Kosovo, among them many ethnic Albanians." ("Under Orders: War Crimes in Kosovo," n.d., 54)	Yes. "The perception that the Serbs were omniscient had three adverse effects on the KLA insurgency. First, it intimidated those who otherwise might be inclined to become actively involved or to assume leadership positions. Second, it also reduced the likelihood of broad popular support, both because the population was afraid and because it had no reason to believe that the insurgency could be successful. Third, it reinforced the KLA instinct that it had to be profoundly clandestine. But staying underground undercut the KLA's need to be visible in order to be credible among the general population in Kosovo and in the West." (Perritt 2008, 49)	Yes. Civilians forced to inform.	Could not find evidence.
Indonesia (Aceh? 1999-2005)	1999	Yes. "GAM's strategy was one of attrition, using guerrilla warfare and making use of its superior knowledge of the terrain and the population to counter-balance its lack of real military capacity. It relied upon the civilian population — sometimes using force — to provide it with information, food, shelter, and money to buy weapons." (Schulze 2006, 227). This example was undated, but others in the preceding and following text took place in 2000-2004, so it is likely that this refers to GAM during that time period as opposed to the 90s.	Could not find evidence. Difficult to find documents that distinguish between 90s GAM and 2000s GAM.	Yes.	Could not find evidence. Difficult to find documents that distinguish between 90s GAM and 2000s GAM.

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SI-44

Country Name (conflict if ambiguous)	Start Year	Evidence that information sharing by civilians matters?	Evidence that information sharing helps the receiving party? (Government or Insurgents)	Direct evidence of civilian informing?	Evidence that civilians respond to harm by reducing/increasing information sharing?
Russia (Chechnya)	1999	Yes. Souleimanov makes frequent references to Russian officers attempting to gain information from Chechen civilians. (Souleimanov and Aliyev 2015a)	Yes. "During the first Chechen War, insurgents were routinely provided with a spectrum of material support by the local population, including food, shelter, clothing, medicine, weapons, and ammunition. They would also provide insurgents with information on the movements and activities of Russian troops stationed nearby. Interviewees have asserted that their support was clearly mandated by the local code of hospitality...The implementation of the code of hospitality shaped the social base of the Chechen insurgency to a large extent during the First Chechen War. As an insurgency rises and falls on the tide of popular support, the locals' commitment to providing tangible support to insurgents, dictated by the code of hospitality, enhanced the Chechen insurgents' social mobility in that food, shelter, medicine, and other forms of support were provided to them by the local population in various parts of the republic." (34-35)	Yes. Civilians forced to inform.	Yes. "In keeping with the code of silence, Chechens largely refused to provide internal information to the Russian military and secret services during the First Chechen War, including information on the identities of insurgents, their supporters, and relatives. In contrast to a number of other (counter)insurgencies elsewhere in the world where locals have often been eager to supply incumbents with information on the insurgents and their social networks in an attempt to obtain benefits, the Chechens stubbornly resisted dragging outsiders into what they considered to be their own internal issues. As one interviewee observed, 'on many occasions, the Russian officers approached us offering various things... Money, cattle, security [...] in exchange for information about the fighters. Naturally, we refused, because it's not a Chechen habit to rat on your people.' " (30-31)
Afghanistan	2001	Yes. "As during the pre-9/11 era, village and neighborhood level intelligence networks continue to provide the Taliban with a large quantity of information on U.S. and ISAF movements and potential spies or government collaborators, as well as providing a population control function: fear of the Taliban's purportedly omnipresent spies is a major factor in many Afghans' decision to obey the Taliban's edicts and avoid assisting counterinsurgency efforts...Taliban informants appear to be motivated by multiple factors, including ideological fervor and financial inducements." (Brandt 2011)	Yes. "As during the pre-9/11 era, village and neighborhood level intelligence networks continue to provide the Taliban with a large quantity of information on U.S. and ISAF movements and potential spies or government collaborators, as well as providing a population control function: fear of the Taliban's purportedly omnipresent spies is a major factor in many Afghans' decision to obey the Taliban's edicts and avoid assisting counterinsurgency efforts...Taliban informants appear to be motivated by multiple factors, including ideological fervor and financial inducements." (Brandt 2011)	Could not find evidence.	Ambiguous "Second, we find evidence that the civilian response to casualties in Afghanistan is asymmetric with respect to the armed actor responsible." (Condra et al. 2010, 32-33)

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Country Name (conflict if ambiguous)	Start Year	Evidence that information sharing by civilians matters?	Evidence that information sharing helps the receiving party? (Government or Insurgents)	Direct evidence of civilian informing?	Evidence that civilians respond to harm by reducing/increasing information sharing?
Iraq	2003	<p>Yes. "But even as they promote the Desert Protectors, apparently the first unit of its kind in Iraq, the commanders admit that the new alliance is, at present, little more than a marriage of convenience that could break apart at any time. "This is the land of 'the enemy of my enemy is my friend,' " said Col. Stephen W. Davis, the Marine commander who oversees security for western Anbar Province from a base here. "The best friend you got today could be your enemy tomorrow." That caution was echoed by Lt. Col. Dale Alford, commander of the Third Battalion, Sixth Marines, which is operating in the towns along the southern Euphrates riverbank. "They're going to pick the side that allows them to get back to work," he said. "We just got to make sure it's us. As long as they're working on our side, that's all I care about." " (Semple 2005)</p>	<p>Yes. "On the final day of a town-to-town military sweep in November along the Euphrates River, hundreds of men in Ar Rabit, a farming village, were rousted from their homes by American and Iraqi troops and shepherded into long rows on a harvested cornfield. With the help of a group of locally recruited informants, most with their faces concealed by balaclavas and scarves, the troops pulled 12 suspected insurgents from the lineup, bound them in handcuffs and blindfolds, and took them away." (Semple 2005)</p>	<p>Yes. Informed to US Government.</p>	<p>Yes. "The patterns we find are consistent with a theory of insurgent violence that takes civilian agency into account....To the extent that collateral damage causes local noncombatants to effectively punish the armed group responsible by sharing less information with that group and more with its antagonist, collateral damage by Coalition forces should increase attacks by insurgents, whereas collateral damage caused by insurgents should decrease attacks. Our data are consistent with this argument and cast doubt on several alternative explanations for the result." (Condra and Shapiro 2012, 185)</p>
Thailand	2004	<p>Yes. "Recent statements by the military on the state of the southern turbulence are positive, yet hedged with critical qualifications, chief among which is the continuing challenge to increase the cooperation of local people and to gain positive press coverage." (Askew 2008, 207)</p>	<p>Yes. "Intelligence tip-offs from local informants led to further sweeps and raids in late July, and by early August the numbers of suspects detained and questioned numbered around 2,000, though many were subsequently released." (Askew 194) Also, "In Narathiwat, Pattani and Yala between February and May, security forces targeted key districts for cordon and sweep operations following tip-offs from informants about insurgents' movements and the location of individuals listed in arrest warrants. In these operations, they captured Runda Kumpulan Kecil (RKK, purportedly the armed wing of the BRN-C) guerilla fighters, suspected insurgent sympathizers and drug dealers." (205)</p>	<p>Yes</p>	<p>Yes. "More informants in Muslim areas were reported to have been available because local people were growing weary of the violence and intimidation exercised by insurgent groups." (195)</p>

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Country Name (conflict if ambiguous)	Start Year	Evidence that information sharing by civilians matters?	Evidence that information sharing helps the receiving party? (Government or Insurgents)	Direct evidence of civilian informing?	Evidence that civilians respond to harm by reducing/increasing information sharing?
Mali (Mali War)	2009	Yes. "To collect information MINUSMA had a great variety of sensors at its disposal. These sensors varied from the typical military battalions to innovative newcomers such as ASIFU and SOLTG. Many African nations contributed troops to MINUSMA, including battalions from Burkina Faso, Chad, Guinea, Niger, Senegal and Togo. These units had great potential to collect relevant information, mainly due to the cultural similarities they had with the Malian population. Language skills were an important part of this, though the extent to which African soldiers mastered French or any of the local languages differed." (Rietjens and Dorn 2017, 9)	Could not find evidence.	Yes. "The SOLTG collected much information through multiday operations. During these operations the Special Forces visited several communities at long distances from their base in Gao. This was a task that few other UN units could perform, given the remote locations of some of these communities, far from UN bases and normal patrol routes. The Special Forces held many meetings with a variety of people, including military commanders, police chiefs, political leaders, leaders of 'terrorist' armed groups and local villagers." (208)	Could not find evidence.
Nigeria (Boko Haram insurgency)	2009	Yes. "The Borno State government has partnered with the military to train the youth on how to gather intelligence and make arrests. Known as the Civilian Joint Task Force (CJTF) (Strochlic 2014), they have been very active in Borno State. Night patrols are organized to protect communities and wade off nocturnal attacks by Boko Haram. The CJTF gathers intelligence information and hands over arrested Boko Haram members to the relevant agencies." (Akinola, Khan, and Faluyi 2019, 101)	Yes. "In some cases, the terrorist group paid families in cash to release their male children to join Boko Haram (ICC 2015). These children are used as soft tools for intelligence gathering on the activities of military personnel (ICC 2015). This is an effective strategy as children are assumed to pose no threat." (68)	Yes. "The police also work with local communities, through community public relations committees, which meet intermittently to exchange information to prevent and combat crime (including terrorism)." (94)	No evidence. "The group also enjoys the support of sympathizers, who are not necessary taking part in the struggle, but provide information for the insurgents because they have had lost faith in the government." (Azama 2017, 58)
Lybia (Libyan Civil War)	2011	Could not find evidence.	Could not find evidence.	Yes. "In some areas, local activists have started compiling lists and other information about missing people, and sharing them with the Libyan Red Crescent or contacting the ICRC, hoping to get some information." (<i>THE BATTLE FOR LIBYA KILLINGS, DISAPPEARANCES AND TORTURE</i> 2011, 59)	Could not find evidence.

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Country Name (conflict if ambiguous)	Start Year	Evidence that information sharing by civilians matters?	Evidence that information sharing helps the receiving party? (Government or Insurgents)	Direct evidence of civilian informing?	Evidence that civilians respond to harm by reducing/increasing information sharing?
Syria (Syrian Civil War)	2011	Yes. "An April 2019 report by the Syrian Justice and Accountability Centre (SJAC), based on a sample of 5 003 documents drawn from about 483 000 papers retrieved from Syria during the civil war, revealed how the intelligence agencies created a wide network of informants and used phone surveillance to ensure that the government kept a close watch of the most mundane of Syrians' everyday life and restrict criticism of Assad and his government." (<i>Syria Targeting of individuals</i> 2020, 15)	Yes. "Kurdish-led forces allied with the United States provided information — including used underwear for a DNA analysis — that was key to the operation that killed the Islamic State group's leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, the leader of the Kurdish forces in Syria said Monday." (Engel and Arkin 2019)	Yes. Children were used as informants: "The CoI stated in a report covering the period from September 2011 to the end of October 2019 that 'children, most frequently boys, but also on occasion girls, have been used in hostilities by parties to the conflict for combat roles, to acts as spies, informants, or to serve at checkpoints, in violation of international humanitarian law.'" (<i>Syria Targeting of individuals</i> 2020, 92)	Could not find evidence.
South Sudan (South Sudanese Civil War)	2013	Could not find evidence.	Could not find evidence.	Could not find evidence.	Could not find evidence.
Ukraine (Ukrainian crisis)	2014	Could not find evidence.	Could not find evidence.	Yes. "Residents of areas outside government control face a double threat in that Security Service officers may pressure them to become informants, placing them at serious risk of ill treatment by the Russian-backed armed formations upon their return home." (<i>"Nobody Wants Us": The Alienated Civilians of Eastern Ukraine</i> 2018, 22)	No. Evidence of force to extract info: "On 2 June 2017, a woman in Kramatorsk was abducted by unknown men dressed in black, without any insignia. She was threatened at gun point, and questioned about her family for approximately 90 minutes. The perpetrators demanded that she provide information about armed groups' military equipment." (<i>Report on the human rights situation in Ukraine 16 May to 15 August 2017</i> 2017, 11)
Chad (Boko Haram)	2015	Yes. "Unlike government troops, guerrillas effectively engage locals and recruits from inhabitant of their geographical location (community) with knowledge of the terrain and can easily spot any unusual movement in their controlled." (Azama 2017, 59)	Yes, "Additionally, Boko Haram has been able to dominate its areas of operation, establish bases, and shift within Niger, Nigeria, Chad, and the Republic of Cameroon unopposed. The group has employed the services of local inhabitants, who also provide support and information to the group, further enhancing their knowledge of terrain." (59)	Yes. "The coupeurs de route have also drawn a steady flow of young men from more urban settings, from the expanding towns and cities across the region who have not been able to find more conventional work; they may not be as used to the rigors of life in the bush as ex-soldiers and herdsmen are, but they bring connections and intelligence from the towns, vital in planning bandit attacks." (MacEachern 2018, 59)	Could not find evidence.

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Country Name (conflict if ambiguous)	Start Year	Evidence that information sharing by civilians matters?	Evidence that information sharing helps the receiving party? (Government or Insurgents)	Direct evidence of civilian informing?	Evidence that civilians respond to harm by reducing/increasing information sharing?
Tunisia (Islamic insurgency in Tunisia)	2015	Yes. "Two of the proposed amendments, Articles 107 and 108, have prompted criticism by lawyers who argue that attorney-client confidentiality would be threatened by regulations requiring lawyers to report clients suspected of terrorist activities." (<i>Country Reports on Terrorism 2017</i> 2018, 153)	Could not find evidence.	Could not find evidence.	Could not find evidence.
Cameroon (Ambazonia insurgents)	2017	Could not find evidence.	Could not find evidence.	Yes. "Cameroon's intelligence services and security forces rely, in part, on informers to pinpoint the whereabouts, movements and activities of individuals linked to armed separatists. In response, many people have been intimidated, beaten or killed for being perceived to be collaborating with security forces and secret services." (<i>A TURN FOR THE WORSE: VIOLENCE AND HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS IN ANGLOPHONE CAMEROON</i> 2017, 15)	Could not find evidence.
Mali (Terrorism)	2017	Yes. "While gendarmes we spoke with also noted capability gaps in intelligence, they reported that every gendarme receives training to elicit information from the population and that this is made easy for them because of their role as community police in rural areas." (Shurkin, Pezard, and S. R. Zimmerman 2017, 73)	Could not find evidence.	Yes. "However, in Timbuktu, one officer reported receiving numerous calls a day from locals wishing to provide information on enemy movements." (72)	No. "Militants have targeted civilians in an attempt to gain their support or prevent them, through intimidation, from working with international and Malian forces. Militants killed more than ten people in 2014 for allegedly providing information." (36)
Mozambique (Insurgency in Cabo Delgado)	2018	Yes. "The intelligence community has infiltrated all the social tiers of village life and speaking is risky." (Matsinhe and Valoi, 6)	Could not find evidence.	Yes. "According to local opinion, the extremists targeted community leaders because they believed they were acting as informants working in collaboration with military and security forces, revealing the identities and positions of the extremists." (7)	Could not find evidence.

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