

# Civilians, Control, and Collaboration during Civil Conflict\*

Luke N. Condra<sup>†</sup> and Austin L. Wright<sup>‡</sup>

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## Abstract

What affects civilian collaboration with armed actors during civil war? While theory and evidence confirm that harm by armed actors influences when and with whom civilians collaborate, we argue that collaboration is also a function of civilians' *perceptions* of armed actors' efforts to minimize collateral casualties. We test this argument using a series of nationwide surveys of Afghan civilians conducted quarterly between 2013-2015. Our data record civilian willingness to report roadside bombs to government authorities and perceptions of government and Taliban efforts to minimize civilian harm. Civilians are less (more) willing to collaborate with the government when they perceive the government (Taliban) carelessly using force, even after accounting for political sentiment, local security conditions, and a range of additional confounding factors. Moreover, our evidence suggests that perceived carelessness in the *rival's* area of control influences collaboration. We discuss how these empirical results inform broader literatures on collaboration, conquest, occupation, and control.

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<sup>†</sup>*Corresponding author.* Assistant Professor, Graduate School of Public and International Affairs, University of Pittsburgh, Pittsburgh, PA 15260. Email: [lcondra@pitt.edu](mailto:lcondra@pitt.edu)

<sup>‡</sup>Assistant Professor, Harris School of Public Policy, The University of Chicago, Chicago, IL 60637. Email: [austinlw@uchicago.edu](mailto:austinlw@uchicago.edu)

What affects civilian collaboration with armed actors during civil war? The strategic consequences of this civilian decision-making are extensively documented in the literature on foreign occupation and conquest (MacDonald, 2014), as well as civil conflicts in which governments battle insurgents for the support of the population (Berman et al., 2011). Across widely varying contexts, civilian collaboration with armed actors impacts the use of violence by combatants and, ultimately, the final outcomes of battles and wars.

While we now have empirical evidence corroborating the theory that harm to civilians affects willingness to collaborate (Condra and Shapiro, 2012; Shaver and Shapiro, forthcoming), we know substantially less about whether civilians' *perceptions* of armed actor behavior affect their willingness to collaborate. Specifically, do civilian perceptions of an armed actor's effort to avoid harm to civilians affect willingness to share valuable information about potential threats? Furthermore, how does collaboration due to armed actor abuse vary across zones of territorial control?

In this paper, we examine how Afghan civilians' perceptions of the level of effort that the government and insurgents exert to avoid civilian casualties affects civilians' self-reported willingness to engage in risky and meaningful collaboration with counterinsurgents: providing a tip regarding insurgent-emplaced Improvised Explosive Devices (IED). Using quarterly, nationally representative survey waves conducted in Afghanistan between 2013-2015, we test whether collaboration is affected by perceptions of armed actor abuse of civilians, and whether this effect is mediated by armed actor control of the territory in which the respondent lives, as theories of collaboration would suggest (Kalyvas, 2006). We focus on two main findings. First, civilian willingness to report IED deployment decreases as civilians perceive that the government is not doing enough to reduce civilian casualties, but increases as they believe insurgents are not doing enough. This relationship in the data is robust to controlling for a host of demographic, economic, security, and other factors. Second, we find that armed actor control of territory mediates the relationship between perceptions and will-

ingness to collaborate with the government. The negative relationship between willingness to collaborate and perceptions of low government effort is heightened in *insurgent*-controlled territory (but not government-controlled); symmetrically, the positive relationship between willingness to collaborate and perceptions of low insurgent effort is heightened in *government*-controlled territory (but not insurgent-controlled). Thus, perceptions that an armed actor does not exert sufficient effort to limit harm to civilians trigger different informational dynamics depending on which armed actor controls the territory: the government can expect even less collaboration in insurgent strongholds, while insurgents should fear even more collaboration in government-controlled areas. These insights remain as relevant as ever for the war in Afghanistan, in particular. As the U.S. continues to withdraw its forces, responsibility for counterterrorism and counterinsurgency in the country’s rural hinterland increasingly may fall to elite, CIA-trained and sponsored, Afghan strike forces. These units operate “with looser rules of engagement” in their raids, resulting in potentially devastating harm to civilians (Mashal, 2018). Such harm may enhance the popularity of the Taliban, undermining the broader state-building effort in Afghanistan.

In the next section, we review the literature on collaboration and conflict to motivate our empirical inquiry. We then describe the data and the empirical analysis of civilian decision-making in this context. We then review the main results as well as attempts to address threats to inference. A final section concludes with a discussion of the broader implications for our understanding of civilian collaboration in conflict.

## **Collaboration during War**

For centuries, civilian collaboration with rival armed actors has helped determine the outcome in numerous wars (Burbank and Cooper, 2010; Newbury, 2003; Robinson, 1972). Civilian collaboration actually enhances the effectiveness of armed actors’ military capabilities

and bolsters these actors' legitimacy in the eyes of the civilian population (MacDonald, 2014, 6-7,46-47). By providing critical information, "[i]nformants can help a conqueror identify potential allies as well as opponents. Agents can funnel intelligence about the size and location of enemy forces" (MacDonald, 2014, 55). Information was the colonialists' commodity of control, and ties with local elites shaped patterns of colonial governance across Africa (Boone, 2003), the Middle East, and the Indian subcontinent (MacDonald, 2014). As Bayly (1996, 1) argues, "[t]he quality of military and political intelligence available to European colonial powers was evidently a critical determinant of their success in conquest and profitable governance." Even a century later, colonial powers continued to rely crucially on information gathering networks in an effort to forestall violent rebellion, as illustrated in the British and French efforts in North Africa, Sudan, the Levant and Iraq (Thomas, 2008).

The strategic importance of this question is reflected not only in scholarship on international war and conquest, but emphasized in early counterinsurgency practitioners' arguments that connect civilian provision of information with military success (Galula, 1964; Kitson, 1971; Thompson, 1966). More recently, Kalyvas (2006, 90) notes that "[i]t is widely argued that the outcome of irregular war hinges on the behavior of civilians", and Lyall et al. (2015, 833) remark that "[i]nformation about insurgent groups is a central resource in civil wars: counterinsurgents seek it, insurgents safeguard it, and civilians often trade it." To gain access to this valuable information, governments compete with insurgents for civilian support using violence and public service delivery in irregular asymmetric civil conflicts (Berman and Matanock, 2015).

Perhaps the most well studied factor shaping civilians' willingness to collaborate with the government is suffering abuse at the hands of armed actors (Wood, 2008). Civilians may condition sharing of information with armed actors on harm resulting from violence, wielding information as a reward or punishment for treatment of civilians (Condra and Shapiro, 2012). Systematic empirical support for this argument is seen both in Iraq (Shaver and Shapiro,

forthcoming) and in Afghanistan (Wright et al., 2017), where civilians provide more (less) information to government when insurgents (government) inflict more harm on civilians. Though there are certainly exceptions (Lyall, 2009), generally, indiscriminate violence against civilians is strategically counterproductive in these contexts (Kalyvas, 2006; Kocher et al., 2011; Valentino, 2014).

How civilians respond to armed actor abuse may be tightly linked to which actor has established territorial control over their area. “Gaining control over an area brings collaboration, and losing control of an area brings much of that collaboration to an end” (Kalyvas, 2006, 119).<sup>1</sup> Specifically, Kalyvas (2006, 111) argues that “the higher the level of control exercised by a political actor in an area, the higher the level of civilian collaboration with this political actor will be.” Thus, territorial control may play a substantial mediating role in shaping collaboration in the aftermath of civilian casualties.

While we have good reason to believe that harm to civilians affects willingness to collaborate, we argue that the bulk of empirical scholarship on the dynamics of wartime informing has neglected two critical factors affecting civilian behavior: their *perception* of armed actors’ efforts to be discriminate in their use of force, and how these perceptions may be mediated by territorial control. Perceptions are central to theories of counterinsurgency. Our argument emanates from a core principle at the heart of “population-centric” counterinsurgency practiced in irregular asymmetric conflicts (Kalyvas and Balcells, 2010): the government should be perceived as legitimate in the eyes of the public (Lake, 2010). “[Establishing legitimacy] is, in fact, the second-most important requirement after physically securing the population” (Boot, 2013, 563).<sup>2</sup> Early counterinsurgency theorists argued that in order to es-

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<sup>1</sup>Similarly, Kalyvas and Kocher (2009) state: “the extent of collaboration [armed actors] can achieve hinges largely on the degree of control they are able to exercise.”

<sup>2</sup>Commanding the 101st Airborne Division in Iraq in 2003, General David Petraeus hung a sign at his headquarters that read, “We are in a race to win over the people. What have you and your element done to

Establishing legitimacy, governments had to attend to the psychological dimensions of the conflict. Establishing legitimacy is not only a problem for the government, but also for insurgents (Berman et al., 2011): “[it] is vital for any successful insurgency or counterinsurgency...[it] is a problem for insurgents as well” (Boot, 2013, 563-64). Moreover, there is evidence that perceptions of armed actor abuse do not correspond well with objective measures of harm against civilians in civil conflict. Lyall et al. (2013) compare declassified military records and original survey evidence regarding civilian casualties in Afghanistan. They find that beliefs and official records are often highly inconsistent. As Lyall et al. (2013, 696) argue, “civilian attitudes may represent a substantial omitted variable in most statistical accounts of civil war dynamics.”

While armed actor control of territory affects civilian collaboration in theories of these dynamics (Kalyvas, 2006), it is a notoriously difficult variable to measure. One approach is to use the ratio of troops or other relevant personnel belonging to an armed actor vis-a-vis the other in a given area (Galula, 1964, 87). Another measure is based on freedom of movement for each armed actor in an area (Kalyvas, 2006, 421), an approach used in studying the Vietnam War (Kocher et al., 2011). Or, one might use the level of observed incumbent-insurgent violence as a proxy, as the U.S. military has done in Afghanistan (Kilcullen, 2010).

But these approaches highlight three problems. First, some of these measures are of questionable validity. For example, if we observe low levels of insurgent-government violence, that could mean an area is *either* a government or insurgent stronghold. Second, it is often difficult to collect data for some of these measures (e.g., ratios of soldiers to insurgents, or freedom of movement). Third, even when such data are compiled, there is often considerable uncertainty surrounding their accuracy, sometimes because of the possibility of bias in data collection. An example of this problem comes directly from Afghanistan, where there is extreme divergence in the estimates on armed actor control of districts generated by the US

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contribute to that goal today?” (Boot, 2013, 538).

government, the Afghan government, and military analysts (Nordland et al., 2018). Which of these is the “right” set of estimates of armed actor control?

We take a different approach in light of these issues. We note that fundamental to theories of how control affects collaboration is who civilians *themselves* perceive to be in control, which may be different from armed actors’ assessments. We measure control of territory using local civilians’ own assessments. We do not claim that this measure is necessarily more accurate than objective measures, and lacking reliable and systematic data on troop locations and movements, we cannot compare them in this case. But we argue that since we are interested in how control might influence civilians’ attitudes and behaviors, civilians’ *own* assessments of armed actor control are meaningful metrics and provide some advantages over more objective measures of control.

To test our argument, we use a series of nationwide survey waves conducted in Afghanistan. Our data record civilians’ willingness to report information about roadside bombs to government authorities. This type of collaboration is a deeply meaningful outcome in this and similar contexts. IEDs have accounted for thousands of coalition fatalities since 2001 in Afghanistan.<sup>3</sup> Insurgents use IEDs not only to wound, but also to intimidate civilians and achieve political goals. Condra et al. (2018) provide evidence that IEDs emplaced along roads that connected villages to polling stations in the month leading up to the 2014 Afghan national election substantially depressed turnout. The surveys that we use also record civilians’ perceptions of how much effort insurgents and the government exert to try and minimize civilian casualties. We estimate the relationship between a civilian’s willingness to report and these perceptions, controlling for a series of other factors that could confound the results.

Next, we contribute to a literature that theorizes how variation in armed actor control of territory affects civilian collaboration in irregular asymmetric conflicts (Kalyvas, 2006).<sup>4</sup>

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<sup>3</sup>Available from: <http://icasualties.org/App/AfghanFatalities>. Last accessed: 7 February 2019.

<sup>4</sup>Like Kalyvas (2006, 112), we acknowledge that our empirical analysis does not provide estimates of the

We test this unconditional hypothesis empirically, and also investigate how armed actor control—as reported by survey respondents—might mediate the relationship between civilians’ perceptions of armed actors’ effort to minimize harm to civilians and civilians’ willingness to meaningfully collaborate with the government. In the next section, we turn to a description of the data and our empirical strategy for examining these dynamics.

## Data and Design

We study Waves 20 through 27 of the Afghanistan Nationwide Quarterly Research (AN-QAR) survey collected every quarter (three months) from May 2013 to March 2015, which constitutes eight total survey rounds. These are the only waves which include the core question about civilian collaboration.<sup>5</sup> ACSOR, an Afghan subsidiary of the international firm D3, was contracted to design and field the survey. ACSOR hired and trained local enumerators in household and respondent selection, how to correctly record answers to questions, culturally sensitive interview methods, and secure storage of contact information. The administrative district is the primary sampling unit. These sampling units are selected via probability proportional to size systematic sampling approach. After districts have been sampled, secondary sampling units composed of villages and settlements are randomly selected. A random walk method is used to identify target households and a Kish grid is used to randomize the respondent within each selected household. After the sampling set has been identified and before fielding a survey wave, ACSOR engages with local elders to secure permission for enumerators to enter sample villages.

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independent effect of control on collaboration, since “[t]here is little doubt that collaboration and control are self-reinforcing.”

<sup>5</sup>As such, results described below should be interpreted as indicative of civilian decision-making within this time period; we do not know whether results might be different earlier or later in the war. We thank an anonymous reviewer for this point.



Several diagnostics reveal that the surveys we use (20-27) in this study meaningfully capture public opinions. Participation and non-contact rates among ANQAR waves coordinated by ACSOR are low.<sup>6</sup> NATO granted the authors access to data on these rates for waves 16 through 38.<sup>7</sup> We plot these in Supporting Information (see Figure SI-1). ACSOR's cooperation rate exceeds 94% in all rounds, with an average of 96%. The refusal rate during this period never exceeds 5% (mean = 3.5%). The non-contact rate similarly ranges from 1.9% to 3.9% (mean = 3%). These are consistent with or better than national surveys conducted in the United States, such as the American National Election Studies, and other developed countries.<sup>8</sup> These diagnostic trends give us confidence in the overall design and implementation of the survey.

Our study is primarily focused on the link between civilian abuse during civil war and whether non-combatants will provide critical information about security threats to government security forces. IEDs pose a grave threat to civilians and security forces, and often are indiscriminate by design. Knowing when and where insurgents have emplaced IEDs is of profound interest to counterinsurgents and civilians may be well-positioned to share tips about potential roadside hazards. During the sample period, ANQAR included an instrument specifically focused on whether, if the subject witnessed an insurgent planting an IED, they were likely to report it to the security forces.<sup>9</sup> Across waves, roughly 43% of respondents

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<sup>6</sup>Blair et al. (2014) point to high refusal and non-contact rates (nearly 50%) observed during Wave 13, conducted in November to December 2011. It is important to note that ACSOR did not administer Waves 11 through 15. A separate firm that did not employ local enumerators and deviated from other ACSOR protocols conducted these waves.

<sup>7</sup>NATO does not have records on these rates prior to wave 16.

<sup>8</sup>For examples of other similarly scaled survey platforms, see the Household, Income and Labour Dynamics in Australia or British Household Panel Survey in the United Kingdom

<sup>9</sup>"If you knew that an IED had been planted, how likely would you be to report it to the local security forces?" See Table SI-5 for a list and coding of survey questions used in the empirical analysis.

indicated that they would provide such a tip.

ANQAR also includes questions about whether insurgents and, separately, Afghan security forces are doing enough to prevent civilian casualties.<sup>10</sup> During the course of our study, 9.4% of respondents stated that the government was doing nothing to prevent harm to non-combatants. 64%, on the other hand, report the same about insurgents. If these responses are truthful, this suggests a substantial gap between civilians' perceptions of combat operations conducted by each armed group. In our theoretical argument, we anticipate that the link between tips and civilian abuse is likely mediated by which armed actor controls the region where the subject lives. Our survey data include this information as well, classifying territorial control as being held by the government, insurgents (Taliban), or contested. 78% of respondents report that the government controls their area, whereas 15% state that insurgents maintain control. The remaining subjects (roughly 7%) live in contested zones.

Before proceeding to detailing the estimating equations, it is worth making several points about these descriptive statistics that should aid in interpretation of results below. The first is the considerable gap between respondents' perceptions that the government—relative to insurgents—is doing nothing to minimize harm to civilians. These figures are consistent with a survey conducted by the Asia Foundation in 2016 (Warren et al., 2016), which found that roughly 14% of civilians feel a lot of fear encountering the Afghan National Army, while 75% feel the same while encountering the Taliban.<sup>11</sup> This likely also reflects a distinction civilians draw between actors that initiate attacks which cause civilian harm and actors that cause collateral harm to civilians in responding to attacks. Second, given that the majority of respondents reside in government-controlled areas, the proportion of respondents willing to provide an IED-related tip (43%) may seem low to some readers. But even though the

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<sup>10</sup>“Do you think the insurgents/International Forces/ANDSF do enough to prevent the killing or injuring of civilians?”

<sup>11</sup>Q29, Warren et al. (2016).

risk associated with informing should be lower in government-controlled than contested or insurgent-controlled areas (Kalyvas, 2006), it is still considerable. Surveying the history of civilian collaboration with would-be external “conquerors”—like the U.S. in this case—MacDonald (2014, 47,52) observes: “collaboration can expose an individual to potential reprisals and detach them from traditional sources of patronage or prestige...the choice to align with an external conqueror can be quite risky. Collaboration can alienate an individual from traditional sources of power and patronage. Collaborators can be branded as traitors and face retribution. There is also no guarantee that a conqueror will adhere to their promises and provide anticipated spoils. Fear of exploitation by a foreign power or alienation from one’s own society can temper potential collaborators’ enthusiasm.”<sup>12</sup> Informing—no matter the context—is associated with significant costs and uncertainty for the collaborator.<sup>13</sup> Finally, one might be concerned that areas of insurgent control are under-represented in the data because they are more difficult for enumerators to access. While we note that survey

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<sup>12</sup>One such example is French civilians’ collaboration with the Vichy regime, which historical evidence indicates involved a much smaller percentage of the population than is often assumed (Sweets, 1986, 82-98). In part, this was because members of the French resistance made collaboration costly: “Not only did the Milician risk harm personally—through October 1943, 20 Milice had been killed and 135 wounded, and the number slain in southern France by the resistance rose to 85 by March 1944—but his family and children were ostracized at school or work, and along with him they were potential victims of the frequent bombings of the offices, stores, or private homes of Milice adherents...Because the Milice and the other ultracollaborationist organizations were most closely identified in the popular mind with the German cause, the retribution that followed the liberation not surprisingly fell swiftly and most heavily on their heads” (Sweets, 1986, 96-97).

<sup>13</sup>Others’ work suggests collaboration is costly specifically in Afghanistan. In an endorsement experiment designed to study determinants of wartime informing in Afghanistan, Lyall et al. (2015, 842) find that the median response to the question that they use as a measure of willingness to tip is “not participate” (Pashtuns) and “unlikely to participate” (Tajiks), which “suggest[s] that willingness tracks with our intuitive understanding of informing as a risky prospect that many individuals are unlikely to consider.”

enumerators attempt to collect responses from these areas directly and indirectly,<sup>14</sup> we think that the logic of this concern actually strengthens our argument in light of the empirical evidence detailed below. If this concern were valid, then any districts under insurgent control that appear in our data should be areas *least* controlled by insurgents, since the concern is that difficulty of enumerator access is increasing in insurgent control. Thus, we should treat the statistical estimates of the mediating effect of territorial control on behavior as lower bounds of the true average effect (i.e., if we also included possibly missing areas of strong insurgent control). This reasoning does not dispense entirely with the concern, but it does helpfully “sign the bias” in a way that aids interpretation of observational studies such as ours.

We first study the individual-level relationship between perceptions of civilian casualties that armed actors commit and willingness to report insurgent activity. We begin by estimating equation 1:

$$tip_i = \alpha + \beta_1 GovtNoEffort_i + \beta_2 InsNoEffort_i + \beta D_i + \beta W_i + \beta X_i + \epsilon \quad (1)$$

Where  $tip_i$  is the respondent’s willingness to report emplacement of an IED.  $D_i$  indicates district level fixed effects,  $W_i$  represents survey wave fixed effects, and  $X_i$  is a vector of control variables. All models include age, age squared, gender, education, socio-economic status, and ethnicity as demographic controls. Robust standard errors are clustered by district. All models are adjusted using population sampling weights.

We next add two measures of territorial control and their interactions with civilian perceptions of armed actor effort to avoid civilian casualties. We estimate equation (2):

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<sup>14</sup>When ACSOR cannot directly access sampled villages or districts, enumerators use intercept interviews to capture responses.

$$\begin{aligned}
tip_i = & \alpha + \beta_1 GovtNoEffort_i + \beta_2 InsNoEffort_i + \beta_3 GovtControl_i + \beta_4 InsControl_i \\
& + \beta_5 GovtNoEffort_i \times GovtControl_i + \beta_6 GovtNoEffort_i \times InsControl_i \\
& + \beta_7 InsNoEffort_i \times InsControl_i + \beta_8 InsNoEffort_i \times GovtControl_i \\
& + \beta D_i + \beta W_i + \beta X_i + \epsilon
\end{aligned} \tag{2}$$

Where  $tip_i$  is the respondent’s willingness to report insurgent emplacement of IEDs. Importantly, the base category for territorial control is ‘contested’, where neither actor is perceived to have more influence at the local level. In equations 1 and 2, we parameterize instrument non-response using a set of indicator variables. All other components of the model remain the same.

## Results

Table 1 reports the results from our main specifications (equations 1 and 2). In Column 1, we present the results of the basic model. We find evidence consistent with our theoretical argument. Government forces not doing enough to prevent civilian casualties decreases the probability the subject is likely to report insurgent activity by 10%. We find an asymmetric and similarly sized effect for perceptions of insurgent civilian casualties. If civilians believe rebels are not doing enough to avoid harming civilians, they are 11.5% more likely to share a tip with Afghan security forces.

We next consider how territorial control mediates the relationship between armed actor abuse and civilian collaboration. In Column 2, we interact these baseline measures with measures of which armed actor, if any, controls the subject’s area. In this model, the base terms should be interpreted as the impact of perceptions about armed actor effort to minimize civilian casualties in contested areas (when government and insurgent control equals zero).

We next turn our attention to comparing perceptions of actor effort in areas controlled by themselves versus their rivals. While a lack of government effort in government-held areas is negatively associated with the willingness to collaborate, it is statistically imprecise. The same effect in insurgent-controlled areas is more than twice as large in magnitude and highly statistically precise. We find similar evidence with respect to a perceived lack of insurgent effort to avoid civilian harm. This dynamic in areas that insurgents control is statistically indistinguishable from zero. On the other hand, in areas that the government controls, we estimate a large, very precise positive effect. In both cases, perceived abuse leads to differentially larger effects on civilian collaboration in areas that the rival controls. In principle, the effects of territorial control could work through several mechanisms. We emphasize one, which is consistent with other evidence on civilian collaboration in this context: the risks associated with informing.<sup>15</sup> We expect the risks that civilians face for providing intelligence to security forces are lower under government control and higher under insurgent control relative to contested areas where both actors have meaningful influence. These shifting risks compound the impact of perceived carelessness by armed actors.

We next add control variables to this interacted model. In Column 3, we control for political attitudes by including a measure of whether the Government is going in the wrong direction. To this model, we next add several measures of the local area's security (Column 4). It could be the case that police officers play a substantial role in influencing how civilians think about government security forces, so we include a dummy variable for weekly police patrols in the local area. We also include an indicator variable for perceived village insecurity, and another for increased Taliban strength in the previous 6 months. Our results are consistent, suggesting a robust link between civilian abuse, territorial control, and collaboration during civil war.

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<sup>15</sup>See discussion of collaboration risks in Data and Design.

Table 1: Impact of belief that armed actor tries to minimize civilian casualties on civilian's willingness to provide tips, baseline specifications

	(1) Basic Model	(2) Interacted Model	(3) Interacted Model w. Political Controls	(4) Interacted Model w. Political and Security Controls (Baseline)
Govt. No Effort	-0.103*** (0.00829)	-0.0640*** (0.0172)	-0.0583*** (0.0171)	-0.0559*** (0.0169)
Ins. No Effort	0.115*** (0.00703)	0.0623*** (0.0142)	0.0619*** (0.0139)	0.0644*** (0.0137)
Govt. Control		0.0582*** (0.0126)	0.0527*** (0.0125)	0.0417*** (0.0123)
Ins. Control		0.0685*** (0.0114)	0.0672*** (0.0113)	0.0612*** (0.0114)
Govt. No Effort × Govt. Control		-0.0291 (0.0185)	-0.0299 (0.0185)	-0.0265 (0.0184)
Govt. No Effort × Ins. Control		-0.0632*** (0.0235)	-0.0573** (0.0230)	-0.0531** (0.0226)
Ins. No Effort × Ins. Control		-0.00687 (0.0162)	-0.00856 (0.0160)	-0.0147 (0.0159)
Ins. No Effort × Govt. Control		0.0690*** (0.0136)	0.0656*** (0.0134)	0.0594*** (0.0134)
SUMMARY STATISTICS				
Outcome Mean	0.442	0.442	0.442	0.442
Outcome SD	0.497	0.497	0.497	0.497
PARAMETERS				
District FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Demographic Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Interacted Model	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Govt. going Wrong Direction	No	No	Yes	Yes
Police Patrols Weekly	No	No	No	Yes
Village Insecure	No	No	No	Yes
Taliban Gaining Strength	No	No	No	Yes
MODEL STATISTICS				
N	99666	99666	99666	99666
Clusters	377	377	377	377

Notes: Outcome of interest is willingness to report insurgents planting IEDs. Unit of analysis is individual survey respondent. All models include administrative district fixed effects (using ESOC boundaries), survey wave fixed effects, and demographic controls (age, education, gender, ethnicity, socio-economic status). *Govt going Wrong Direction*=1 if believes that Government is going in the wrong direction; *Police Patrols Weekly*=1 if police patrols local area at least weekly; *Village Insecure*=1 if local area security situation bad; *Taliban Gaining Strength*=1 if Taliban grown stronger in prior 6 months. Standard errors are clustered at the district level and presented in parentheses; \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$ , \*\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*  $p < 0.1$ .

## Main Threats to Inference

In this section, we address potential threats to inference. The relationship we identify in our main results might be complicated by trends in conflict and economic conditions near or directly affecting the survey respondent. It might also be the case that the relationship between civilian abuse and collaboration is confounded by latent preferences for local rule by insurgents. Our results might also be sensitive to a number of biases specific to survey data, including misrepresentation of preferences and heterogeneity in the quality of survey enumeration. We attempt to rule out each of these concerns, though we acknowledge that within this research design, we cannot rule out all potential confounding factors.

## Demographic and Economic Conditions

A range of demographic conditions might explain why some civilians respond strongly to harm that combatants inflict while others do not, including age, gender, ethnicity, socioeconomic status, and education. Whether insurgents (or government forces) carefully avoid civilian casualties may also vary from commander to commander across areas of operation (districts). These concerns are important and motivate our decision to incorporate demographic controls and administrative fixed effects in our baseline model specification. To account for any country-wide shocks—such as large-scale civilian massacres—we also incorporate survey wave fixed effects. Our main results rule out these immediate concerns to identification.

Local institutional and economic conditions also could influence how civilians respond to abuse. Corrupt, inept institutions might increase local support for insurgents. Poor economic conditions might also increase frustration with government and raise demand for a resolution of the conflict. We supplement the baseline model (Column 4, Table 1) with other measures of respondents' economic situation in Table 2. In Column 2, we control for self-reported



exposure to corruption. We do this because there is wide-ranging primary evidence that Afghan civilians view Afghan security forces as both corrupt and predatory (Giustozzi and Isaqzadeh, 2012), and these perceptions could affect citizens’ willingness to share sensitive information. We emphasize that we see this as another possible channel through which perceptions could affect behavior, distinct from perceptions of armed actors’ efforts to minimize harm to civilians in the context of battlefield violence. Put differently, civilians could at once believe that security forces are corrupt in their dealings with civilians but also believe that security forces try to minimize harm to civilians in the course of battling insurgent attacks (Condra et al., forthcoming). Nevertheless, controlling for respondents’ reported exposure to corruption should help to distinguish this potential behavioral channel from the one of interest in this study. Economic circumstances might also influence willingness to collaborate through financial incentives.<sup>16</sup> In Column 3, we account for whether the respondent’s family’s economic condition has worsened in the prior 12 months. There might also be a relationship between territorial control and opium production. This might bias how civilians respond to abuse in these areas. To account for this, we incorporate a measure of reported community dependence on opium production in Column 4. Across these specifications, we find evidence highly consistent with our main results.

Before moving on, we note that these results are consistent with work that focuses on the role that ethnic identity plays in such decision-making. Lyall et al. (2015) use endorsement experiments to investigate coethnic bias in wartime informing in Afghanistan and find evidence that respondents’ willingness to support a program “designed to elicit anonymous tips about the identities and activities of insurgents and nonsanctioned militia (arbaki) from locals” (Lyall et al., 2015, 837) is higher among Tajiks than Pashtuns and increases when the program’s (experimentally manipulated) endorser is a coethnic. These results inform our

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<sup>16</sup>For example, U.S. forces, through the Small Rewards Program, provided compensation for actionable intelligence.

model specifications, which control for respondent ethnicity, allowing us to focus attention on other factors of theoretical interest. But nothing in our results disputes the argument that ethnic identity plays an important role in this decision-making context.

## **Pro-Taliban Preferences**

The relationship between how people perceive the actions of armed actors and whether they share intelligence with government forces may be confounded by pro-insurgent sentiments. In particular, it may be the case that Taliban territorial control is endogenously bundled together with public support for the insurgency. Preferences for Taliban rule may therefore confound the relationship between perceptions of armed actor effort and information sharing in areas where the Taliban exert high, or low, levels of influence. Such a relationship might lead us to estimate an upwardly (downwardly) biased effect of abuse by government (insurgent) forces.

We account for this potential source of bias by including several control variables to the baseline model in Table 3. Respondents were asked directly if things have gotten worse since the Taliban were removed from power (Column 2) and whether a Taliban return to power would be good for the country (Column 3). If the respondent's willingness to report insurgent activity to the government is confounded by preferences for Taliban rule, then our main results should weaken significantly in magnitude and become less precise. They do not.

## **Survey Design and Enumeration**

Surveys are difficult to conduct during war and responses among sampled subjects may be biased. We probe the robustness of the main results when controlling for such possible bias in Table 4. The firm conducting our survey established ties to village elders prior to survey collection to enable enumeration even in contested areas. These factors likely explain why

Table 2: Impact of belief that armed actor tries to minimize civilian casualties on civilian's willingness to provide tips, accounting for economic conditions

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	Baseline Model	Baseline Model w. Corruption	Baseline Model w. Family Econ.	Baseline Model w. Opium Income
Govt. No Effort	-0.0559*** (0.0169)	-0.0554*** (0.0170)	-0.0554*** (0.0170)	-0.0505*** (0.0167)
Ins. No Effort	0.0644*** (0.0137)	0.0594*** (0.0137)	0.0594*** (0.0137)	0.0548*** (0.0135)
Govt. Control	0.0417*** (0.0123)	0.0358*** (0.0122)	0.0358*** (0.0123)	0.0329*** (0.0122)
Ins. Control	0.0612*** (0.0114)	0.0538*** (0.0113)	0.0538*** (0.0113)	0.0529*** (0.0112)
Govt. No Effort × Govt. Control	-0.0265 (0.0184)	-0.0265 (0.0185)	-0.0265 (0.0185)	-0.0285 (0.0183)
Govt. No Effort × Ins. Control	-0.0531** (0.0226)	-0.0549** (0.0226)	-0.0549** (0.0226)	-0.0570** (0.0224)
Ins. No Effort × Ins. Control	-0.0147 (0.0159)	-0.0120 (0.0159)	-0.0120 (0.0159)	-0.0129 (0.0157)
Ins. No Effort × Govt. Control	0.0594*** (0.0134)	0.0620*** (0.0135)	0.0620*** (0.0135)	0.0613*** (0.0133)
SUMMARY STATISTICS				
Outcome Mean	0.442	0.442	0.442	0.442
Outcome SD	0.497	0.497	0.497	0.497
MODEL PARAMETERS				
District FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Demographic Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Interacted Model	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Govt. going Wrong Direction	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Police Patrols Weekly	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Village Insecure	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Taliban Gaining Strength	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
ECONOMIC CONTROLS				
Corruption Exposure	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Family Econ. Worse	No	No	Yes	Yes
Rely on Opium Income	No	No	No	Yes
MODEL STATISTICS				
N	99666	99666	99666	99666
Clusters	377	377	377	377

Notes: Outcome of interest is willingness to report insurgents planting IEDs. Unit of analysis is individual survey respondent. All models include administrative district fixed effects (using ESOC boundaries), wave fixed effects, as well as demographic controls (age, education, gender, ethnicity, socio-economic status). Column 1 corresponds to Table 1, column 4. *Corruption Exposure*=1 if corruption affects daily life; *Family Econ. Worse*=1 if family's economic situation worsened in prior 12 months; *Rely on Opium Income*=1 if believes it not possible for Afghan farmers to provide for their families without growing poppies. Standard errors are clustered at the district level and presented in parentheses; \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$ , \*\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*  $p < 0.1$ .

Table 3: Impact of belief that armed actor tries to minimize civilian casualties on civilian’s willingness to provide tips, accounting for pro-Taliban preferences

	(1) Baseline Model	(2) Baseline Model w. Worse Since Taliban Overthrow	(3) Baseline Model w. Support Taliban Regime	(4) Baseline Model w. Overthrow Bad and Taliban Support
Govt. No Effort	-0.0559*** (0.0169)	-0.0512*** (0.0168)	-0.0531*** (0.0172)	-0.0487*** (0.0171)
Ins. No Effort	0.0644*** (0.0137)	0.0594*** (0.0135)	0.0596*** (0.0137)	0.0550*** (0.0135)
Govt. Control	0.0417*** (0.0123)	0.0365*** (0.0122)	0.0400*** (0.0122)	0.0350*** (0.0121)
Ins. Control	0.0612*** (0.0114)	0.0600*** (0.0113)	0.0651*** (0.0114)	0.0637*** (0.0113)
Govt. No Effort × Govt. Control	-0.0265 (0.0184)	-0.0253 (0.0183)	-0.0274 (0.0187)	-0.0262 (0.0185)
Govt. No Effort × Ins. Control	-0.0531** (0.0226)	-0.0504** (0.0225)	-0.0498** (0.0230)	-0.0474** (0.0229)
Ins. No Effort × Ins. Control	-0.0147 (0.0159)	-0.0156 (0.0159)	-0.0192 (0.0159)	-0.0198 (0.0158)
Ins. No Effort × Govt. Control	0.0594*** (0.0134)	0.0582*** (0.0132)	0.0584*** (0.0134)	0.0572*** (0.0132)
SUMMARY STATISTICS				
Outcome Mean	0.442	0.442	0.442	0.442
Outcome SD	0.497	0.497	0.497	0.497
PARAMETERS				
District FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Demographic Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Interacted Model	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Govt. going Wrong Direction	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Police Patrols Weekly	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Village Insecure	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Taliban Gaining Strength	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
TALIBAN SUPPORT				
Worse Since Overthrow	No	Yes	No	Yes
Taliban Return Good	No	No	Yes	Yes
MODEL STATISTICS				
N	99666	99666	99666	99666
Clusters	377	377	377	377

Notes: Outcome of interest is willingness to report insurgents planting IEDs. Unit of analysis is individual survey respondent. All models include administrative district fixed effects (using ESOC boundaries), wave fixed effects, as well as demographic controls (age, education, gender, ethnicity, socio-economic status). Column 1 corresponds to Table 1, column 4. *Worse Since Overthrow*=1 if personal situation worse since Taliban was overthrown; *Taliban Return Good*=1 if believes Taliban return to power would be good for Afghanistan. Standard errors are clustered at the district level and presented in parentheses; \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$ , \*\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*  $p < 0.1$ .

refusal and non-cooperation rates achieved by the firm in later ANQAR survey waves (when this data was available to the authors) are consistently low. Non-response rates on sensitive questions were also consistently low. In addition, survey respondents might be uncomfortable with the questions or, more generally, not understand the instruments. Enumerators were asked to record whether the subject was comfortable with and understood the interview questions (Column 2). It might also be the case that subjects are less likely to respond truthfully if a large number of people are present during the interview. This was recorded by the enumerators and is incorporated as a control in Column 3. Local trust in the enumerator might also increase as villagers see the enumerator throughout the day conducting interviews. We know which enumerators conducted interviews and the start time of each interview, allowing us to reconstruct the within-day sequence of data collection. We incorporate this measure in Column 4. Across these robustness checks, our main results are highly consistent.

We have focused discussion in this section on the main variables of interest. In the Supporting Information, we present the complete results (with confounding factors) from these tables (see Tables SI-1 to SI-4) and briefly discuss associations between control variables and our outcome of interest.

## Discussion

This paper highlights several gaps in the literature on civil war. Prior empirical work on civilian casualties focuses heavily on exposure to violence by armed actors, while neglecting a highly relevant factor influencing collaboration: civilian beliefs. During the fog of war, how civilians perceive attempts to avoid collateral harm to non-combatants is likely to be an important determinant of behavior but is usually difficult to study. Our primary contribution is to note this overlooked factor and to provide evidence that perceptions about armed actors' effort to minimize harm to civilians, even after accounting for local security condi-

Table 4: Impact of belief that armed actor tries to minimize civilian casualties on civilian's willingness to provide tips, accounting for survey design

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	Baseline Model	Baseline Model w. Survey Comfort and Comprehension	Baseline Model w. Number Present	Baseline Model w. Survey Sequence
Govt. No Effort	-0.0559*** (0.0169)	-0.0555*** (0.0169)	-0.0545*** (0.0168)	-0.0542*** (0.0168)
Ins. No Effort	0.0644*** (0.0137)	0.0641*** (0.0137)	0.0652*** (0.0136)	0.0651*** (0.0136)
Govt. Control	0.0417*** (0.0123)	0.0411*** (0.0123)	0.0416*** (0.0123)	0.0415*** (0.0123)
Ins. Control	0.0612*** (0.0114)	0.0610*** (0.0114)	0.0608*** (0.0114)	0.0606*** (0.0114)
Govt. No Effort × Govt. Control	-0.0265 (0.0184)	-0.0263 (0.0184)	-0.0276 (0.0183)	-0.0279 (0.0183)
Govt. No Effort × Ins. Control	-0.0531** (0.0226)	-0.0538** (0.0226)	-0.0540** (0.0225)	-0.0541** (0.0224)
Ins. No Effort × Ins. Control	-0.0147 (0.0159)	-0.0146 (0.0159)	-0.0151 (0.0159)	-0.0148 (0.0159)
Ins. No Effort × Govt. Control	0.0594*** (0.0134)	0.0597*** (0.0134)	0.0587*** (0.0134)	0.0587*** (0.0134)
SUMMARY STATISTICS				
Outcome Mean	0.442	0.442	0.442	0.442
Outcome SD	0.497	0.497	0.497	0.497
PARAMETERS				
District FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Demographic Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Interacted Model	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Govt. going Wrong Direction	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Police Patrols Weekly	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Village Insecure	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Taliban Gaining Strength	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
SURVEY DESIGN EFFECTS				
Understood/Comfortable Survey	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Number Present	No	No	Yes	Yes
Survey Seq. in Day	No	No	No	Yes
MODEL STATISTICS				
N	99666	99666	99666	99666
Clusters	377	377	377	377

Notes: Outcome of interest is willingness to report insurgents planting IEDs. Unit of analysis is individual survey respondent. All models include administrative district fixed effects (using ESOC boundaries), wave fixed effects, as well as demographic controls (age, education, gender, ethnicity, socio-economic status). Column 1 corresponds to Table 1, column 4. *Comfortable Survey*=1 if respondent felt comfortable with the survey; *Understood Survey*=1 if respondent understood the survey; *Number Present* is a count of individuals from respondent's household present during enumeration; *Survey Sequence in Day* is the order in the sequence of that day's enumeration (1-8). Standard errors are clustered at the district level and presented in parentheses; \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$ , \*\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*  $p < 0.1$ .

tions, substantially influence collaboration with government forces. Our results consistently point to an asymmetric response that validates prior theories of information sharing: harm by government forces reduces the public’s willingness to share information about potential threats, while harm by insurgents has the opposite effect.

These results also contribute to a broader literature that emphasizes the role that civilian behavior plays in armed actors’ competition for governance in these conflicts (Arjona, 2016; Wagstaff and Jung, 2017). First, the results highlight the importance of studying command-and-control strategies and structures of both government and insurgent actors (Heger et al., 2012). Commanders face a dilemma (Green, 2016): they must train their followers to wield deadly violence, but they must also encourage restraint toward civilians. In contexts where insurgents forcibly recruit members and use violence to build group cohesion (Cohen, 2013, 2016), or where governments must control militias (Stanton, 2015), this dilemma may be particularly difficult to resolve.

Second, we explore an important theoretical insight from Kalyvas (2006) that is notoriously difficult to study empirically: the mediating role of territorial control. This theoretical literature suggests that collaboration with government authorities varies with who controls an area and how they treat the local population. Our research design extends the logic of this argument to territory held by rivals. We overcome the challenge of measuring territorial control by collecting civilians’ own assessments of which armed actor has consolidated authority in their area. As we discuss above, perhaps the most meaningful metric of territorial consolidation is who civilians *believe* controls their area. We find strong evidence that perceived misconduct in an area reported as being controlled by an actor’s opponent triggers an even stronger response among potential collaborators. These results are consistent with the differential risks associated with civilian collaboration under government and insurgent control potentially magnifying the impacts of perceived grievances with armed actors.

These findings yield several potentially actionable insights for counterinsurgency policy.

The first regards decisions about the use of force (Crawford, 2013). Conventional wisdom is that the government should contest insurgent-controlled territory and move contested territory to government control. In Afghanistan, like other irregular asymmetric conflicts, both government and insurgents have publicly stated that they understand the importance of minimizing harm to civilians for successfully acquiring and maintaining control of territory. General Stanley McChrystal famously restricted soldiers’ ability to use force in an effort to reduce civilian casualties (Felter and Shapiro, 2017), and when General David Petraeus took over as commander of ISAF in 2010, he promised Congress that he would “continue the emphasis on reducing the loss of innocent civilian life to an absolute minimum in the course of military operations.”<sup>17</sup> As for insurgents, at least as early as 2006, Taliban leaders have issued public *layha* (code of conduct documents) directing their rank and file not to target civilians with violence and to limit harm to them (Condra et al., 2018). Our results reinforce this strategic thinking, but provide reason to be even more cautious about use of force decisions in rival-controlled territory because the strategic effects (in terms of information sharing) of civilians’ perceptions of armed actor behavior are even more consequential in this context. The risk that these results highlight is that government or insurgent-initiated harm to civilians can harden existing attitudes and perceptions in the rival’s territory, making it difficult to expand the “line of control.”

Our results also reinforce the need for governments to attend to the psychological dimension of policy—civilian perceptions—and help explain why rebels all over the world take so readily to social media. To establish legitimacy, it is not enough to minimize harm to civilians; governments have to ensure that civilians believe they are making strong efforts to do so, which may require investments separate and apart from policy concerning rules of engagement. While provision of security and other vital public services should help in this regard (Berman et al., 2011), governments may need to invest in shaping popular per-

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<sup>17</sup>Available from: <https://tinyurl.com/ydbayfmr>. Last accessed: 7 February 2019.



ceptions through what Kitson (1971, 78) called “psychological operations” and propaganda: “All too often successful government action in the civil and military field is rendered completely useless because the machinery for exploiting success in the minds of the people is non-existent.”

Finally, these results are relevant for thinking about the management of failed states, particularly with the recent uptick in civil wars terminating via negotiated settlement (Howard and Stark, 2018), requiring external actors to enhance the credibility of actors’ commitments to keep the peace (Walter, 1997). The international community faces strong incentives to govern as neo-trustees through “complicated mixes of international and domestic governance structures” (Fearon and Laitin, 2004, 7) that often involve multiple actors coordinating to provide security and governance. This approach to state rehabilitation is prone to failure for many reasons (Lake and Fariss, 2014), but an oft-repeated critique is that these coalitions and the governments they endorse lack popular legitimacy (Lake, 2010). Any successful rebuilding of such states’ governance capacity depends crucially on “restoring the legitimacy of the state’s monopoly of violence” (Lake and Fariss, 2014, 573), and our results suggest that perceived lack of government effort at minimizing harm to civilians leads to diminished state legitimacy in civilians’ eyes, as evidenced by their reduced willingness to collaborate meaningfully with the state.

Our results also dovetail with evidence from historical cases of foreign occupation and state-building—which mirror in many ways contemporary patterns of neo-trusteeship of failed states—that emphasize the importance of civilian collaboration, rather than military superiority, in successful governance (MacDonald, 2014). Foreign powers depended critically on the collaboration of the local population to effectively conquer the territory because of how local intelligence “provide[s] conquerors with new military capabilities, and enhance the capabilities they already possess” (MacDonald, 2014, 216). But conquerors also depended critically on civilian collaboration for the legitimacy this behavior lent to the occupier in

its quest to both conquer and govern: “Collaborators are critical because they provide aspiring conquerors access to local assets—including local resources, local information, and local legitimacy—that they would be unable to generate on their own, or unable to raise at reasonable cost in sufficient numbers. In this way, reliable local collaborators can help aspiring conquerors overcome the constraints imposed by the tyranny of distance...Accurate local intelligence allows conquerors to direct their military operations at their adversary’s vulnerabilities.” (MacDonald, 2014, 215-16). This paper provides evidence at the micro-level, and in a crucial case for this approach to state-building, that government efforts to legitimate their use of violence by minimizing harm to civilians is strategically beneficial.

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## A Supporting Information

In this Supporting Information, we present tables that show the estimated coefficients on control variables that are included in the models whose results are shown in Tables 1 to 4. In the main text, we explain the theoretical rationale for including each set of controls in the estimated models. These additional model parameters address potential concerns about omitted variables that may be correlated with civilians' perceptions of armed actor abuse and territorial control, potentially biasing our results. We exclude these model estimates from our main table to avoid confusion about the variables of interest. That said, the estimated correlations between these supplemental confounding factors and willingness to collaborate are generally consistent with our theoretical rationale for inclusion (see Tables SI-1 to SI-4).

Table SI-1 corresponds to Table 1 and presents results from our baseline specifications. As expected, a respondent that thinks the government is heading the country in the wrong direction is less likely to tip on an emplaced IED (column 3). Respondents living in areas with relatively high frequency police patrols (weekly) are more willing to tip (column 4). Willingness to tip is decreasing in village insecurity and increasing as the Taliban gains strength in the respondent's area (column 4) (holding insecurity and territorial control fixed). Table SI-2 corresponds to Table 2, accounting for economic conditions. Respondents who report that corruption affects their daily life (columns 2-4) are more likely to tip. Exposure to corruption is increasing with use of roads, which may heighten concerns about the hazards of roadside bombs. The belief that farmers cannot make a living without planting poppies (column 4) is associated with a reduced willingness to tip. There is no statistically significant estimated relationship between tipping and a family's worsening economic situation (column 3).

Table SI-3 corresponds to Table 3, accounting for pro-Taliban preferences. An individual who believes her personal situation has worsened since the overthrow of the Taliban is less

likely to tip, arguably in part because she likely has a stronger preference for the Taliban than the government relative to an individual whose situation has not worsened (columns 2 and 4). Similarly, an individual who believes a return to Taliban would be good for the country is less likely to tip relative to an individual who does not have such a preference for the Taliban (columns 3-4).

Finally, Table SI-4 corresponds to Table 4, accounting for aspects of the survey's design and enumeration. As one would expect, reporting being comfortable taking the survey is associated with higher willingness to tip (columns 2-4) (survey comprehension is positively associated with willingness to tip but is imprecisely estimated; columns 2-4). Willingness to tip is increasing in the number of people from the respondent's household present during enumeration, perhaps reflecting increasing pro-Government social desirability bias, though we cannot be sure (columns 3-4). Similarly, the later in the day the respondent is enumerated, the less willing he is to tip. It may be that comfort and familiarity with enumerators (which would increase with the amount of time enumerators are present in the village) emboldens respondents to reveal preferences that are less favorable toward the Government and more favorable toward the Taliban. Importantly, our main effects are highly consistent after taking these factors into consideration.



Table SI-1: Full Results of Table 1, baseline specifications

	(1) Basic Model	(2) Interacted Model	(3) Interacted Model w. Political Controls	(4) Interacted Model w. Political and Security Controls (Baseline)
Govt. No Effort	-0.103*** (0.00829)	-0.0640*** (0.0172)	-0.0583*** (0.0171)	-0.0559*** (0.0169)
Ins. No Effort	0.115*** (0.00703)	0.0623*** (0.0142)	0.0619*** (0.0139)	0.0644*** (0.0137)
Govt. Control		0.0582*** (0.0126)	0.0527*** (0.0125)	0.0417*** (0.0123)
Ins. Control		0.0685*** (0.0114)	0.0672*** (0.0113)	0.0612*** (0.0114)
Govt. No Effort × Govt. Control		-0.0291 (0.0185)	-0.0299 (0.0185)	-0.0265 (0.0184)
Govt. No Effort × Ins. Control		-0.0632*** (0.0235)	-0.0573** (0.0230)	-0.0531** (0.0226)
Ins. No Effort × Ins. Control		-0.00687 (0.0162)	-0.00856 (0.0160)	-0.0147 (0.0159)
Ins. No Effort × Govt. Control		0.0690*** (0.0136)	0.0656*** (0.0134)	0.0594*** (0.0134)
Govt. going Wrong Direction			-0.0615*** (0.00637)	-0.0545*** (0.00575)
Police Patrol Weekly				0.0819*** (0.00670)
Village Insecure				-0.0414*** (0.00842)
Taliban Gaining Strength				0.0153*** (0.00549)
SUMMARY STATISTICS				
Outcome Mean	0.442	0.442	0.442	0.442
Outcome SD	0.497	0.497	0.497	0.497
PARAMETERS				
District FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Demographic Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Interacted Model	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
MODEL STATISTICS				
N	99666	99666	99666	99666
Clusters	377	377	377	377

Notes: Outcome of interest is willingness to report insurgents planting IEDs. Unit of analysis is individual survey respondent. All models include administrative district fixed effects (using ESOC boundaries), survey wave fixed effects, and demographic controls (age, education, gender, ethnicity, socio-economic status). *Govt going Wrong Direction*=1 if believes that Government is going in the wrong direction; *Police Patrols Weekly*=1 if police patrols local area at least weekly; *Village Insecure*=1 if local area security situation bad; *Taliban Gaining Strength*=1 if Taliban grown stronger in prior 6 months. Standard errors are clustered at the district level and presented in parentheses; \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$ , \*\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*  $p < 0.1$ .

Table SI-2: Full Results of Table 2, accounting for economic conditions

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	Baseline Model	Baseline Model w. Corruption	Baseline Model w. Family Econ.	Baseline Model w. Opium Income
Govt. No Effort	-0.0559*** (0.0169)	-0.0554*** (0.0170)	-0.0554*** (0.0170)	-0.0505*** (0.0167)
Ins. No Effort	0.0644*** (0.0137)	0.0594*** (0.0137)	0.0594*** (0.0137)	0.0548*** (0.0135)
Govt. Control	0.0417*** (0.0123)	0.0358*** (0.0122)	0.0358*** (0.0123)	0.0329*** (0.0122)
Ins. Control	0.0612*** (0.0114)	0.0538*** (0.0113)	0.0538*** (0.0113)	0.0529*** (0.0112)
Govt. No Effort × Govt. Control	-0.0265 (0.0184)	-0.0265 (0.0185)	-0.0265 (0.0185)	-0.0285 (0.0183)
Govt. No Effort × Ins. Control	-0.0531** (0.0226)	-0.0549** (0.0226)	-0.0549** (0.0226)	-0.0570** (0.0224)
Ins. No Effort × Ins. Control	-0.0147 (0.0159)	-0.0120 (0.0159)	-0.0120 (0.0159)	-0.0129 (0.0157)
Ins. No Effort × Govt. Control	0.0594*** (0.0134)	0.0620*** (0.0135)	0.0620*** (0.0135)	0.0613*** (0.0133)
Govt. going Wrong Direction	-0.0545*** (0.00575)	-0.0544*** (0.00582)	-0.0542*** (0.00553)	-0.0508*** (0.00536)
Police Patrol Weekly	0.0819*** (0.00670)	0.0805*** (0.00659)	0.0805*** (0.00662)	0.0784*** (0.00664)
Village Insecure	-0.0414*** (0.00842)	-0.0427*** (0.00840)	-0.0425*** (0.00842)	-0.0406*** (0.00836)
Taliban Gaining Strength	0.0153*** (0.00549)	0.0132** (0.00547)	0.0133** (0.00536)	0.0142*** (0.00536)
Corruption Exposure		0.0698*** (0.00811)	0.0698*** (0.00809)	0.0620*** (0.00781)
Family Econ. Worse			-0.00123 (0.00661)	0.00163 (0.00661)
Rely on Opium Income				-0.0671*** (0.00618)
SUMMARY STATISTICS				
Outcome Mean	0.442	0.442	0.442	0.442
Outcome SD	0.497	0.497	0.497	0.497
PARAMETERS				
District FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Demographic Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Interacted Model	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
MODEL STATISTICS				
N	99666	99666	99666	99666
Clusters	377	377	377	377

Notes: Outcome of interest is willingness to report insurgents planting IEDs. Unit of analysis is individual survey respondent. All models include administrative district fixed effects (using ESOC boundaries), wave fixed effects, as well as demographic controls (age, education, gender, ethnicity, socio-economic status). *Corruption Exposure*=1 if corruption affects daily life; *Family Econ. Worse*=1 if family's economic situation worsened in prior 12 months; *Rely on Opium Income*=1 if believes it not possible for Afghan farmers to provide for their families without growing poppies. Standard errors are clustered at the district level and presented in parentheses; \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$ , \*\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*  $p < 0.1$ .

Table SI-3: Full Results of Table 3, accounting for pro-Taliban preferences

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	Baseline Model	Baseline Model w. Worse Since Taliban Overthrow	Baseline Model w. Support Taliban Regime	Baseline Model w. Overthrow Bad and Taliban Support
Govt. No Effort	-0.0559*** (0.0169)	-0.0512*** (0.0168)	-0.0531*** (0.0172)	-0.0487*** (0.0171)
Ins. No Effort	0.0644*** (0.0137)	0.0594*** (0.0135)	0.0596*** (0.0137)	0.0550*** (0.0135)
Govt. Control	0.0417*** (0.0123)	0.0365*** (0.0122)	0.0400*** (0.0122)	0.0350*** (0.0121)
Ins. Control	0.0612*** (0.0114)	0.0600*** (0.0113)	0.0651*** (0.0114)	0.0637*** (0.0113)
Govt. No Effort × Govt. Control	-0.0265 (0.0184)	-0.0253 (0.0183)	-0.0274 (0.0187)	-0.0262 (0.0185)
Govt. No Effort × Ins. Control	-0.0531** (0.0226)	-0.0504** (0.0225)	-0.0498** (0.0230)	-0.0474** (0.0229)
Ins. No Effort × Ins. Control	-0.0147 (0.0159)	-0.0156 (0.0159)	-0.0192 (0.0159)	-0.0198 (0.0158)
Ins. No Effort × Govt. Control	0.0594*** (0.0134)	0.0582*** (0.0132)	0.0584*** (0.0134)	0.0572*** (0.0132)
Govt. going Wrong Direction	-0.0545*** (0.00575)	-0.0475*** (0.00561)	-0.0538*** (0.00576)	-0.0470*** (0.00561)
Police Patrol Weekly	0.0819*** (0.00670)	0.0790*** (0.00659)	0.0813*** (0.00670)	0.0785*** (0.00659)
Village Insecure	-0.0414*** (0.00842)	-0.0335*** (0.00827)	-0.0388*** (0.00831)	-0.0313*** (0.00818)
Taliban Gaining Strength	0.0153*** (0.00549)	0.0198*** (0.00547)	0.0168*** (0.00555)	0.0211*** (0.00553)
Worse Since Overthrow		-0.0785*** (0.00677)		-0.0766*** (0.00670)
Taliban Return Good			-0.0546*** (0.0110)	-0.0513*** (0.0110)
SUMMARY STATISTICS				
Outcome Mean	0.442	0.442	0.442	0.442
Outcome SD	0.497	0.497	0.497	0.497
PARAMETERS				
District FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Demographic Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Interacted Model	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
MODEL STATISTICS				
N	99666	99666	99666	99666
Clusters	377	377	377	377

Notes: Outcome of interest is willingness to report insurgents planting IEDs. Unit of analysis is individual survey respondent. All models include administrative district fixed effects (using ESOC boundaries), wave fixed effects, as well as demographic controls (age, education, gender, ethnicity, socio-economic status). *Worse Since Overthrow*=1 if personal situation worse since Taliban was overthrown; *Taliban Return Good*=1 if believes Taliban return to power would be good for Afghanistan. Standard errors are clustered at the district level and presented in parentheses; \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$ , \*\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*  $p < 0.1$ .


Table SI-4: Full Results of Table 4, accounting for survey design

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	Baseline Model	Baseline Model w. Survey Comfort and Comprehension	Baseline Model w. Number Present	Baseline Model w. Survey Sequence
Govt. No Effort	-0.0559*** (0.0169)	-0.0555*** (0.0169)	-0.0545*** (0.0168)	-0.0542*** (0.0168)
Ins. No Effort	0.0644*** (0.0137)	0.0641*** (0.0137)	0.0652*** (0.0136)	0.0651*** (0.0136)
Govt. Control	0.0417*** (0.0123)	0.0411*** (0.0123)	0.0416*** (0.0123)	0.0415*** (0.0123)
Ins. Control	0.0612*** (0.0114)	0.0610*** (0.0114)	0.0608*** (0.0114)	0.0606*** (0.0114)
Govt. No Effort × Govt. Control	-0.0265 (0.0184)	-0.0263 (0.0184)	-0.0276 (0.0183)	-0.0279 (0.0183)
Govt. No Effort × Ins. Control	-0.0531** (0.0226)	-0.0538** (0.0226)	-0.0540** (0.0225)	-0.0541** (0.0224)
Ins. No Effort × Ins. Control	-0.0147 (0.0159)	-0.0146 (0.0159)	-0.0151 (0.0159)	-0.0148 (0.0159)
Ins. No Effort × Govt. Control	0.0594*** (0.0134)	0.0597*** (0.0134)	0.0587*** (0.0134)	0.0587*** (0.0134)
Govt. going Wrong Direction	-0.0545*** (0.00575)	-0.0544*** (0.00577)	-0.0542*** (0.00581)	-0.0540*** (0.00580)
Police Patrol Weekly	0.0819*** (0.00670)	0.0817*** (0.00671)	0.0819*** (0.00672)	0.0817*** (0.00670)
Village Insecure	-0.0414*** (0.00842)	-0.0409*** (0.00843)	-0.0405*** (0.00840)	-0.0406*** (0.00840)
Taliban Gaining Strength	0.0153*** (0.00549)	0.0153*** (0.00549)	0.0150*** (0.00544)	0.0149*** (0.00544)
Comfortable Survey		0.0223** (0.0113)	0.0233** (0.0114)	0.0230** (0.0114)
Understood Survey		0.00111 (0.0108)	0.00265 (0.0108)	0.00264 (0.0108)
Number Present			0.0110*** (0.00221)	0.0110*** (0.00221)
Survey Seq. in Day				-0.00270*** (0.000557)
SUMMARY STATISTICS				
Outcome Mean	0.442	0.442	0.442	0.442
Outcome SD	0.497	0.497	0.497	0.497
PARAMETERS				
District FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Demographic Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Interacted Model	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
MODEL STATISTICS				
N	99666	99666	99666	99666
Clusters	377	377	377	377


Notes: Outcome of interest is willingness to report insurgents planting IEDs. Unit of analysis is individual survey respondent. All models include administrative district fixed effects (using ESOC boundaries), wave fixed effects, as well as demographic controls (age, education, gender, ethnicity, socio-economic status). *Comfortable Survey*=1 if respondent felt comfortable with the survey; *Understood Survey*=1 if respondent understood the survey; *Number Present* is a count of individuals from respondent's household present during enumeration; *Survey Sequence in Day* is the order in the sequence of that day's enumeration (1-8). Standard errors are clustered at the district level and presented in parentheses; \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$ , \*\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*  $p < 0.1$ .

## B Survey Diagnostics and Primary Instruments


Figure SI-1: ANQAR diagnostics during waves conducted by firm collecting Wave 20-27 survey data (ACSOR)



(a) Refusal rate



(b) Non-contact rate



(c) Cooperation rate

Notes: data on refusal, non-contact, and overall cooperation were shared with the authors by NATO.

Table SI-5: Survey Instruments Overview

<b>Variable</b>	<b>Question</b>	<b>Coding (= 1 if)</b>
Collaboration (IED tips)	If you knew that an IED had been planted, how likely would you be to report it to the local security forces?	Very likely
Ins. No Effort	Do you think the insurgents do enough to prevent the killing or injuring of civilians?	No
Govt. No Effort	Do you think ANDSF does enough to prevent the killing or injuring of civilians?	No
Ins. Control	Between the two, the Anti-Government Elements and the Government, who has more influence in your mantaqa now?	Insurgent (AGE)
Govt. Control	Between the two, the Anti-Government Elements and the Government, who has more influence in your mantaqa now?	Government
Govt. going Wrong Direction	Generally speaking, do you believe the Government of Afghanistan is going in the right direction, the wrong direction, or is in the same place, not going anywhere?	Wrong Direction
Police Patrols Weekly	How often do you see the Police in your mantaqa?	At least weekly
Village Insecure	How is the security situation in your mantaqa? Good, fair, bad?	Bad
Taliban Gaining Strength	Over the past 6 months, do you think that the Taliban have grown stronger, grown weaker, or remained the same?	Yes
Corruption Exposure	Do you believe that corruption in the Government affects your daily life?	Yes
Family Econ. Worse	Has your familys economic situation gotten better, stayed the same or gotten worse compared to 12 months ago?	Worse
Rely on Opium Income	Do you think it is possible for Afghan farmers to provide for their families without growing poppies?	No
Worse Since Overthrow	How would you say things have changed for you since the time that the Taliban was in power? Have things gotten better, worse or remained the same?	Worse
Taliban Return Good	In your opinion, if the Taliban were to return to power and govern Afghanistan, would it be a good thing for the people and the country or would it be a bad thing for the people and the country?	Good