Political Consequences of Fear during War*

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Abstract

What are the political consequences of fear during war? Prior work on crime and conflict suggests that traumatic events may trigger strong emotional responses, which can increase political participation in a number of ways. Fear is also associated with anxiety, depression, and loss of cognitive and social functions, which may lead to political withdrawal. We present evidence of a link between past exposure to violence and heightened feelings of fear using a large-scale national survey. We find consistent evidence that fear significantly reduces political engagement. These findings provide evidence of a psychological mechanism largely absent from prior work in politics and challenges the notion that survivors of trauma are politically activated by their experiences with violence.

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Civilians increasingly represent the vast majority of victims in armed combat. As of November 2019, some scholars estimate that in the post-2001 wars of Afghanistan, Iraq, Pakistan, Syria, and Yemen, war has directly led to the deaths of between 313,000 and 335,000 civilians, far surpassing deaths of soldiers and insurgents (Crawford and Lutz, 2019). Those that survive must learn to live with the immediate consequences of such violence—lost family members, burned homes, destroyed public infrastructure—and cope with the psychological aftermath of such trauma. These traumatic experiences may mobilize civilians, leading them to become more politically engaged. These events might also rip the social fabric of communities in ways that are difficult to mend. At an individual level, trauma might threaten mental health, harden beliefs about helplessness, and trigger political withdrawal.

It is difficult to disentangle the political consequences of direct exposure to violence from the subjective ways individuals process and cope with such events. Following a traumatic experience, some may form deep-seated fears about physical security while others do not. The impacts of civilian trauma may extend far beyond the triggering event, influencing a range of political, economic, and social behaviors.

Understanding the political consequences of fear is crucial. During war, fear may undermine civilian support for political institutions, trigger distrust and doubt, and increase pessimism about peace-building, perhaps prolonging hostilities. After war, trauma might hinder reconciliation and reconstruction efforts and harden attitudes toward out-groups.

Our contribution is to use a detailed, large-scale national survey in Afghanistan to unpack how physical insecurity and fear influence political behavior. While prior work in political science and economics has demonstrated an inconsistent but positive impact of violence exposure on pro-social and political behaviors, the related literature in psychology has pointed to a more robust negative impact of violence-induced trauma on subject behavior. In this note, we demonstrate that violence induces fear and anxiety and that fear reduces political engagement. We also point to an overlooked gap in both disciplines: fear, even when it has

no rational basis in prior direct exposure to physical violence or subjective expectations of future violence, can affect social and political behaviors and economic productivity. We are able to thread this needle by studying the impact of fear induced by troop movement while holding constant actual and expected exposure to violence. Isolating residual variation in fear uncovers a novel and important measure of war-induced trauma: how fear can influence political behaviors and attitudes even when it is an irrational emotional response, untethered from direct or subjective experiences of violence.

Our evidence strongly suggests that fear undermines political participation, even after controlling for direct and subjective exposure to violence. Feelings of fear about physical insecurity significantly decreases the likelihood the subject is registered to vote, intends to vote, relies on the government's formal court system to resolve legal disputes, trusts the government, and believes that the conflict will end in the next decade. Our findings illustrate that harm to civilians, physical or psychological, can undermine support for political institutions, potentially destabilizing emerging democracies.

Importantly, the core contribution of this paper is inherently international in scope. With more than one percent of the world's population currently displaced by political and economic turmoil and 19% of countries engaged in active civil conflicts, the potential for violence to induce fear, anxiety, and other debilitating mental health conditions is shockingly widespread. If fear undermines political development in these at-risk settings, the prospects for reliably resolving some of the longest running conflicts is bleak. Responding to these crises will involve more than winning battles through classical 'hearts and minds' techniques. It likely hinges on carefully evaluating how to address the largely hidden and poorly understood mental health issues that arise from war and persist even after conflicts end.

Despite the importance of addressing this topic, we recognize the inferential limitations of our approach. Using observational survey data to investigate this question requires careful interpretation. Violence is rarely randomized and emotional responses to fear are likely

correlated with factors that are difficult to observe or measure. While we cannot fully resolve these issues, we introduce a number of additional robustness checks that give us more confidence in the sign and magnitude of the effects that we estimate. Given the stability of our estimates in the presence of numerous robustness checks, it is highly unlikely that omitted factors sufficiently bias our estimates such that the true causal effects are null or, in line with the prior literature, positive. Still, it is important to interpret our results as descriptive evidence of a robust link between fear and political withdrawal in a highly salient policy and political context.

Insecurity and Fear during Conflict

Research on the political consequences of violence exposure has yielded mixed results. On one hand, physical insecurity may lead to political engagement following the cessation of conflict. Civilians affected by violence and former armed combatants exhibit higher levels of political participation than unexposed individuals (Bellows and Miguel, 2009; Blattman, 2009; Gilligan, Pasquale and Samii, 2014; Gneezy and Fessler, 2011) and exhibit greater pro-social behavior (Voors et al., 2012), particularly toward in-group members (Bauer et al., 2016). Recent victims of both petty and violent crime are also more likely to attend community and political meetings, have political conversations, hold leadership positions in organizations, and participate in political protests (Bateson, 2012; Nussio, 2019). These positive shifts in political engagement may be explained by a psychological mechanism defined as post-traumatic growth. When given appropriate time to reflect on the impact of past traumatic experiences, individuals may develop a greater appreciation for interpersonal relationships and seek purpose and forgiveness via political expression.

Yet the psychological consequences of continuous traumatic exposure could also have the opposite effect. Clinical research suggests that exposure to violence triggers feelings of

anxiety and hopelessness, causes short-term depression, and increases the likelihood that subjects exhibit symptoms of psychological disorders (Newnham et al., 2015; Riley et al., 2017). People experiencing insecurity may have heightened sensitivity to uncertainty, reducing their emotional and cognitive functions (Bogliacino et al., 2017).[1] These psychological impairments reduce economic productivity, undermine social ties, and may influence political behavior (Eysenck et al., 2007; Callen et al., 2014; Voytas and Crisman, 2019). Studies of violence around elections illustrates that armed attacks influence how politicians craft their campaigns, whether voters turn out, and for whom they vote (Berrebi and Klor, 2008; Condra et al., 2018; Getmansky and Zeitzoff, 2014).

Violence exposure may also normalize the use of interpersonal aggression to resolve conflicts (Guerra, Rowell Huesmann and Spindler, 2003), including in intimate relationships (Østby, Leiby and Nordås, 2019). Victims and perpetrators of violence typically experience a hardening of views toward out-groups, resulting in decreased support for peaceful compromise and a movement towards more hawkish or violent political action against perpetrators (Grossman, Manekin and Miodownik, 2015; Peffley, Hutchison and Shamir, 2015). Emotional responses to violence have also been found to increase pessimism about the prospects of peace-building and support for vigilantism while reducing approval for non-violent reconciliation (Vinck et al., 2007; Pham, Weinstein and Longman, 2004).

Our central aim in this research note is to identify factors that trigger fear and attempt to examine how physical insecurity and fear influence political behavior. We anticipate that fear will be closely linked to objective, direct measures of trauma exposure as well as subjective perceptions of insecurity. Clinical evidence from psychopathology suggests that how subjects perceive their physical state may have a greater influence on psychological responses and

[1]Evidence from neuroscience suggests fear induced by unpredictable trauma stimuli influences cognitive function, physical movement, and social connections even after the stimuli abate (Zovkic and Sweatt, 2013).

physical behavior than actual trauma (Braun-Lewensohn et al., 2009). Consequently, how individuals assess their security conditions may be more influential than objective measures of insecurity. We also expect that fear, even after accounting for direct and subjective measures of violence and insecurity, will be correlated with political behaviors. It remains unclear under what conditions trauma and fear lead to personal growth. If they do not, we expect fear will diminish political engagement.

Data and Design

We study violence exposure and fear in Afghanistan. Since 1973, the country has suffered from three major regime transitions, and, most recently, a widespread insurgency led primarily by factions associated with the Taliban government that Coalition forces deposed in 2001. A prominent mental health assessment among Afghans conducted during the early phases of the US-led occupation suggests psychological impairments due to violence exposure are acute (Cardozo et al., 2004). During 2010 (our sample year), 7,120 civilians were injured or killed during combat.[2] Exposure to violence continues to be widespread. As a taxi cab driver in Kabul put it, he felt "threatened by government troops, police, Taliban ethnic militias, and neighbors belonging to different ethic groups—in short, by almost everybody who was not his kin" (Badkhen, 2012). In response to such violence, the subjects we study may have adopted psychological coping mechanisms (Miller et al., 2008). Such coping strategies may mask the full extent to which civilians in less violent conflict settings are affected by combat. If true, we believe the relationships we identify in this paper are underestimated and may be more severe in other contexts.

We study Wave 8 of the Afghanistan Nationwide Quarterly Research (ANQAR) survey, collected in May and June 2010. The firm contracted to design and implement the survey

[2]See https://bit.ly/2S8ysv2 for additional details.

was the Afghan Center for Socio-Economic and Opinion Research (ACSOR, an Afghan subsidiary of D3). This firm administered ANQAR Waves 1 through 10 and 16 through 38 (present). Local (to the survey region) enumerators were selected by ACSOR and trained in proper household and respondent selection, recording of questions, appropriate interview techniques, and secure use of contact sheets. The administrative district is the primary sampling unit (PSU) and are selected via probability proportional to size (PPS) systematic sampling. Among sampled districts, secondary sampling units (villages/settlements) are randomly selected. A random walk method is used to identify select households and a Kish grid is use to randomize the target respondent within each selected household. Before administering a survey wave, ACSOR contacts local elders to secure permission for enumerators to enter sample villages.

Prior survey research on Afghanistan suggests that ANQAR may have been poorly administered. This work, primarily Blair, Imai and Lyall (2014), point to high refusal and non-contact rates (nearly 50%) observed during Wave 13, conducted in November to December 2011. It is important to note that ACSOR did not administer Waves 11 through 15. A separate firm that did not employ local (to region) enumerators and deviated from other ACSOR protocols conducted these waves. Although NATO did not keep records of participation and non-contact rates during Wave 8 (used in this study), we have been given access to data on these rates for ACSOR's subsequent rounds (16-38). We plot these in the Online Supporting Information (see Figure SI-1). ACSOR's cooperation rate exceeds 94% in all rounds, with an average of 96%. The refusal rate during this period never exceeds 5% (mean = 3.5%). The non-contact rate similarly ranges from 1.9% to 3.9% (mean = 3%). These are consistent with or better than national surveys conducted in the United States (such as ANES) and other developed countries (BHPS in the UK and HILDA in Australia). These diagnostic trends give us confidence in the overall design and implementation of the survey.

Our study is primarily focused on the links between violence exposure, fear, and political behaviors. We identify several measures of direct exposure to combat (government and insurgent), as well as subjective assessments of general village security. Because the scale of some measures vary, we ease interpretation by constructing a binary outcome for each instrument. Direct exposure to combat is pervasive: roughly 54% and 56% of sampled subjects report exposure to government and insurgent operations respectively. More than 18% of subjects report their village security situation is bad. We also incorporate several measures of economic volatility (family economic situation, food scarcity), corruption, and criminality.[3] 11% of sample subjects report that their family's economic situation has worsened in the past year, while 36% indicate that their household has experienced food scarcity during the same period. Strikingly, 55% state there is criminality in their community and 85% indicate that corruption impacts their daily life.

To measure fear, we rely on a survey instrument unique to Wave 8: feelings of fear by the presence of an armored vehicle in the respondent's vicinity. 34.8% of respondents report feeling scared or threatened by these vehicles, suggesting a potentially pervasive sense of anxiety when government forces are conducting operations. We anticipate that such emotions are closely linked to how subjects assess their physical security and may influence political outcomes. Measures of democratic participation include being registered to vote, intending to vote, having trust in the government, and the use of formal court systems. The authors note social desirability bias may also be at issue when utilizing self-reported survey data of intentions to vote.[4] To address this concern, we collect official voting data from the

[3]The literature on trauma psychiatry suggests these "daily stressors" likely mediate the link between war-time trauma and mental health (Miller and Rasmussen, 2010; Riley et al., 2017).

[4]We have found no empirical evidence suggesting a cultural aversion in Afghanistan to expressing feelings of fear. Similarly, we do not anticipate that subjects were likely to over-

election that occurred following the survey. We then compared turnout at the provincial level to the survey based measure in Figure 1. We plot province-level averages from the intent-to-vote survey question we use in the main analysis below (X axis) against official turnout in the province (weighted by voting age population) (Y axis). We next overlaid the line of best fit on the scatterplot. The correlation coefficient is 0.624 and intention-to-vote explains just over half of the variation in actual turnout in the subsequent election. Although we cannot make inferences about turnout at the individual level from these aggregate statistics, this exercise gives us more confidence that our measure of intent-to-vote is likely to map actual voting behavior quite accurately.

Figure 1: Intention-to-Vote against Turnout in 2010 Afghan Election



Notes: Figure displays province-level averages of pre-election intent-to-vote (from Afghanistan Nationwide Quarterly Research survey data) and official turnout (from publicly available Independent Election Commission of Afghanistan data), weighted by voting age population (from Afghanistan's Central Statistics Organization population estimates).

report their political engagement, given that no strong social norms exist for voting and the other political behaviors we study (Fisher, 1993; Karp and Brockington, 2005). However, we introduce a battery of tests which help us more convincingly address potential concerns about social desirability.

We first study the individual-level relationship between exposure to violence and feelings of fear. We then evaluate the impact of fear on political behaviors. We begin by studying equation 1:

$$y_i = \alpha + \beta_1 DirectExposure_i + \beta_2 SubjectiveExposure_i + \beta D_i + \beta X_i + \epsilon \quad (1)$$

Where y_i is the respondent's self-reported level of fear (feeling frightened or threatened) when armed vehicles are present in their vicinity. D_i indicates district level fixed effects and X_i is a vector of individual-level control variables. All models include age, age squared, gender, education, socio-economic status, and ethnicity as demographic controls. Additional control variables include exposure to corruption, criminality, and non-violent economic stressors. Robust standard errors are clustered by district. All models are adjusted using population sampling weights.

We then add fear as a right-hand side variable and estimate equation (2):

$$y_i = \alpha + \beta_1 DirectExposure_i + \beta_2 SubjectiveExposure_i + \beta_3 Fear_i + \beta D_i + \beta X_i + \epsilon \quad (2)$$

Where y_i is the respondent's self-reported level of political engagement. We focus on five outcomes: (1) whether the individual is registered to vote for the upcoming election, (2) plans to vote in upcoming election, (3) uses formal courts to resolve legal disputes, (4) has no trust in the Afghan government, and (5) believes the next generation of Afghans will be able to live in peace. In equations 1 and 2, we parameterize instrument non-response using a set of indicator variables. All other components of the model remain the same.

Crucially, the core model specification allows us to study the political consequences of fear while holding constant any correlation between fear and direct exposure to, and subjective assessments of, local violence. Since our model specifications include administrative district fixed effects, we are also holding fixed any common shocks (non-local violence, meso-level economic growth or recession) within regions. This approach enables us to more credibly

evaluate the link between fear (with no proximate violent causes) and political engagement.

Results

Table 1 reports the results from our main specifications (equations 1 and 2). In Column 1, the outcome of interest is our measure of fear. Respondent perceptions of village insecurity are positively correlated with feelings of fear, as is prior direct exposure to government operations and bombings. We find no effect of direct exposure to insurgent violence. Consistent with findings in psychiatry on how humans process trauma, the effect of subjective assessments of insecurity is larger in magnitude and more precise when compared to direct measures of violence exposure (Braun-Lewensohn et al., 2009).

In Columns 2-6, we investigate the impact of fear and exposure to violence on political engagement. We find strikingly consistent evidence that fear during war undermines participation in politics and related outcomes. Columns 2 and 3 suggest that fear is associated with approximately a 6% reduction in the probability a respondent is registered to vote or plans to vote. Fear also reduces the likelihood the respondent uses the government's formal court system by 3.6% (Column 4) and increases the likelihood the respondent has no trust in government by 5.5% (Column 5). In Column 6, we report fear is associated with a 5.4% decrease in self-reported beliefs that the next generation of Afghans (next 10 years) will live in peace.

We also find robust evidence of a negative relationship between subjective assessments of insecurity and political engagement. These effects are present after accounting for fearful emotions, suggesting that trauma exposure influences political behavior through channels other than anxiety. Columns 2-6 indicate that respondents reporting that their village security situation is poor are 14% less likely to be registered, 15.5% less likely to vote, use formal courts 5.4% less, report no trust in government 9.8% more, and are 22.8% less likely to be-

lieve peace will be attained in the next decade. We find no consistent relationship between direct measures of trauma exposure and political engagement.[5] This suggests that *after* controlling for direct exposure to violence, a significant relationship is still found between subjective trauma and political behavior.

[5]One exception is a positive correlation between exposure to insurgent violence and reported plans to vote in the upcoming election. This result is line with recent survey evidence regarding terrorist attacks in Spain (Balcells and Torrats-Espinosa, 2018). Another is an increased level of trust in government for the same condition.

Table 1: Impact of security perceptions on psychological well-being and political behavior, baseline specifications

	(1) Anxiety	(2) Registered	(3) Plan to Vote	(4) Formal Courts	(5) No Govt. Trust	(6) Future Peace
Village security situation bad (= 1)	0.138***	-0.140***	-0.155***	-0.0542**	0.0986***	-0.228***
	(0.0244)	(0.0276)	(0.0322)	(0.0247)	(0.0296)	(0.0276)
Govt. bombing operations (= 1)	0.0426**	-0.0105	-0.0306	0.00839	0.000128	-0.00719
	(0.0184)	(0.0200)	(0.0196)	(0.0210)	(0.0167)	(0.0160)
Insurgent violence exposure (= 1)	0.00125	0.0272	0.0337**	0.0299	-0.0352*	0.0209
	(0.0176)	(0.0180)	(0.0153)	(0.0202)	(0.0185)	(0.0201)
Feel threatened by armored vehicle (= 1)		-0.0604***	-0.0626***	-0.0365**	0.0556***	-0.0542***
		(0.0207)	(0.0163)	(0.0141)	(0.0176)	(0.0141)
N	10270	10301	10061	10227	10178	9901
Clusters	227	227	227	227	227	227

Notes: Outcome of interest in changes by column, see headings. Unit of analysis is individual survey respondent. All models include administrative district fixed effects (using ESOC boundaries), as well as demographic controls (age, education, gender, ethnicity, socio-economic status). Standard errors clustered at the district level and are presented in parentheses, stars indicate *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

Threats to Inference

Civilians rarely expose themselves to violence deliberately. How individuals cope with such traumatic events is also difficult to anticipate before exposure. Yet certain individuals are more likely to be exposed to combat violence than others. Similarly, the relationship between fear and politics may be confounded by latent support for armed actors opposing the government. From a survey design perspective, our findings may be biased if respondents do not respond honestly or if the quality of data collection was uneven (varied across villages or by enumerator). The uniquely rich details available in our survey data allow us to address these three concerns.

Exposure to Violence

A range of demographic factors might explain why some civilians are exposed to violence while others are not, including age, gender, ethnicity, socioeconomic status, and education. Recall, our baseline specification accounts for these conditions. The likelihood of exposure may also be correlated within districts. To address this concern, our main specification includes a district fixed effect.

If combat is more severe in rural areas, our district fixed effect is coarser than ideal. Although we do not know the exact locations of survey respondents, we do know whether their settlement is classified as rural. We add this fixed effect to our main specification in Table SI-1. Exposure to violence may be systematically higher in places where the government does not maintain territorial control. Respondents were asked which armed actor was in control of their area, which we include in Table SI-2. Trauma exposure may also be greater in areas that security forces patrol with greater frequency. We add measures of Afghan military and local police patrol frequency to the main specification in Tables SI-3 and SI-4. Individuals might be exposed to more violence if the security forces operating in their area

are inefficient or do not conduct themselves professionally. To address this concern, respondents were asked if the Afghan military or local police had done anything improper in their village in the past year. We incorporate these measures in Tables SI-5 and SI-6. Across all of these specifications, our main effects remain highly consistent.

Confounding Fear and Politics

The relationship between fear and politics may be confounded by preferences for Taliban rule. Individuals who support the Taliban insurgency may be particularly fearful in the presence of government forces. These individuals may also be less likely to engage in democratic politics, rely on government legal services, trust the government, and think that peace will be attained in the near future. Preferences for Taliban control may therefore confound the relationship we estimate in our main specification.

We assess support for rebel actors using a battery of direct and indirect measures. Respondents were asked directly whether a Taliban return to power would be good for the country and if things have gotten worse since the Taliban were removed from power. Individuals were asked if they would welcome former fighters back to their community and whether demobilized fighters could rejoin the society the government is trying to establish. We add these four measures to our main specification and report the results in Tables SI-7, SI-8, SI-9, and SI-10. If the relationship between fear and politics is largely confounded by preferences for Taliban rule, then our main results should weaken significantly in magnitude and become less precise. They do not. In certain models, our precision actually improves marginally.

Yet direct questions about preferences for Taliban rule or reintegration of former fighters are unlikely to fully reveal support for armed actors. We next rely on a set of indirect questions to generate a more complete profile of potential latent support. Respondents were asked for the top three reasons why *some* Afghans choose to support the Taliban. By asking

if others prefer the Taliban, the response may capture explanations for support that the individual might not reveal if the question had been about their own support. The list of reasons included intimidation and coercion, religious motivations, government corruption, nationalism, hatred of foreign forces, tribal ties, economic conditions, lack of justice, and unlawful governance. Using these responses, we construct a series of indicators for whether the respondent's list included any of the most frequent explanations for support: coercion, religion, corruption, nationalism, hatred for foreign forces, and tribal ties.

Responses were recorded separately, enabling us to identify which of the respondents provided three actual answers. Providing a substantive response for each of the three reasons might suggest the respondent has thought more about the question or, because of their latent preferences, can more easily explain why others (or they) support the Taliban. Alternatively, if someone responded substantively all three times but never listed intimidation and coercion as a cause for supporting the Taliban, it might suggest familiarity with the subject and a more positive view of Taliban sympathies (or sympathizers). We construct indicators for both of these "complete response" conditions.

We include these indirect measures of potential Taliban support in Tables SI-11, SI-12, and SI-13. Again, our main results are highly consistent, suggesting that the strong relationship we find between fear and political engagement is not driven by an omitted confounding variable: preferences for Taliban rule.

Survey Design and Bias

Surveys are difficult to conduct during war and responses among sampled subjects may be biased. The firm conducting our survey established ties to village elders prior to survey collection to enable enumeration even in contested areas. These factors likely explain why refusal and non-cooperation rates achieved by the firm in later ANQAR survey waves (when this data was available to the authors) are consistently low. Non-response rates on sensi-

tive questions were also consistently low and comparable to similar surveys conducted in Afghanistan using more robust indirect survey techniques. In our research design, we parameterize non-response to survey questions as a regressor, which allows us to identify and condition out some biases.[6] Next, we consider several other concerns about survey design and response reliability.

Survey respondents might be uncomfortable with the questions or, more generally, not understand the instruments. Enumerators were asked to record how comfortable the subject was with the interview and how much of the survey the respondent understood. We add these measures to the main specification in Tables SI-14 and SI-15. It might also be the case that subjects are less likely to respond truthfully if they are from a large household or if a large number of people are present during the interview. These indicators were recorded by the enumerators and are incorporated as controls for models in Tables SI-16 and SI-17. Local trust in the enumerator might increase as villagers see the enumerator throughout the day conducting interviews. We know which enumerators conducted interviews and the start time of each interview, allowing us to reconstruct the within-day sequence of data collection. We incorporate this measure in the baseline model in Table SI-18. Across these robustness checks, our main results are highly consistent.

Other Sensitivity Tests

We conduct a number of other miscellaneous sensitivity tests, which we list for brevity: (1) incorporating measures of the most frequent source of news as well as the source the subject trusts the most (Tables SI-19 and SI-20); (2) accounting for the perceived safety of students at school (Table SI-21); (3) incorporating a measure of generalized frustration with the central

[6]We find no systematic evidence that these parameters have explanatory power in our models.

government (Table SI-22); (4) supplementing our baseline measure of corruption with a direct question about whether the subject has paid *baksheesh* (a bribe) for government services in the prior year (Table SI-23); (5) incorporating a measure of general dissatisfaction with the quality of life (Table SI-24); (6) incorporating three supplemental measures of economic conditions: staple product price shocks, dependence on income from agricultural production, and assessment of community dependence on opium revenue (Tables SI-25, SI-26, and SI-27); and, (7) excluding Kabul (a population outlier) from the survey sample (Table SI-28).

Discussion

Survey evidence from Afghanistan suggests a robust descriptive link between fear during war and political engagement. Fear reduces democratic participation, undermines the function of judicial systems, fosters distrust of government, and increases feelings of pessimism regarding peace-building prospects. A similar relationship exists between subjective assessments of security and political behavior. These patterns consistently hold, even when accounting for numerous potential threats to inference. We conclude with a discussion of the broader significance of these results and implications for future research.

First, the evidence presented here suggests a way of reconciling findings from two separate but compatible research programs. Psychological research shows the negative and lasting psychological effects of trauma during war on well-being. Studies that focus on how exposure to wartime violence affects political and economic attitudes and behavior indicate increased pro-social tendencies and political participation. The survey evidence from Afghanistan that we present here indicates that it is fruitful to examine the effects of exposure to violence on outcomes of interest *separately* from the effects of fear, recognizing that these represent different routes through which war can have effects on individuals' attitudes and behavior. Information from others' surveys in this particular context illustrate this point. While Afghan

adolescents' most distressing lifetime trauma tended to be related to violence in a 2006 study, they also experienced trauma emanating from events and experiences separate and apart from exposure to violence (Panter-Brick et al., 2009). In prior work, it has been difficult to disentangle the downstream consequences of these different sources of trauma and fear. Our descriptive results here, however, highlight the importance of examining these distinct channels, most notably fear unrelated to violence exposure, and their potential consequences for political engagement.

Second, the relationships between exposure to violence and political attitudes that we document here are likely to last for some time. Civilian populations are especially susceptible to persistent mental stress after exposure to violence. This is due largely to little or no psychological preparation for the traumas of war. Non-combatants also often lack the mental health resources necessary to properly process traumatic events, exacerbating the impact of violent experiences (Riley et al., 2017). Indeed, we know that the effects of exposure to violence do not dissipate quickly. Identities that emerge from this exposure are transmitted through families and local institutions across generations, affecting the political and economic behavior and preferences of descendants who never actually experienced violence or trauma (Fouka and Voth, 2019; Lupu and Peisakhin, 2017; Rozenas and Zhukov, 2019).

Third, and unfortunately, these results are likely relevant beyond the war in Afghanistan, as civilian distress triggered by violence is widespread. Students in Beirut, Kosovar refugees, displaced Burmese and Yugoslavians, and community groups from Cambodia to Iraq all display significant levels of mental stress in psychological evaluation studies (Johnson and Thompson, 2008). The proportion of communities afflicted by war-induced mental disorders is striking, ranging from 17% in post-war Kosovo to 27% in Sri Lanka. Among displaced populations, levels of psychological distress are even higher, often exceeding 60% of study participants.

Given the pervasiveness of exposure to violence during war, our results present a challenge

for future research. How can democratizing states address mental health crises while waging war? This is an issue of first-order importance not only for civilians, but also for former combatants, who face the challenge of reintegrating into society after conflict ends. Trauma deeply affects victims of violence but it also results from participation in it (Pizarro, Silver and Prause, 2006), a finding replicated across multiple contexts (Laufer, Brett and Gallops, 1985; MacNair, 2002). As one scholar observes, "Victimized people tend to suffer from both PTSD and complex trauma. They feel diminished and vulnerable, seeing the world, other people, and especially members of groups other than their own as dangerous. Without healing, when there is new group conflict, it will be difficult for them to consider the needs of the other and to trust the other, and thereby to resolve conflict peacefully" (Staub, 2006, 872).

Failing to provide such services may undermine the most critical institutions states attempt to establish during political consolidation. Untreated psychological disorders might also jeopardize political stability even after fighting has ended. How governments tackle the psychological residue of war may have profound consequences for post-conflict reconstruction.

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A Survey Diagnostics and Supplemental Results

Figure SI-1: ANQAR diagnostics during waves conducted by firm collecting Wave 8 survey data (ACSOR)



(a) Refusal rate



(b) Non-contact rate



(c) Cooperation rate

Notes: data on refusal, non-contact, and overall cooperation were shared with the authors by NATO.

Table SI-1: Impact of security perceptions on psychological well-being and political behavior, with geographic (rural classification) fixed effect

	(1) Anxiety	(2) Registered	(3) Plan to Vote	(4) Formal Courts	(5) No Govt. Trust	(6) Future Peace
Village security situation bad (= 1)	0.141***	-0.140***	-0.155***	-0.0541**	0.0965***	-0.225***
	(0.0253)	(0.0276)	(0.0322)	(0.0247)	(0.0293)	(0.0277)
Govt. bombing operations (= 1)	0.0420**	-0.0106	-0.0304	0.00826	0.000747	-0.00779
	(0.0183)	(0.0200)	(0.0195)	(0.0210)	(0.0170)	(0.0160)
Insurgent violence exposure (= 1)	-0.00111	0.0275	0.0336**	0.0300	-0.0344*	0.0192
	(0.0182)	(0.0181)	(0.0153)	(0.0201)	(0.0183)	(0.0198)
Feel threatened by armored vehicle (= 1)		-0.0605***	-0.0619***	-0.0368**	0.0592***	-0.0570***
		(0.0209)	(0.0162)	(0.0144)	(0.0179)	(0.0142)
N	10270	10301	10061	10227	10178	9901
Clusters	227	227	227	227	227	227

Notes: Outcome of interest in changes by column, see headings. Unit of analysis is individual survey respondent. All models include administrative district fixed effects (using ESOC boundaries), as well as demographic controls (age, gender, ethnicity, socio-economic status). Standard errors clustered at the district level and are presented in parentheses, stars indicate *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

Table SI-2: Impact of security perceptions on psychological well-being and political behavior, accounting for government control of area

	(1) Anxiety	(2) Registered	(3) Plan to Vote	(4) Formal Courts	(5) No Govt. Trust	(6) Future Peace
Village security situation bad (= 1)	0.120***	-0.131***	-0.140***	-0.0501**	0.0883***	-0.226***
	(0.0261)	(0.0296)	(0.0319)	(0.0248)	(0.0290)	(0.0271)
Govt. bombing operations (= 1)	0.0366**	-0.00804	-0.0259	0.0100	-0.00350	-0.00655
	(0.0181)	(0.0198)	(0.0204)	(0.0211)	(0.0164)	(0.0158)
Insurgent violence exposure (= 1)	-0.000203	0.0272	0.0344**	0.0309	-0.0366*	0.0214
	(0.0172)	(0.0176)	(0.0154)	(0.0201)	(0.0188)	(0.0202)
Feel threatened by armored vehicle (= 1)		-0.0568***	-0.0563***	-0.0346**	0.0510***	-0.0531***
		(0.0197)	(0.0156)	(0.0143)	(0.0172)	(0.0147)
N	10270	10301	10061	10227	10178	9901
Clusters	227	227	227	227	227	227

Notes: Outcome of interest in changes by column, see headings. Unit of analysis is individual survey respondent. All models include administrative district fixed effects (using ESOC boundaries), as well as demographic controls (age, gender, ethnicity, socio-economic status). Standard errors clustered at the district level and are presented in parentheses, stars indicate *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

Table SI-3: Impact of security perceptions on psychological well-being and political behavior, accounting for military patrol frequency

	(1) Anxiety	(2) Registered	(3) Plan to Vote	(4) Formal Courts	(5) No Govt. Trust	(6) Future Peace
Village security situation bad (= 1)	0.138***	-0.139***	-0.154***	-0.0532**	0.0987***	-0.228***
	(0.0244)	(0.0277)	(0.0323)	(0.0246)	(0.0297)	(0.0276)
Govt. bombing operations (= 1)	0.0438**	-0.0117	-0.0318	0.00647	-0.0000467	-0.00730
	(0.0182)	(0.0200)	(0.0195)	(0.0212)	(0.0168)	(0.0159)
Insurgent violence exposure (= 1)	0.00235	0.0247	0.0319**	0.0283	-0.0351*	0.0206
	(0.0178)	(0.0184)	(0.0151)	(0.0191)	(0.0184)	(0.0205)
Feel threatened by armored vehicle (= 1)		-0.0592***	-0.0615***	-0.0351**	0.0558***	-0.0541***
		(0.0208)	(0.0162)	(0.0142)	(0.0175)	(0.0139)
N	10270	10301	10061	10227	10178	9901
Clusters	227	227	227	227	227	227

Notes: Outcome of interest in changes by column, see headings. Unit of analysis is individual survey respondent. All models include administrative district fixed effects (using ESOC boundaries), as well as demographic controls (age, gender, ethnicity, socio-economic status). Standard errors clustered at the district level and are presented in parentheses, stars indicate *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

Table SI-4: Impact of security perceptions on psychological well-being and political behavior, accouting for local police patrol frequency

	(1) Anxiety	(2) Registered	(3) Plan to Vote	(4) Formal Courts	(5) No Govt. Trust	(6) Future Peace
Village security situation bad (= 1)	0.138***	-0.139***	-0.154***	-0.0536**	0.0990***	-0.228***
	(0.0244)	(0.0279)	(0.0323)	(0.0246)	(0.0296)	(0.0276)
Govt. bombing operations (= 1)	0.0428**	-0.0110	-0.0309	0.00804	-0.000213	-0.00740
	(0.0186)	(0.0200)	(0.0196)	(0.0212)	(0.0167)	(0.0160)
Insurgent violence exposure (= 1)	0.00204	0.0263	0.0332**	0.0293	-0.0353*	0.0206
	(0.0174)	(0.0179)	(0.0152)	(0.0202)	(0.0185)	(0.0201)
Feel threatened by armored vehicle (= 1)		-0.0590***	-0.0615***	-0.0353**	0.0546***	-0.0542***
		(0.0214)	(0.0164)	(0.0140)	(0.0179)	(0.0141)
N	10270	10301	10061	10227	10178	9901
Clusters	227	227	227	227	227	227

Notes: Outcome of interest in changes by column, see headings. Unit of analysis is individual survey respondent. All models include administrative district fixed effects (using ESOC boundaries), as well as demographic controls (age, gender, ethnicity, socio-economic status). Standard errors clustered at the district level and are presented in parentheses, stars indicate *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

Table SI-5: Impact of security perceptions on psychological well-being and political behavior, accounting for security force misconduct

	(1) Anxiety	(2) Registered	(3) Plan to Vote	(4) Formal Courts	(5) No Govt. Trust	(6) Future Peace
Village security situation bad (= 1)	0.136***	-0.139***	-0.152***	-0.0499**	0.0916***	-0.218***
	(0.0245)	(0.0277)	(0.0316)	(0.0240)	(0.0289)	(0.0270)
Govt. bombing operations (= 1)	0.0422**	-0.00967	-0.0295	0.00980	-0.00147	-0.00551
	(0.0183)	(0.0201)	(0.0196)	(0.0209)	(0.0167)	(0.0153)
Insurgent violence exposure (= 1)	0.00227	0.0274	0.0331**	0.0286	-0.0326*	0.0175
	(0.0177)	(0.0177)	(0.0152)	(0.0200)	(0.0183)	(0.0203)
Feel threatened by armored vehicle (= 1)		-0.0606***	-0.0624***	-0.0362**	0.0549***	-0.0527***
		(0.0207)	(0.0162)	(0.0141)	(0.0174)	(0.0135)
N	10270	10301	10061	10227	10178	9901
Clusters	227	227	227	227	227	227

Notes: Outcome of interest in changes by column, see headings. Unit of analysis is individual survey respondent. All models include administrative district fixed effects (using ESOC boundaries), as well as demographic controls (age, gender, ethnicity, socio-economic status). Standard errors clustered at the district level and are presented in parentheses, stars indicate *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

Table SI-6: Impact of security perceptions on psychological well-being and political behavior, accounting for police force misconduct

	(1) Anxiety	(2) Registered	(3) Plan to Vote	(4) Formal Courts	(5) No Govt. Trust	(6) Future Peace
Village security situation bad (= 1)	0.128***	-0.139***	-0.147***	-0.0437*	0.0936***	-0.215***
	(0.0240)	(0.0260)	(0.0308)	(0.0244)	(0.0290)	(0.0267)
Govt. bombing operations (= 1)	0.0416**	-0.0105	-0.0303	0.00849	-0.000287	-0.00626
	(0.0185)	(0.0201)	(0.0196)	(0.0208)	(0.0168)	(0.0157)
Insurgent violence exposure (= 1)	0.00395	0.0273	0.0331**	0.0288	-0.0341*	0.0175
	(0.0175)	(0.0178)	(0.0155)	(0.0202)	(0.0186)	(0.0198)
Feel threatened by armored vehicle (= 1)		-0.0603***	-0.0605***	-0.0337**	0.0541***	-0.0496***
		(0.0216)	(0.0168)	(0.0138)	(0.0179)	(0.0142)
N	10270	10301	10061	10227	10178	9901
Clusters	227	227	227	227	227	227

Notes: Outcome of interest in changes by column, see headings. Unit of analysis is individual survey respondent. All models include administrative district fixed effects (using ESOC boundaries), as well as demographic controls (age, gender, ethnicity, socio-economic status). Standard errors clustered at the district level and are presented in parentheses, stars indicate *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

Table SI-7: Impact of security perceptions on psychological well-being and political behavior, incorporating measure of preference for Taliban return to power (direct)

	(1) Anxiety	(2) Registered	(3) Plan to Vote	(4) Formal Courts	(5) No Govt. Trust	(6) Future Peace
Village security situation bad (= 1)	0.139***	-0.136***	-0.151***	-0.0525**	0.0986***	-0.226***
	(0.0244)	(0.0273)	(0.0319)	(0.0248)	(0.0294)	(0.0272)
Govt. bombing operations (= 1)	0.0429**	-0.00977	-0.0300	0.00871	0.000327	-0.00683
	(0.0185)	(0.0201)	(0.0197)	(0.0209)	(0.0167)	(0.0159)
Insurgent violence exposure (= 1)	0.00115	0.0270	0.0334**	0.0298	-0.0352*	0.0205
	(0.0177)	(0.0179)	(0.0153)	(0.0203)	(0.0185)	(0.0197)
Feel threatened by armored vehicle (= 1)		-0.0608***	-0.0628***	-0.0366***	0.0555***	-0.0542***
		(0.0212)	(0.0166)	(0.0141)	(0.0176)	(0.0142)
N	10270	10301	10061	10227	10178	9901
Clusters	227	227	227	227	227	227

Notes: Outcome of interest in changes by column, see headings. Unit of analysis is individual survey respondent. All models include administrative district fixed effects (using ESOC boundaries), as well as demographic controls (age, gender, ethnicity, socio-economic status). Standard errors clustered at the district level and are presented in parentheses, stars indicate *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

Table SI-8: Impact of security perceptions on psychological well-being and political behavior, accounting for subject belief things have worsened since the Taliban were deposed

	(1) Anxiety	(2) Registered	(3) Plan to Vote	(4) Formal Courts	(5) No Govt. Trust	(6) Future Peace
Village security situation bad (= 1)	0.128***	-0.129***	-0.146***	-0.0495**	0.0879***	-0.213***
	(0.0242)	(0.0268)	(0.0328)	(0.0247)	(0.0283)	(0.0263)
Govt. bombing operations (= 1)	0.0441**	-0.0124	-0.0320	0.00741	0.00187	-0.00970
	(0.0188)	(0.0200)	(0.0199)	(0.0212)	(0.0167)	(0.0153)
Insurgent violence exposure (= 1)	0.00200	0.0263	0.0332**	0.0297	-0.0341*	0.0198
	(0.0170)	(0.0177)	(0.0155)	(0.0203)	(0.0187)	(0.0188)
Feel threatened by armored vehicle (= 1)		-0.0562***	-0.0595***	-0.0348**	0.0513***	-0.0483***
		(0.0213)	(0.0162)	(0.0141)	(0.0179)	(0.0140)
N	10270	10301	10061	10227	10178	9901
Clusters	227	227	227	227	227	227

Notes: Outcome of interest in changes by column, see headings. Unit of analysis is individual survey respondent. All models include administrative district fixed effects (using ESOC boundaries), as well as demographic controls (age, gender, ethnicity, socio-economic status). Standard errors clustered at the district level and are presented in parentheses, stars indicate *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

Table SI-9: Impact of security perceptions on psychological well-being and political behavior, accounting for subject's willingness to welcome back former fighters

	(1) Anxiety	(2) Registered	(3) Plan to Vote	(4) Formal Courts	(5) No Govt. Trust	(6) Future Peace
Village security situation bad (= 1)	0.138***	-0.138***	-0.154***	-0.0533**	0.0979***	-0.227***
	(0.0246)	(0.0276)	(0.0323)	(0.0243)	(0.0296)	(0.0276)
Govt. bombing operations (= 1)	0.0432**	-0.0116	-0.0315	0.00731	0.000756	-0.00864
	(0.0187)	(0.0201)	(0.0195)	(0.0210)	(0.0169)	(0.0162)
Insurgent violence exposure (= 1)	0.00182	0.0263	0.0329**	0.0285	-0.0348*	0.0185
	(0.0181)	(0.0184)	(0.0152)	(0.0198)	(0.0179)	(0.0210)
Feel threatened by armored vehicle (= 1)		-0.0594***	-0.0615***	-0.0357**	0.0550***	-0.0528***
		(0.0200)	(0.0157)	(0.0143)	(0.0169)	(0.0133)
N	10270	10301	10061	10227	10178	9901
Clusters	227	227	227	227	227	227

Notes: Outcome of interest in changes by column, see headings. Unit of analysis is individual survey respondent. All models include administrative district fixed effects (using ESOC boundaries), as well as demographic controls (age, gender, ethnicity, socio-economic status). Standard errors clustered at the district level and are presented in parentheses, stars indicate *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

Table SI-10: Impact of security perceptions on psychological well-being and political behavior, accounting for subject's belief that fighters can rejoin Afghan society

	(1) Anxiety	(2) Registered	(3) Plan to Vote	(4) Formal Courts	(5) No Govt. Trust	(6) Future Peace
Village security situation bad (= 1)	0.138***	-0.137***	-0.152***	-0.0530**	0.0962***	-0.227***
	(0.0248)	(0.0275)	(0.0319)	(0.0247)	(0.0295)	(0.0275)
Govt. bombing operations (= 1)	0.0426**	-0.0112	-0.0313	0.00803	0.000894	-0.00739
	(0.0185)	(0.0200)	(0.0194)	(0.0211)	(0.0169)	(0.0159)
Insurgent violence exposure (= 1)	0.00108	0.0278	0.0344**	0.0303	-0.0359*	0.0212
	(0.0174)	(0.0182)	(0.0152)	(0.0202)	(0.0184)	(0.0203)
Feel threatened by armored vehicle (= 1)		-0.0612***	-0.0632***	-0.0367**	0.0563***	-0.0546***
		(0.0201)	(0.0157)	(0.0142)	(0.0168)	(0.0136)
N	10270	10301	10061	10227	10178	9901
Clusters	227	227	227	227	227	227

Notes: Outcome of interest in changes by column, see headings. Unit of analysis is individual survey respondent. All models include administrative district fixed effects (using ESOC boundaries), as well as demographic controls (age, gender, ethnicity, socio-economic status). Standard errors clustered at the district level and are presented in parentheses, stars indicate *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

Table SI-11: Impact of security perceptions on psychological well-being and political behavior, accounting for explanations for Taliban support (indirect)

	(1) Anxiety	(2) Registered	(3) Plan to Vote	(4) Formal Courts	(5) No Govt. Trust	(6) Future Peace
Village security situation bad (= 1)	0.139***	-0.139***	-0.154***	-0.0531**	0.0960***	-0.227***
	(0.0244)	(0.0279)	(0.0325)	(0.0245)	(0.0297)	(0.0275)
Govt. bombing operations (= 1)	0.0420**	-0.0106	-0.0307	0.00815	0.00109	-0.00849
	(0.0183)	(0.0201)	(0.0199)	(0.0209)	(0.0166)	(0.0161)
Insurgent violence exposure (= 1)	0.00312	0.0259	0.0327**	0.0290	-0.0345*	0.0209
	(0.0178)	(0.0180)	(0.0155)	(0.0201)	(0.0180)	(0.0200)
Feel threatened by armored vehicle (= 1)		-0.0599***	-0.0614***	-0.0360**	0.0552***	-0.0541***
		(0.0208)	(0.0160)	(0.0140)	(0.0172)	(0.0142)
N	10270	10301	10061	10227	10178	9901
Clusters	227	227	227	227	227	227

Notes: Outcome of interest in changes by column, see headings. Unit of analysis is individual survey respondent. All models include administrative district fixed effects (using ESOC boundaries), as well as demographic controls (age, gender, ethnicity, socio-economic status). Standard errors clustered at the district level and are presented in parentheses, stars indicate *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

Table SI-12: Impact of security perceptions on psychological well-being and political behavior, accounting for subject response to full list of Taliban support rankings (indirect)

	(1) Anxiety	(2) Registered	(3) Plan to Vote	(4) Formal Courts	(5) No Govt. Trust	(6) Future Peace
Village security situation bad (= 1)	0.138***	-0.140***	-0.154***	-0.0542**	0.0985***	-0.228***
	(0.0242)	(0.0275)	(0.0319)	(0.0247)	(0.0296)	(0.0276)
Govt. bombing operations (= 1)	0.0426**	-0.0105	-0.0307	0.00840	0.0000770	-0.00726
	(0.0183)	(0.0199)	(0.0194)	(0.0210)	(0.0167)	(0.0160)
Insurgent violence exposure (= 1)	0.00218	0.0265	0.0323**	0.0302	-0.0344*	0.0203
	(0.0178)	(0.0180)	(0.0151)	(0.0203)	(0.0181)	(0.0198)
Feel threatened by armored vehicle (= 1)		-0.0600***	-0.0617***	-0.0367***	0.0550***	-0.0537***
		(0.0208)	(0.0160)	(0.0140)	(0.0173)	(0.0143)
N	10270	10301	10061	10227	10178	9901
Clusters	227	227	227	227	227	227

Notes: Outcome of interest in changes by column, see headings. Unit of analysis is individual survey respondent. All models include administrative district fixed effects (using ESOC boundaries), as well as demographic controls (age, gender, ethnicity, socio-economic status). Standard errors clustered at the district level and are presented in parentheses, stars indicate *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

Table SI-13: Impact of security perceptions on psychological well-being and political behavior, accounting for subject response to full list of Taliban support rankings while excluding coercion and intimidation by rebels (indirect)

	(1) Anxiety	(2) Registered	(3) Plan to Vote	(4) Formal Courts	(5) No Govt. Trust	(6) Future Peace
Village security situation bad (= 1)	0.138***	-0.140***	-0.155***	-0.0543**	0.0988***	-0.228***
	(0.0244)	(0.0277)	(0.0323)	(0.0247)	(0.0297)	(0.0275)
Govt. bombing operations (= 1)	0.0426**	-0.0105	-0.0308	0.00838	0.000169	-0.00714
	(0.0183)	(0.0200)	(0.0196)	(0.0210)	(0.0168)	(0.0160)
Insurgent violence exposure (= 1)	0.00129	0.0273	0.0338**	0.0299	-0.0352*	0.0208
	(0.0177)	(0.0180)	(0.0153)	(0.0202)	(0.0185)	(0.0201)
Feel threatened by armored vehicle (= 1)		-0.0605***	-0.0626***	-0.0365**	0.0558***	-0.0541***
		(0.0208)	(0.0164)	(0.0141)	(0.0176)	(0.0140)
N	10270	10301	10061	10227	10178	9901
Clusters	227	227	227	227	227	227

Notes: Outcome of interest in changes by column, see headings. Unit of analysis is individual survey respondent. All models include administrative district fixed effects (using ESOC boundaries), as well as demographic controls (age, gender, ethnicity, socio-economic status). Standard errors clustered at the district level and are presented in parentheses, stars indicate *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

Table SI-14: Impact of security perceptions on psychological well-being and political behavior, accounting for subject comfort with survey

	(1) Anxiety	(2) Registered	(3) Plan to Vote	(4) Formal Courts	(5) No Govt. Trust	(6) Future Peace
Village security situation bad (= 1)	0.139***	-0.139***	-0.153***	-0.0540**	0.0995***	-0.227***
	(0.0244)	(0.0272)	(0.0320)	(0.0247)	(0.0296)	(0.0276)
Govt. bombing operations (= 1)	0.0430**	-0.0101	-0.0300	0.00845	0.000469	-0.00658
	(0.0182)	(0.0200)	(0.0197)	(0.0210)	(0.0168)	(0.0159)
Insurgent violence exposure (= 1)	0.00122	0.0272	0.0337**	0.0299	-0.0352*	0.0209
	(0.0176)	(0.0180)	(0.0152)	(0.0202)	(0.0185)	(0.0201)
Feel threatened by armored vehicle (= 1)		-0.0606***	-0.0627***	-0.0365**	0.0555***	-0.0544***
		(0.0206)	(0.0162)	(0.0141)	(0.0177)	(0.0139)
N	10270	10301	10061	10227	10178	9901
Clusters	227	227	227	227	227	227

Notes: Outcome of interest in changes by column, see headings. Unit of analysis is individual survey respondent. All models include administrative district fixed effects (using ESOC boundaries), as well as demographic controls (age, gender, ethnicity, socio-economic status). Standard errors clustered at the district level and are presented in parentheses, stars indicate *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

Table SI-15: Impact of security perceptions on psychological well-being and political behavior, accounting for subject comprehension of survey instruments

	(1) Anxiety	(2) Registered	(3) Plan to Vote	(4) Formal Courts	(5) No Govt. Trust	(6) Future Peace
Village security situation bad (= 1)	0.138***	-0.139***	-0.153***	-0.0544**	0.100***	-0.229***
	(0.0242)	(0.0275)	(0.0321)	(0.0247)	(0.0297)	(0.0276)
Govt. bombing operations (= 1)	0.0427**	-0.0104	-0.0305	0.00837	0.000384	-0.00734
	(0.0183)	(0.0200)	(0.0197)	(0.0210)	(0.0168)	(0.0161)
Insurgent violence exposure (= 1)	0.00133	0.0276	0.0343**	0.0298	-0.0344*	0.0205
	(0.0176)	(0.0180)	(0.0152)	(0.0203)	(0.0185)	(0.0200)
Feel threatened by armored vehicle (= 1)		-0.0605***	-0.0626***	-0.0365**	0.0555***	-0.0542***
		(0.0207)	(0.0163)	(0.0141)	(0.0176)	(0.0141)
N	10270	10301	10061	10227	10178	9901
Clusters	227	227	227	227	227	227

Notes: Outcome of interest in changes by column, see headings. Unit of analysis is individual survey respondent. All models include administrative district fixed effects (using ESOC boundaries), as well as demographic controls (age, gender, ethnicity, socio-economic status). Standard errors clustered at the district level and are presented in parentheses, stars indicate *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

Table SI-16: Impact of security perceptions on psychological well-being and political behavior, accounting for household size

	(1) Anxiety	(2) Registered	(3) Plan to Vote	(4) Formal Courts	(5) No Govt. Trust	(6) Future Peace
Village security situation bad (= 1)	0.138***	-0.140***	-0.154***	-0.0545**	0.0989***	-0.228***
	(0.0245)	(0.0277)	(0.0324)	(0.0247)	(0.0297)	(0.0276)
Govt. bombing operations (= 1)	0.0427**	-0.0105	-0.0307	0.00841	0.000144	-0.00722
	(0.0182)	(0.0200)	(0.0196)	(0.0210)	(0.0167)	(0.0160)
Insurgent violence exposure (= 1)	0.00148	0.0271	0.0335**	0.0299	-0.0354*	0.0209
	(0.0178)	(0.0180)	(0.0153)	(0.0203)	(0.0186)	(0.0201)
Feel threatened by armored vehicle (= 1)		-0.0602***	-0.0621***	-0.0366***	0.0564***	-0.0543***
		(0.0208)	(0.0162)	(0.0141)	(0.0173)	(0.0141)
N	10267	10299	10058	10224	10175	9898
Clusters	227	227	227	227	227	227

Notes: Outcome of interest in changes by column, see headings. Unit of analysis is individual survey respondent. All models include administrative district fixed effects (using ESOC boundaries), as well as demographic controls (age, gender, ethnicity, socio-economic status). Standard errors clustered at the district level and are presented in parentheses, stars indicate *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

Table SI-17: Impact of security perceptions on psychological well-being and political behavior, accounting for number of individuals present during interview

	(1) Anxiety	(2) Registered	(3) Plan to Vote	(4) Formal Courts	(5) No Govt. Trust	(6) Future Peace
Village security situation bad (= 1)	0.138***	-0.140***	-0.154***	-0.0542**	0.0987***	-0.228***
	(0.0245)	(0.0276)	(0.0322)	(0.0246)	(0.0297)	(0.0276)
Govt. bombing operations (= 1)	0.0423**	-0.0105	-0.0304	0.00849	0.000252	-0.00731
	(0.0181)	(0.0200)	(0.0195)	(0.0210)	(0.0167)	(0.0160)
Insurgent violence exposure (= 1)	0.00128	0.0272	0.0337**	0.0299	-0.0352*	0.0209
	(0.0176)	(0.0180)	(0.0152)	(0.0202)	(0.0185)	(0.0201)
Feel threatened by armored vehicle (= 1)		-0.0604***	-0.0618***	-0.0363**	0.0560***	-0.0544***
		(0.0209)	(0.0162)	(0.0140)	(0.0177)	(0.0142)
N	10270	10301	10061	10227	10178	9901
Clusters	227	227	227	227	227	227

Notes: Outcome of interest in changes by column, see headings. Unit of analysis is individual survey respondent. All models include administrative district fixed effects (using ESOC boundaries), as well as demographic controls (age, gender, ethnicity, socio-economic status). Standard errors clustered at the district level and are presented in parentheses, stars indicate *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

Table SI-18: Impact of security perceptions on psychological well-being and political behavior, accounting for within-day sequence of interviews conducted by enumerator

	(1) Anxiety	(2) Registered	(3) Plan to Vote	(4) Formal Courts	(5) No Govt. Trust	(6) Future Peace
Village security situation bad (= 1)	0.138***	-0.139***	-0.154***	-0.0543**	0.0985***	-0.228***
	(0.0245)	(0.0276)	(0.0321)	(0.0246)	(0.0297)	(0.0276)
Govt. bombing operations (= 1)	0.0427**	-0.0108	-0.0306	0.00863	0.000442	-0.00759
	(0.0182)	(0.0201)	(0.0195)	(0.0209)	(0.0167)	(0.0160)
Insurgent violence exposure (= 1)	0.00124	0.0273	0.0337**	0.0299	-0.0352*	0.0209
	(0.0176)	(0.0180)	(0.0152)	(0.0202)	(0.0186)	(0.0200)
Feel threatened by armored vehicle (= 1)		-0.0603***	-0.0617***	-0.0364**	0.0558***	-0.0541***
		(0.0208)	(0.0161)	(0.0140)	(0.0177)	(0.0142)
N	10270	10301	10061	10227	10178	9901
Clusters	227	227	227	227	227	227

Notes: Outcome of interest in changes by column, see headings. Unit of analysis is individual survey respondent. All models include administrative district fixed effects (using ESOC boundaries), as well as demographic controls (age, gender, ethnicity, socio-economic status). Standard errors clustered at the district level and are presented in parentheses, stars indicate *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

Table SI-19: Impact of security perceptions on psychological well-being and political behavior, accounting for most common source of news

	(1) Anxiety	(2) Registered	(3) Plan to Vote	(4) Formal Courts	(5) No Govt. Trust	(6) Future Peace
Village security situation bad (= 1)	0.134***	-0.137***	-0.151***	-0.0505**	0.0981***	-0.228***
	(0.0243)	(0.0275)	(0.0320)	(0.0247)	(0.0298)	(0.0274)
Govt. bombing operations (= 1)	0.0410**	-0.00780	-0.0277	0.0106	-0.000228	-0.00728
	(0.0187)	(0.0200)	(0.0196)	(0.0210)	(0.0165)	(0.0157)
Insurgent violence exposure (= 1)	0.00368	0.0281	0.0329**	0.0287	-0.0344*	0.0209
	(0.0185)	(0.0183)	(0.0148)	(0.0202)	(0.0184)	(0.0200)
Feel threatened by armored vehicle (= 1)		-0.0593***	-0.0599***	-0.0329**	0.0549***	-0.0541***
		(0.0205)	(0.0159)	(0.0143)	(0.0168)	(0.0145)
N	10270	10301	10061	10227	10178	9901
Clusters	227	227	227	227	227	227

Notes: Outcome of interest in changes by column, see headings. Unit of analysis is individual survey respondent. All models include administrative district fixed effects (using ESOC boundaries), as well as demographic controls (age, gender, ethnicity, socio-economic status). Standard errors clustered at the district level and are presented in parentheses, stars indicate *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

Table SI-20: Impact of security perceptions on psychological well-being and political behavior, accounting for most trusted source of news

	(1) Anxiety	(2) Registered	(3) Plan to Vote	(4) Formal Courts	(5) No Govt. Trust	(6) Future Peace
Village security situation bad (= 1)	0.135***	-0.137***	-0.151***	-0.0524**	0.0998***	-0.227***
	(0.0235)	(0.0269)	(0.0313)	(0.0248)	(0.0298)	(0.0277)
Govt. bombing operations (= 1)	0.0413**	-0.00942	-0.0296	0.00950	0.000401	-0.00710
	(0.0180)	(0.0201)	(0.0194)	(0.0210)	(0.0166)	(0.0158)
Insurgent violence exposure (= 1)	0.00239	0.0290	0.0334**	0.0305	-0.0351*	0.0211
	(0.0182)	(0.0185)	(0.0149)	(0.0199)	(0.0186)	(0.0207)
Feel threatened by armored vehicle (= 1)		-0.0584***	-0.0585***	-0.0344**	0.0563***	-0.0532***
		(0.0209)	(0.0162)	(0.0142)	(0.0173)	(0.0141)
N	10270	10301	10061	10227	10178	9901
Clusters	227	227	227	227	227	227

Notes: Outcome of interest in changes by column, see headings. Unit of analysis is individual survey respondent. All models include administrative district fixed effects (using ESOC boundaries), as well as demographic controls (age, gender, ethnicity, socio-economic status). Standard errors clustered at the district level and are presented in parentheses, stars indicate *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

Table SI-21: Impact of security perceptions on psychological well-being and political behavior, incorporating additional subjective assessment of security (school safety)

	(1) Anxiety	(2) Registered	(3) Plan to Vote	(4) Formal Courts	(5) No Govt. Trust	(6) Future Peace
Village security situation bad (= 1)	0.127***	-0.132***	-0.142***	-0.0506**	0.0922***	-0.219***
	(0.0230)	(0.0282)	(0.0318)	(0.0254)	(0.0284)	(0.0270)
Govt. bombing operations (= 1)	0.0415**	-0.00980	-0.0297	0.00868	-0.000382	-0.00616
	(0.0188)	(0.0201)	(0.0199)	(0.0211)	(0.0168)	(0.0157)
Insurgent violence exposure (= 1)	0.00298	0.0262	0.0317**	0.0293	-0.0343*	0.0193
	(0.0169)	(0.0179)	(0.0155)	(0.0204)	(0.0187)	(0.0195)
Feel threatened by armored vehicle (= 1)		-0.0590***	-0.0593***	-0.0354**	0.0545***	-0.0520***
		(0.0204)	(0.0160)	(0.0140)	(0.0177)	(0.0142)
N	10270	10301	10061	10227	10178	9901
Clusters	227	227	227	227	227	227

Notes: Outcome of interest in changes by column, see headings. Unit of analysis is individual survey respondent. All models include administrative district fixed effects (using ESOC boundaries), as well as demographic controls (age, gender, ethnicity, socio-economic status). Standard errors clustered at the district level and are presented in parentheses, stars indicate *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

Table SI-22: Impact of security perceptions on psychological well-being and political behavior, accounting for general frustration with government

	(1) Anxiety	(2) Registered	(3) Plan to Vote	(4) Formal Courts	(5) No Govt. Trust	(6) Future Peace
Village security situation bad (= 1)	0.128***	-0.121***	-0.133***	-0.0393	0.0781***	-0.207***
	(0.0243)	(0.0267)	(0.0309)	(0.0242)	(0.0284)	(0.0272)
Govt. bombing operations (= 1)	0.0419**	-0.00987	-0.0295	0.00911	-0.0000242	-0.00674
	(0.0184)	(0.0197)	(0.0193)	(0.0209)	(0.0170)	(0.0159)
Insurgent violence exposure (= 1)	0.00200	0.0262	0.0323**	0.0291	-0.0342*	0.0199
	(0.0175)	(0.0178)	(0.0151)	(0.0201)	(0.0183)	(0.0201)
Feel threatened by armored vehicle (= 1)		-0.0561***	-0.0573***	-0.0331**	0.0510***	-0.0497***
		(0.0206)	(0.0160)	(0.0140)	(0.0178)	(0.0138)
N	10270	10301	10061	10227	10178	9901
Clusters	227	227	227	227	227	227

Notes: Outcome of interest in changes by column, see headings. Unit of analysis is individual survey respondent. All models include administrative district fixed effects (using ESOC boundaries), as well as demographic controls (age, gender, ethnicity, socio-economic status). Standard errors clustered at the district level and are presented in parentheses, stars indicate *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

Table SI-23: Impact of security perceptions on psychological well-being and political behavior, accounting for alternative measure of corruption (baksheesh payments)

	(1) Anxiety	(2) Registered	(3) Plan to Vote	(4) Formal Courts	(5) No Govt. Trust	(6) Future Peace
Village security situation bad (= 1)	0.137***	-0.140***	-0.155***	-0.0539**	0.0982***	-0.227***
	(0.0244)	(0.0277)	(0.0322)	(0.0245)	(0.0295)	(0.0273)
Govt. bombing operations (= 1)	0.0430**	-0.0100	-0.0297	0.00798	0.000530	-0.00873
	(0.0190)	(0.0195)	(0.0192)	(0.0213)	(0.0165)	(0.0155)
Insurgent violence exposure (= 1)	0.00158	0.0277	0.0348**	0.0294	-0.0347*	0.0193
	(0.0173)	(0.0181)	(0.0152)	(0.0203)	(0.0188)	(0.0200)
Feel threatened by armored vehicle (= 1)		-0.0638***	-0.0651***	-0.0329**	0.0531***	-0.0505***
		(0.0208)	(0.0166)	(0.0144)	(0.0181)	(0.0136)
N	10270	10301	10061	10227	10178	9901
Clusters	227	227	227	227	227	227

Notes: Outcome of interest in changes by column, see headings. Unit of analysis is individual survey respondent. All models include administrative district fixed effects (using ESOC boundaries), as well as demographic controls (age, gender, ethnicity, socio-economic status). Standard errors clustered at the district level and are presented in parentheses, stars indicate *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

Table SI-24: Impact of security perceptions on psychological well-being and political behavior, accounting for subject general dissatification with life

	(1) Anxiety	(2) Registered	(3) Plan to Vote	(4) Formal Courts	(5) No Govt. Trust	(6) Future Peace
Village security situation bad (= 1)	0.128***	-0.131***	-0.144***	-0.0493**	0.0884***	-0.210***
	(0.0251)	(0.0268)	(0.0316)	(0.0245)	(0.0293)	(0.0264)
Govt. bombing operations (= 1)	0.0421**	-0.0101	-0.0300	0.00891	-0.000465	-0.00668
	(0.0184)	(0.0198)	(0.0194)	(0.0211)	(0.0169)	(0.0162)
Insurgent violence exposure (= 1)	0.00151	0.0270	0.0334**	0.0299	-0.0349*	0.0208
	(0.0175)	(0.0179)	(0.0152)	(0.0204)	(0.0187)	(0.0200)
Feel threatened by armored vehicle (= 1)		-0.0579***	-0.0597***	-0.0352**	0.0530***	-0.0496***
		(0.0205)	(0.0162)	(0.0143)	(0.0173)	(0.0135)
N	10270	10301	10061	10227	10178	9901
Clusters	227	227	227	227	227	227

Notes: Outcome of interest in changes by column, see headings. Unit of analysis is individual survey respondent. All models include administrative district fixed effects (using ESOC boundaries), as well as demographic controls (age, gender, ethnicity, socio-economic status). Standard errors clustered at the district level and are presented in parentheses, stars indicate *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

Table SI-25: Impact of security perceptions on psychological well-being and political behavior, accounting for alternative daily stressor: staple good price shocks

	(1) Anxiety	(2) Registered	(3) Plan to Vote	(4) Formal Courts	(5) No Govt. Trust	(6) Future Peace
Village security situation bad (= 1)	0.139***	-0.139***	-0.154***	-0.0544**	0.100***	-0.229***
	(0.0246)	(0.0275)	(0.0322)	(0.0246)	(0.0298)	(0.0275)
Govt. bombing operations (= 1)	0.0429**	-0.0103	-0.0304	0.00857	-0.000263	-0.00684
	(0.0183)	(0.0199)	(0.0195)	(0.0210)	(0.0166)	(0.0160)
Insurgent violence exposure (= 1)	0.00129	0.0273	0.0337**	0.0297	-0.0343*	0.0202
	(0.0173)	(0.0180)	(0.0152)	(0.0202)	(0.0186)	(0.0200)
Feel threatened by armored vehicle (= 1)		-0.0610***	-0.0630***	-0.0365**	0.0551***	-0.0539***
		(0.0207)	(0.0162)	(0.0141)	(0.0181)	(0.0142)
N	10270	10301	10061	10227	10178	9901
Clusters	227	227	227	227	227	227

Notes: Outcome of interest in changes by column, see headings. Unit of analysis is individual survey respondent. All models include administrative district fixed effects (using ESOC boundaries), as well as demographic controls (age, gender, ethnicity, socio-economic status). Standard errors clustered at the district level and are presented in parentheses, stars indicate *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

Table SI-26: Impact of security perceptions on psychological well-being and political behavior, accounting for alternative daily stressor: dependence on agricultural sector

	(1) Anxiety	(2) Registered	(3) Plan to Vote	(4) Formal Courts	(5) No Govt. Trust	(6) Future Peace
Village security situation bad (= 1)	0.137***	-0.140***	-0.155***	-0.0540**	0.0988***	-0.228***
	(0.0241)	(0.0277)	(0.0324)	(0.0247)	(0.0297)	(0.0276)
Govt. bombing operations (= 1)	0.0421**	-0.0108	-0.0308	0.00860	0.000112	-0.00708
	(0.0180)	(0.0202)	(0.0198)	(0.0210)	(0.0167)	(0.0161)
Insurgent violence exposure (= 1)	0.00151	0.0274	0.0336**	0.0298	-0.0351*	0.0208
	(0.0173)	(0.0182)	(0.0153)	(0.0203)	(0.0184)	(0.0200)
Feel threatened by armored vehicle (= 1)		-0.0621***	-0.0639***	-0.0355**	0.0564***	-0.0536***
		(0.0209)	(0.0165)	(0.0140)	(0.0179)	(0.0137)
N	10270	10301	10061	10227	10178	9901
Clusters	227	227	227	227	227	227

Notes: Outcome of interest in changes by column, see headings. Unit of analysis is individual survey respondent. All models include administrative district fixed effects (using ESOC boundaries), as well as demographic controls (age, gender, ethnicity, socio-economic status). Standard errors clustered at the district level and are presented in parentheses, stars indicate *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

Table SI-27: Impact of security perceptions on psychological well-being and political behavior, accounting for alternative daily stressor: communal dependence on opium revenue

	(1) Anxiety	(2) Registered	(3) Plan to Vote	(4) Formal Courts	(5) No Govt. Trust	(6) Future Peace
Village security situation bad (= 1)	0.138***	-0.139***	-0.153***	-0.0526**	0.0978***	-0.227***
	(0.0246)	(0.0276)	(0.0320)	(0.0242)	(0.0295)	(0.0278)
Govt. bombing operations (= 1)	0.0424**	-0.00999	-0.0300	0.00958	-0.000271	-0.00637
	(0.0183)	(0.0199)	(0.0194)	(0.0207)	(0.0166)	(0.0160)
Insurgent violence exposure (= 1)	0.00181	0.0265	0.0324**	0.0279	-0.0341*	0.0194
	(0.0179)	(0.0180)	(0.0152)	(0.0197)	(0.0181)	(0.0202)
Feel threatened by armored vehicle (= 1)		-0.0599***	-0.0617***	-0.0353**	0.0546***	-0.0528***
		(0.0208)	(0.0161)	(0.0144)	(0.0171)	(0.0137)
N	10270	10301	10061	10227	10178	9901
Clusters	227	227	227	227	227	227

Notes: Outcome of interest in changes by column, see headings. Unit of analysis is individual survey respondent. All models include administrative district fixed effects (using ESOC boundaries), as well as demographic controls (age, gender, ethnicity, socio-economic status). Standard errors clustered at the district level and are presented in parentheses, stars indicate *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

Table SI-28: Impact of security perceptions on psychological well-being and political behavior, excluding Kabul from the sample

	(1) Anxiety	(2) Registered	(3) Plan to Vote	(4) Formal Courts	(5) No Govt. Trust	(6) Future Peace
Village security situation bad (= 1)	0.147***	-0.153***	-0.166***	-0.0543**	0.105***	-0.232***
	(0.0230)	(0.0262)	(0.0320)	(0.0254)	(0.0298)	(0.0277)
Govt. bombing operations (= 1)	0.0293*	-0.00697	-0.0211	0.0142	-0.00295	-0.0136
	(0.0158)	(0.0214)	(0.0197)	(0.0218)	(0.0176)	(0.0160)
Insurgent violence exposure (= 1)	-0.00999	0.0341*	0.0291*	0.0169	-0.0231	0.0383**
	(0.0179)	(0.0192)	(0.0168)	(0.0196)	(0.0177)	(0.0157)
Feel threatened by armored vehicle (= 1)		-0.0403**	-0.0488***	-0.0390**	0.0408***	-0.0450***
		(0.0171)	(0.0166)	(0.0167)	(0.0157)	(0.0148)
N	9641	9672	9434	9596	9562	9291
Clusters	226	226	226	226	226	226

Notes: Outcome of interest in changes by column, see headings. Unit of analysis is individual survey respondent. All models include administrative district fixed effects (using ESOC boundaries), as well as demographic controls (age, gender, ethnicity, socio-economic status). Standard errors clustered at the district level and are presented in parentheses, stars indicate *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.